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THE TWO GERMAN STATES AND APARTHEID

As the crisis involving the apartheid state is intensifying, world attention is focussed on events there. Opposition to this pariah state has also become more pronounced around the globe, however, particularly on the part of anti-apartheid activities inside the Western industrialized countries. Meanwhile, the three countries most important to South Africa economically – the United States, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) – continue to maintain full diplomatic relations and to balk at efforts to impose mandatory economic sanctions (1). They thus support, at least tacitly, the continuation of the *status quo* inside South Africa.

This paper will look specifically at the relations of the FRG, as one of the principal economic and political partners, with the apartheid state. These relations will be contrasted with those existing between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the African National Congress (ANC), the oldest and now exiled South African anti-apartheid organization. As will be shown, anti-apartheid activities in the GDR are not limited to the work of small groups of dedicated political activities but instead have always been state policy. This paper will outline some of these activities and seek to assess their importance to the effort to abolish apartheid in South Africa. It will conclude by placing the relations of the two German states with South Africa into a larger context, arguing that, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, the GDR's support of the ANC cannot be equated with the general pattern of East-South relations, although the importance of the support in this present stage of anti-apartheid activities cannot be overestimated.

We will begin by looking briefly at the strikingly different ways in which the situation inside South Africa and its possible solution is analyzed by both German states.

The Problem: Two Opposing Views

The system of racial segregation called 'apartheid' in the language of the Afrikaner population of South Africa is generally viewed in the West as an excess in racial chauvinism on the part of the white minority population. Thus the problem is viewed as a *political* one which thus demands a *political* solution. Of the major business partners of the apartheid state, only the United States has declared limited economic sanctions and American companies have begun to disinvest some of their holdings in South Africa (2). The Bonn government, while agreeing with opponents of apartheid that constitutional changes are urgently needed, does not support economic sanctions against South Africa.

In terms of its opposition to apartheid, the Bonn government has had the same ambivalent approach which has characterized "opposition" on the part of the other Western powers. As early as 1968 then Foreign Minister Willy Brandt explained that his government makes a distinction between politics and economics, thus enabling it to trade with any country, irrespective of how disagreeable its politics might be. This, of course, he felt would let the West German government off the hook in terms of any criticism for cooperating with South Africa economically.

"Friedenspolitik" is the principle guiding Bonn's policies with the forces opposing apartheid, which means the renunciation of violence as a tool for bringing about political change. As stated by Chancellor Kohl in a major policy address, "It has been one of the most important lessons of German history in this century that war and violence may never become political tools. We reject violence as instruments of politics either domestically or internationally." (3) It is with this explanation also that the Bonn government has rejected the tactics employed by the ABC's military wing, *Umkhonto we Siswe* (Spear of the Nation), although the ANC itself has been allowed to maintain an office in Bonn since fall 1981. The Bonn government's main emphasis for resolving the conflict in South Africa has been to encourage the Pretoria government to enter into dialogue with black South African leaders — an approach similar to that of "constructive engagement" employed by the Reagan administration. The image which Bonn thus seeks to foster around the globe is that it strongly opposes the system of apartheid and is looking for a *peaceful* transition to a non-racist constitutional solution to the problem.

This approach is actually typical for the West, where debates have centered on the type of constitutional arrangement to follow the apartheid structures. When Andrew Young represented the USA in the United Nations, for example, he continuously pointed to the applicability of the American model for South Africa. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has also emphatically pushed a solution along these lines. Others, such as Chester A. Crocker, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, have argued in favor of finding entirely new models which would guarantee basic rights to all of South Africa's citizens, particularly the whites, of course, since they are numerically vastly outnumbered by Africans and Asians (4).

In the official East German perspective, on the other hand, the problem in South Africa is primarily an *economic* one, where the element of explicitly racist policies has been added to a general colonial theme of *economic* exploitation. This analysis, then, manifests itself as a cornerstone of the East's condemnation of the West: the linking of colonialism to racism. The SED's General Secretary, Erich Honecker, makes this point, which is repeated *ad infinitum* in the East German literature; i.e., that which binds the peoples of the East and the South is "the anti-imperialist struggle for peace, freedom, and social progress. It is in this that the fundamental concerns of real socialism and of the national and social liberation struggle intertwine. What binds us is firm solidarity against colonialism, racism, and apartheid, against imperialist tutelage and interference" (5).

In analyzing the problems facing the black population of South Africa, East German scholars are also quick to point out not only what they consider to be the colonial nature of that country's economic and political structure, but also the complicity of the West in establishing and maintaining it. Alfred Babing, the GDR's leading expert on South Africa, points to the "economic, political and strategic interests of imperialism in the racist bastion of South Africa" (6). Thus, while the West blames the stubborn resistance of the Afrikaner as the main reason for the continuation of legalized racism there, the East emphasizes the long history of complicity between white South Africa and three major Western countries in creating a structure designed to keep Africans in position of inferiority (7). This complicity is nurtured by solid economic interests: South Africa is one of the major suppliers of minerals to the West, including manganese, chrome, vanadium, platinum, and aluminum, not to mention gold and diamonds. On top of the country's vast mineral deposits, apartheid has proven a bonanza for foreign firms, who have benefitted enormously from the conditions imposed by apartheid (8). These multinational corporations found in South Africa near absolute labor tranquility, a large pool of migrant workers to choose from, until recently the absence of a trade union movement for black workers, and wage scales which enabled the extraction of superprofits (9).

Since apartheid in the view of the East thus is not simply the creation of racism made in Pretoria, but that of imperialism using racism as a mechanism of economic control, it follows that the resistance of Africans to apartheid is seen by the East as part of a global struggle against imperialism (10). The African National Congress, as the main resistance organization to have emanated from South Africa, is thus seen as a legitimate 'national liberation' movement and the East has consistently supported its efforts. Thus, while the main Western countries such as the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Great Britain have attempted to move the Pretoria government to seek constitutional ways of resolving the problem within a Western framework, to the ANC as well as its friends in Eastern Europe the abolition of apartheid must include a fundamental shift in *property* as well as political relations (11). Thus the major Western powers have, by and large, pursued a policy of 'constructive engagement' vis-a-vis the Pretoria government designed to bring about political reforms while, at least until very recently, leaving economic relations basically untouched (12). In contrast, the East has supported the ANC materially as well as diplomatically while withholding from the Pretoria regime any type of diplomatic recognition and eschewing any type of official economic relations with the apartheid state (13). East German as well as Soviet literature also points emphatically to the destabilizing role which the Pretoria government, with either the aid or the tacit approval of the major Western powers, plays in the entire Southern African Region (14).

The FRG and Apartheid

Ties between the two countries are extremely close and span the entire spectrum from diplomatic to economic as well as military relations. The latter, of

course, are clandestine in nature and thus by and large have to be deduced from other, principally economic, transactions (15). We will thus focus in this section mainly on political and economic relations between the two countries.

Political Relations. Bonn maintains full diplomatic relations with the Pretoria government, whose President, Botha, even paid a state visit to the Federal Republic in the summer of 1984. This naturally has earned Bonn the reputation throughout Africa of being a close friend and ally of the apartheid regime and has subjected West Germany to a lot of criticism (16).

Chancellor Kohl again sided with Pretoria in the eyes of black South Africans recently by sending the arch conservative Minister President of Bavaria, Franz Josef Strauss, as his personal envoy to Pretoria in January 1988. Strauss was very warmly received by the government but so alienated the black South African leadership that a visit by a West German parliamentary delegation to South Africa the following week had to be cancelled because these black leaders refused to meet them. Strauss only met with black leaders who actively support Pretoria's vision of a political solution to apartheid such as Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. He was also the first foreign political leader to pay an official visit to Bophuthatswana, a black homeland created by South Africa, the independence of which is not recognized by any country in the world, and called for diplomatic recognition of its sovereignty. Strauss ended his trip with a visit to Namibia where he held talks with the South African puppet government which also is not recognized officially by Bonn (17).

Nowhere, however, are relations between the FRG and Pretoria as close as in the economic sphere. West Germany, along with the United States and Great Britain, is one of the principal foreign economic partners of the apartheid state (18). We will now turn to a brief look at these activities.

Economic Relations. Within this rubric, activities can actually be broken down into several different categories, each having its own level of importance to the maintenance of apartheid. We will begin by looking at bilateral trade between the two countries.

a) *Bilateral Trade.* Inside West Germany, over 7,500 companies are involved in trade with South Africa (19). According to the Institute of European Economic Studies in London, these exports also keep 130,000 workers employed inside the Federal Republic (20). As reflected in the following table based on South African government statistics, trade between the two countries has steadily increased over the past two decades.

As reflected in the table, West Germany's importance to the South African economy is much more as a supplier of goods than a customer for South African products. In fact, in 1974 the FRG for the first time became the most important exporter to South Africa, a position previously held by Great Britain. Since then, the United States and the Federal Republic have competed for the number one spot, with Great Britain generally coming in third. Japan has also enormously increased its exports to South Africa and in 1983 actually pushed itself into the number three spot ahead of Great Britain.

South African Trade with the Federal Republic 1966 – 1985
(in million Rand)

Year	Imports	Exports
1966	176.0	68.9
1967	231.7	80.0
1968	253.7	101.3
1969	292.9	102.8
1970	372.4	109.1
1971	408.9	110.3
1972	411.1	132.6
1973	606.8	186.1
1974	926.8	337.2
1975	1,033.9	426.8
1976	1,057.6	367.5
1977	930.2	529.4
1978	1,274.8	682.2
1979	1,308.9	909.9
1980	1,853.4	814.7
1981	2,365.8	775.1
1982	2,708.7	865.4
1983	2,236.0	768.4
1984	3,425.8	977.7
1985	3,807.2	1,258.4

Source: Africa South of the Sahara, various years. Based on data provided by the Pretoria government and the South African Federated Chamber of Industries.

Great Britain has also lost its role as the principal recipient of South African goods, having been replaced by the United States. The US has consistently ranked number one in this category since the beginning of the eighties. West Germany is only a distant fourth or fifth in imports from South Africa.

The structure of trade between the two countries follows the usual North-South pattern; i.e., West Germany exports industrial goods in exchange for raw materials. Since South Africa holds some of the key minerals needed by Western industries – so-called 'strategic minerals' – there are many both in the West and inside South Africa who emphasize the crucial importance of these minerals for the West (21). Generally, these economic issues are couched in cold war rhetoric which emphasizes the role of the Republic of South Africa in the "Free World" and ominous scenarios are presented involving the Soviet Union's supposed desire to gain control over these mineral resources at the expense of the West. Here is a typical example of this type of thinking, which could well have been written by

the Pretoria government itself: "Is it possible to quantify the effects of a Russian take-over of the South African mineral industry on the prices of key strategic raw materials? ... It therefore appears that Russian domination of the South African mineral industry would greatly enhance the strategic position of the USSR, adversely affect the ability of the USA and its allies to obtain adequate and reliable supplies of many strategic raw materials, encourage other mineral producers to seek an accommodation with the USSR, and increase the price of many strategic minerals." (22)

The status quo thus must be maintained in this line of thinking because the alternatives spell nothing but economic and political trouble for the West.

As has been pointed out by many analysts, however, this may very well be enormously exaggerated. Alternate sources of mineral supplies are generally available but often not utilized because South Africa is able to supply them more cheaply (23). According to a recent study conducted for the Bonn government, only in case of suspension of supplies of six raw materials would serious difficulties arise for West German industry: chromium, cobalt, manganese, platinum, palladium, and vanadium. In terms of South Africa as a supplier, only chromium, vanadium, and platinum apply and would thus pose a problem in case of disruptions. Since alternate sources of supplies could be located if the need or political will to do so existed, the importance of South Africa as a supplier of 'strategic' raw materials to the Federal Republic is clearly exaggerated (24).

The same cannot be said, however, for the level of importance of West German goods for South Africa. As mentioned above, for about a decade now the Federal Republic has been a top supplier of the apartheid state. It is not the mere volume of this trade itself, however, that has come under the strongest attack by anti-apartheid forces around the world. What many find extremely worrisome in this regard is the *nature* of the goods exported, which often make distinctions between civilian and military use impossible. When confronted with this, Bonn has generally pleaded its case by arguing that it is impossible to make and enforce such a distinction for civilian products (25). The argument is not convincing. In its trade with the East, the West has clearly been able to make the connection between civilian technology and its military application by establishing a so-called COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Coordinating East-West Trade Policy) list, which bans the export of certain products because of their potential military use. In the case of South Africa, however, Western governments have been extremely lax in defining military use, despite a mandatory United Nations arms embargo. West Germany, as the main supplier of the apartheid state, thus plays a particularly large role in helping Pretoria arm against its own black population and neighboring African countries. As argued in a recent study on the Federal Republic and the UN arms embargo: "Much publicity has been given to South Africa's extensive efforts to establish a network of domestic arms production with backward linkages in the national industry ... Intensive public relations by Armscor, the government-controlled core of the South African arms industry, portray a domestic industrial capacity producing a full range of infantry weapons, armor, bombs and other sophisticated equipment in search of export markets. A closer

look reveals, however, that the arms sector is dependent on foreign machinery, imported technology and design, foreign exports and know-how as well as on numerous imported components that form part of weaponry 'made in RSA' ... The role of West German capital and industrial supplies in backing up South Africa's industrial strategy of import substitution in the arms sector and its backward linkages can hardly be underestimated." (26)

West Germany thus emerges as a chief ally in Pretoria's efforts to overcome the obstacles presented by the UN arms embargo. Exports to the RSA, then, contribute actively towards maintaining the power of the white regime.

West German exporters can seek federal insurance against possible financial losses through so-called Hermes credits. Exports to South Africa have constituted an important portion of Hermes guarantees over the years. According to one analyst, between 1961 and 1982 guarantees for exports to South Africa amounted to DM 14.8 billion. Fifty-eight percent of the goods went to ESCOM, the South African energy conglomerate which, among other things, operates a nuclear power station in Cape Town which is said to be actively involved in the South African military's nuclear program. Another eighteen percent of the credits were for goods earmarked for the state-owned SASOL I, II, and III, organizations which are involved not only in cutting edge research in the conversion of coal to oil but also in the production of military chemicals (27). In May 1987 Bonn underwrote a DM 32 million credit for exports undertaken by the Siemens corporation to South Africa. Apparently during 1987 it also granted three additional credits to ESCOM for an undisclosed amount (28). When criticisms inside West Germany began to be heard concerning these credits, Bonn's response was simply that economic sanctions will not solve the problem with apartheid! What this shows, however, is that West Germany is far more than a neutral bystander in area of economic cooperation between the two countries.

b) *Direct Foreign Investments*. In addition to this active trade record, there are more than three hundred subsidiaries of West German companies located in South Africa, employing roughly 65,000 workers (29). The precise amount invested by these firms in South Africa is impossible to determine. South Africa itself does not report foreign investments broken down by individual countries, but only by region. West German statistics vary, with some only listing initial investment amounts while others also include reinvested profits. For example, according to the South African Embassy in London, the Federal Republic had total direct investments of \$ 1.4 billion in South Africa in 1983 (30). According to the *Afrika-Verein*, a prestigious West German business association for economic relations with Africa, direct investments in 1983 (cumulative since 1952 but minus portfolio investments and reinvested profits) amounted to DM 1.06 billion (31). Since at this time the exchange rate between US dollars and the German Mark was roughly 3 : 1, the Afrika-Verein figures represent roughly one quarter of those provided by South Africa. No matter which figures one uses, however, West German direct foreign investments have steadily increased over the past several decades. In the early seventies the Bonn government ratified a double taxation agreement with Pretoria, effective retroactive to 1965, which gave a big boost to

West German direct foreign investments in South Africa. Between 1965 and 1980, direct investments in South Africa increased from DM 85.9 million to DM 710.5 million (32). According to the UN Centre on Transnationals, in 1983 alone these investments jumped by thirty percent, particularly in the automobile industry (33). In this regard, it has been particularly the Mercedes-Benz plant in Johannesburg which has made headlines because of poor labor relations with black workers. At the same time, intensive cooperation between this subsidiary and South African security forces has also been amply documented (34).

c) *Bank Credits.* West German banks are the most important credit source for South Africa, particularly in terms of medium and long-term loans to the government or to state-owned corporations (35). Overall, roughly sixty West German Banks are involved in extending loans to South Africa, mostly to the Pretoria government itself or to parastatal institutions inside the country (36). South Africa, which has some \$24 billion in foreign debts, has always been able to count on West German banks to approve loans for it, even as the crisis of the apartheid system has intensified in the eighties. For example, between 1982 and 1985 roughly one third of all public loans taken out by the Pretoria government were managed by West German banks. Again the recipients rank at the top of South Africa's military-industrial complex: The Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) received US \$ 367 million, South African Transport Services (SATS) US \$ 113.4 million, and the Department of Posts and Telecommunications (DPT) US \$ 93.3 million. An additional US \$ 306.3 million went to the Pretoria government for undisclosed purposes. Overall, roughly ten percent of South Africa's total foreign loan commitments were to West German banks, with one-third of these loans backed by guarantees from the Bonn government (37). There is evidence that West German banks have become even more active recently as they have been able to gain some business due to the gradual withdrawal of US banks from South Africa.

In looking at the overall package of economic and political relations between West Germany and South Africa, one thus is compelled to agree with the assessment made in a recent study: "The combination of voluminous industrial exports, industrial investments and lending to parastatal bodies that play a military-strategic role places the FRG into the position of a key supporter of the repressive military apparatus of the apartheid state" (38).

The Bonn government's pronounced commitment to "Friedenspolitik" thus appears nothing more than the homage vice pays to virtue. Bonn expects the oppressed black majority to maintain "peace" in the face of white intransigence, to make any substantial changes. On the other hand, its policies vis-a-vis the white regime actively aid in maintaining apartheid inside South Africa itself as well as in seeking to destabilize neighboring black African states by very unpeaceful means.

In contrast to the activities of the major Western powers, the German Democratic Republic and the other socialist countries have a steady record of helping the opponents of apartheid. As mentioned above, they do not maintain diplomatic relations with Pretoria, nor do they formally trade with it (39). They also

have consistently supported the African National Congress as the only legitimate representative of the South African majority (40). We will now turn to a brief discussion of how precisely the ANC is supported by the East by examining relations between that organization and the German Democratic Republic.

East German Relations with the African National Congress

Since no formal economic or political relations exist with South Africa, ties to the country thus have been limited to those with the main opposition organization against apartheid, the African National Congress. Since November 1978, the ANC, along with the Namibian independence movement, SWAPO, have had offices in East Berlin which are accredited through the Solidarity Committee of the GDR. Thus both organizations are accorded diplomatic recognition and their 'ambassadors' have received highest honors through the Solidarity Committee.

The ANC regularly receives support from the Berlin government, both inside the GDR and in various locations in Africa. For example, the Solidarity Committee (41) prints the ANC's monthly journal *Sechaba* and mails it to subscribers worldwide. East German journalists enter into agreements with the ANC to train journalists. East German women through their organization, the DFD, maintain close ties with ANC women. For example, they declared 1984 "Year of Solidarity with the Women of South Africa" and held special educational events throughout the GDR for the occasion. The East German trade union organization, the FDGB, trains ANC cadre at its union college in Berlin-Bernau and also sends solidarity goods to ANC camps in Africa. ANC youths are welcomed by East German youths through the FDJ, the East German youth organization, both for special events and in training courses at the youth college outside of Berlin. Young school children make collections of toys which are sent to ANC camps in Africa (42).

All of these activities are part of a coordinated policy of the East German government vis-a-vis the ANC, which it considers a movement of 'national liberation' and thus involved in an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle (43). Oliver Tambo, the president of the ANC, is thus accorded highest honors when he visits the GDR, as he does frequently, and he is invited to exchange fraternal ideas with Erich Honecker and other high-ranking government and party officials. The East German government likes to stress the common struggle against imperialism which unites the ANC and all of the countries of 'real socialism'.

Another important vehicle for showing solidarity with the ANC and the African population in South Africa has been through the United Nations. In 1973, for example, the UN called for an international decade of Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. The GDR immediately set up a special committee headed by Dr. Heinrich Toeplitz, president of the GDR's Supreme Court, and comprised of many other leading political figures and the Solidarity Committee. In May 1974, the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Committee held a meeting in East Berlin in honor of the efforts made by the GDR on behalf of the ANC. In 1976, the UN General Assembly adopted the *International Convention on the*

Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, again very much supported by the GDR. When the United Nations called the time from 21 March 1978 to 21 March 1979 as the International Anti-Apartheid Year, the GDR immediately set up a government commission, headed by Alfred Neumann, member of the Politbureau of the SED. The Solidarity Committee of the GDR is a member of both the presidium and secretariat of the UN's International Committee against Apartheid, Racism, and Colonialism in Southern Africa.

The GDR has thus consistently supported the ANC over the years. It has lent ideological as well as material support to the effort. It has sent much needed materials both to the "Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College" in Tanzania and to Lusaka, Zambia, where the ANC headquarters are located. These materials have included text books, medical supplies, food, office equipment, etc. The East German government has also sent material assistance to the liberation committee of the OAU in order to lend help to the struggle for the ending of apartheid in South Africa.

Summary and Conclusion

In looking at the ways in which West and East Germany treat the apartheid problem in South Africa, one is immediately struck by the enormously different approaches. As this brief article has sought to show, West Germany is very heavily involved with the apartheid state, both politically and economically, and has come under justified attack for complicity with South Africa's military as well. While there have certainly been voices inside West Germany that have called for less involvement with Pretoria, the position of consecutive West German governments — CDU or SPD alike — has been one of rhetorically denouncing apartheid as evil while continuing business as usual with the apartheid state.

On the other hand, support for the African National Congress in many ways is a picturebook situation for the GDR. The ANC is internationally recognized as the legitimate representative of black South Africa, both in the United Nations as well as in the Organization of African Unity OAU, whose own Liberation Committee actively supports the ANC's anti-apartheid efforts (44). The GDR, like its socialist brother countries, can count on being in the majority camp in the world community, thus giving it a chance to emphasize its practical commitment to "socialist solidarity". For the GDR, this fact has an additional element of importance since it sees itself locked into direct competition with the Federal Republic of Germany both globally and in the case of its own population. Support for national liberation movements, therefore, also has an important legitimization function inside the GDR itself. The leadership in East Berlin can point to sharing the view of an international majority, while the Bonn government, along with London and Washington, has been criticized for being among the closest allies of the Pretoria government.

Overall, the GDR's support for liberation movements, which often enjoy a high level of sympathy in the third world, has earned it a very positive image in

the global struggle against a postcolonial order considered by many to be fundamentally unjust. As the examples of Angola and Mozambique have shown, however, although the GDR's high level of support for the ANC and other liberation organization has important internal and external political and ideological functions, it is not typical for the general pattern of its relations with the decolonized South. Nor is the amount of help granted after independence commensurate with the importance of the assistance offered during the era of the anti-colonial struggle. This leads to the following concluding remarks:

1. As the process of decolonization has been almost completed globally, there are fewer and fewer organizations seeking to 'liberate' their region from *colonial* rule (45). Thus the world of 'national liberation', one of the cornerstones of East German foreign policy, is shrinking rapidly. This will necessarily mean a reduction in the revolutionary rhetoric emanating from Berlin.

2. Even during the era of decolonization, the GDR's policies were *reactive* rather than *initiating*; i.e., Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union were successful only if movements in the South chose a close alliance with them. This was mostly due to actions on the part of the West which drove liberation movements into close alliances with the East. Thus the East was never as eager to incite revolutions in the South as the leading analysts in the West, particularly in the United States, maintained. Instead, complex historical interactions between the West and the South culminated in conflicts from which the East was able to benefit ideologically and geopolitically. In other words, the East has been able to cash in on the mistakes made by the West. South Africa is a classic example of this. While the West is seen as an active supporter of, and participant in, the apartheid state, the East has thrown its support fully behind the anti-apartheid struggle. This has earned the East praise from the Third World.

3. Because of political decisions made by the East in the early seventies concerning its economic growth, this part of the world is now firmly embedded in the capitalist world economy. Both East and West thus behave as advanced industrialized countries which seek certain materials from the non-industrialized South. There is no indication that the GDR, or the other socialist countries, are pursuing a Third World policy intent on a radical restructuring of the existing international division of labor. Its trade relations with the developing countries follow the traditional North-South pattern, exporting finished goods for primary commodities. Since the prices are also based on those prevailing on the world market, this aspect of East-South relations does not differ fundamentally from those between West and South, official utterances to the contrary notwithstanding (46). It is precisely these trading practices that eventually even out the ideological advantages enjoyed by the East in the immediate aftermath of decolonization. In the case of South Africa, it can be assumed that any multiracial South African government would trade with both East and West on the basis of who offers it the best prices for its goods.

4. Even if the East's programs were aimed at helping Third World countries overcome their level of underdevelopment by radically restructuring the types of products exported by them, the *ability* of the East to do so is severely limited.

The GDR, just like the other socialist countries, simply lacks the economic resources to help underdeveloped countries in a sustained development drive independent of the advanced market economies. On top of that, the East itself is more integrated into the world capitalist economy than ever before and thus its own economic wellbeing depends on the continuation of the international economic status quo.

5. It is the great tragedy of the diplomacy pursued by the Western countries that they once again support a non-democratic regime and thus alienate those fighting against it. The argument advanced by the West that its needs for so-called 'strategic minerals', for example, will no longer be met once a black majority government comes into power in Pretoria seems rather unfounded. Even those governments in Africa with the most radically left-wing governments — Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe — continue to trade heavily with the West, despite their close political ties with the East (47). The United States continues to be Angola's most important trading partner, for instance, despite the fact that Washington has yet to grant the MPLA government diplomatic recognition and has once again begun to supply the opposition UNITA forces with military equipment, including Stinger missiles brought into the country clandestinely through Zaire. Both Angola and Mozambique have signed Lomé III with the European Community. Experience has thus shown, if anything, that the assumption that the West would be cut off from vital resources should a radical black government come to power is unfounded.

In conclusion, then, it has been argued in this paper that, by maintaining close political and economic relations with present South Africa, West Germany is pursuing a short sighted policy of short-term economic benefits. In granting tacit approval to the Pretoria government to carry out its apartheid policies the West has alienated not only the black population inside South Africa but also much of the Third World. Only now that the demands made by the black population are beginning to include more than reforms and in fact appear to be considering various revolutionary options threatening to bring down not only the apartheid structure but private enterprise as well, the Western countries have begun to put mild pressures on the Pretoria government. The time for reforms may indeed have passed, however ...

NOTES

- (1) All of the major non-white South African organizations, including COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), have called for economic sanctions, disinvestments, and ceasing to grant credits to the Pretoria government in terms as strongly as Pretoria's laws would allow. Of the three major countries, the United States has actually gone the furthest by imposing limited sanctions on economic activities with South Africa in August 1986.
- (2) According to the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, in 1984 there were 1,068 MNCs operating in South Africa. By the summer of 1987 roughly one-fifth of them had either limited their activities there or closed down shop completely. The majority of these companies (104) were subsidiaries of US firms such as General Motors, Ford,

Exxon, IBM, General Electric, and Kodak. See *Horizont*, Nr. 12/1987, p. 20.

- (3) *Bulletin, Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, Nr. 78/S. 657, 1 July 1986.
- (4) For a very useful summary of these Western positions, see Klaus Frhr. von der Ropp, "Chancen eines Neubeginns im Südlichen Afrika", in: *Die internationale Politik, 1981 — 1982, Jahrbücher des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, Munich 1984.
- (5) Erich Honecker, Bericht des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands an den X. Parteitag der SED, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1981, p. 31.
- (6) Alfred Babing, "Zur Krise des südafrikanischen Apartheid-Regimes", in: *IPW Berichte*, 1/86, p. 41.
- (7) For a Soviet perspective, see S. Pokrovsky, "The Apartheid Regime and its Imperialist Patrons", in: *International Affairs*, September 1986, pp. 101 — 160.
- (8) Babing, op. cit., pp. 42 — 43. The sources cited in note 18 below essentially confirm Bagin's assessment.
- (9) The term 'superprofits' has a specific technical meaning; i.e., a condition in which capital pays wages which are by themselves insufficient for the reproduction of labor power. Historically this has been a common phenomenon throughout Africa. In South Africa the peasant sector had to be undermined to some degree to create a work force for the mines and factories. On the other hand, by not allowing its complete dissolution and setting up a system of migrant labor, the state was able to shift some of the burden for the reproduction of labor power to those left behind in the peasant sector. These are usually the elderly, the very young, and the women left behind in the so-called reserves, homelands, and bantustans. The male was then forced into the factories and mines under conditions that allowed wages lower than the cost of reproduction; thus allowing employers to make 'super profits'. For a systematic elaboration of this argument, see Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid", in: *Economy and Society*, Vol. 1, Nr. 4, November 1972.
- (10) This hardline ideological approach appears to be softening in the Gorbachev era, which emphasizes "cooperation" instead of "confrontation" with imperialism. Gorbachev seems prepared to continue support for the ANC, however. See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: Die zweite russische Revolution*, Munich 1987, p. 243. There nevertheless seems to be every indication that the East is decreasing its commitment to aid in 'national liberation' struggles. Cf. Winrich Kühne, "Nkomati and Soviet Africa Policy in the Mid-Eighties: The End of Ideological Expansion" in: Brigitte H. Schulz and William W. Hansen, (eds.), *The Soviet Bloc and the Third World: The Political Economy of East-South Relations*, Boulder: 1988 (forthcoming).
- (11) Oliver Tambo, ANC President, has explained his organization's position as anchored in the "Freedom Charter" as follows: "South Africa belongs to everyone who lives there, black and white; it will be the home of all citizens irrespective of skin color; its government must have the mandate of the entire people; the country's resources will belong to everyone who produces them; banks and mines will be nationalized. The charter has thus become a political platform and action program for creating a democratic state on our motherland's soil." *Pravda*, Moscow, 8 July 1986, p. 5.
- (12) West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States have consistently vetoed any efforts on the part of the international community to impose mandatory economic sanctions on South Africa. On February 20, 1987, these three countries again vetoed a UN Security Council resolution, arguing that this would be against the best interests of the South African economy and thus the South African people. *The New York Times*, 21 February 1987.
- (13) Although there is a deafening silence on this point in all of the East, cooperation appears to be alive and well between Moscow and the South African mining conglomerate Anglo-American in the marketing of gold, diamonds, and platinum. Siberian diamonds apparently are marketed through the DeBeers Company, an Anglo-American affiliate, and its Central Marketing Organization, under the terms of the 1957 top secret agreement between South Africa and the Soviet Union. Since South Africa and the Soviet Union

- also mine roughly eighty percent of world's gold, cooperation in marketing that resource apparently also exists. See Kurt M. Campbell, *Soviet Policy Towards South Africa*, New York, 1987. For a typical Soviet explanation of its interests (or lack thereof) in South Africa, see, for example, V. Midtsev, "USA — South Africa: A Sinister Alliance", in: *International Affairs*, January 1986, pp. 72 — 79; Anatoly Gromyko, "Soviet Foreign Policy in Africa", in: *International Affairs*, February 1982, pp. 30 — 35.
- (14) See, for example, Wolfgang Gäbelein and Andrej Reder, "Die Entwicklungsländer in den Kämpfen unserer Zeit", in: *Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika*, 6/86, pp. 949 — 960; "International Conference on Apartheid", in: *International Affairs*, January 1984, pp. 142 — 143. South Africa's activities in neighboring countries have recently also become the subject of some critical reports in the Western press. See, for example, Anthony Lewis, "Would They Call for a Deal If the Victims Were White?", *International Herald Tribune*, 13. October 1987; "In Angola, a Little-Noticed War", *International Herald Tribune*, 22 December 1987.
- (15) When the Bonn government became a member of the UN Security Council in 1977, it co-sponsored the resolution calling for a mandatory arms embargo for South Africa. The Bonn government has nevertheless been under repeated suspicions for its direct military cooperation with Pretoria. In 1975, the ANC, in cooperation with the West German anti-apartheid movement, already published information accusing the Federal Republic of nuclear cooperation with the PSA. For a detailed account of this cooperation, see Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers, *The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa*, London 1987. In February 1988, as West Germany was rocked by a large scandal involving its nuclear industry, this cooperation was once again confirmed. West German uranium brokers, with official permits from the European nuclear control agency Euratom as well as the apparent backing of the Bonn government, sold South African uranium to the United States, Canada, as well as to the Soviet Union, despite the fact that these countries have official embargoes against such imports. This was done via so-called "swaps" which means that labels indicating South African origins were changed to show other origins in order to circumvent the anti-apartheid boycott. *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 7, 1988, pp. 51 — 66.
- (16) On the history of Bonn's relations with South Africa, see Reinhard Rode, "Bonn and Pretoria: Lerndefizite und Lernerfolge in der Südafrika-Politik der Bundesrepublik", in: Helmut Bley and Rainer Tetzlaff (eds.), *Afrika und Bonn: Versäumnisse und Zwänge deutscher Afrika-Politik*, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1978, pp. 88 ff.; Peter Meyns, *Cooperation without Change. The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Southern Africa*, Bonn, 1987.
- (17) See *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 25 and 29 January 1988, 3 February 1988; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 26. January and 1 February 1988.
- (18) For more information on this, see, for example, the official yearbooks of the Republic of South Africa (Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs); information circulars published by the South African Minerals Bureau; Boleslaw Adam Boczek, "Resource Rivalry in the Third World", in: Robert W. Clawson (ed.), *East-West Rivalry in the Third World*, 1986; Anthony Sampson, *Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries, and Apartheid*, New York, 1987. On specific US investments in South Africa, see Lawrence Litvak, Robert DeGrasse, and Kathleen McTigue, *South Africa: Foreign Investment and Apartheid*, second edition, Washington, 1985; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid*, second edition, Washington, 1985. For a review of British interests, see James Barber, *The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa*, London, 1983.
- (19) Die Grünen, Pressemitteilung Nr. 119/83, 26 May 1983.
- (20) *The International Herald Tribune*, 8 August 1985.
- (21) For a comprehensive study of West Germany's imports of raw materials from South Africa, see Rold Holfmeier et al., *Die wirtschaftliche und rohstoffpolitische Bedeutung Afrikas und seiner einzelnen Regionen (Südafrika, Schwarzafrika, Nordafrika) für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1981.
- (22) W. C. J. van Rensburg, "Political Changes in South Africa and the Importance of the Republic of South Africa as a Raw Material Supplier", in: *Analysen: Probleme der Rohstoffsicherung*, 92/93, Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1981, p. 100.
- (23) For this type of argument, see, for example, Greg Lenning, "Consequences of the EEC's Dependence on Primary Commodities from the Republic of South Africa", in: *Analysen*, Nr. 92/93 (Probleme der Rohstoffsicherung), Bonn: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, June 1981, pp. 101 — 111; G. Verheugen, *Apartheid*, op. cit., pp. 182 — 190.
- (24) Cf. G. Verheugen, *Apartheid*, op. cit., pp. 185 — 186.
- (25) For some revealing parliamentary hearings concerning this issue in the Bundestag, see "The UN Arms Embargo and Federal Republic of Germany Controls", paper presented at the International Seminar on the UN Arms Embargo Against South Africa, London, 28 — 30 May 1986, pp. 37 — 39.
- (26) *ibid.*, pp. 26.
- (27) Gottfried Wellmer, "Sichere Geschäfte: Hermes Bürgschaften für Exporte nach Südafrika", in: *Informationsdienst Südliches Afrika*, 1/2, 1983, pp. 11 — 12.
- (28) *Die Rheinpfalz*, 23 January 1988. In contrast to this liberal credit guarantee policy vis-a-vis South Africa, Hermes conditions for Mozambique, for example, are extremely limited: The maximum amount that Hermes will guarantee is DM 1 million, repayable within 180 days! *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 November 1987.
- (29) "The UN Arms Embargo", op. cit., p. 27.
- (30) *The International Herald Tribune*, 8 August 1985.
- (31) "Das Deutsche Afrika-Geschäft 1984", Annual Report of the Afrika-Verein, Hamburg, p. 4.
- (32) Gottfried Wellmer, "Aufrüster der Apartheid: Westdeutsche Multis in Südafrika", in: *Informationsdienst Südliches Afrika*, 1/2, 1983, p. 8.
- (33) *The International Herald Tribune*, 8 August 1985.
- (34) See, for example, Christen für Arbeit und Gerechtigkeit weltweit, *Die deutsche Wirtschaft und Südafrika: Zur Notwendigkeit von Wirtschaftssanktionen*, Heidelberg, 1986, pp. 127 — 133.
- (35) Peter Meyns, op. cit., p. 11.
- (36) Rainer Falk, *Südafrika: Widerstand und Befreiungskampf*, Cologne: 1986, p. 261.
- (37) "UN Embargo", op. cit., pp. 34 — 35.
- (38) *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- (39) Since the GDR is involved in heavy trading with West Germany via so-called inter-German trade, it is difficult to say to what extent East German products reach the South African market or vice versa. That some of this trade does take place should be assumed; however, the GDR is not directly involved in this trade per se. This point was brought up by the author when interviewing various academics while conducting research in the GDR during 1983/84 and summer of 1985. The answer always was that what the West Germans do with East German products is no longer of concern to the GDR, indicating a capacity for political cynicism that comes close to matching that of the FRG and its allies in the West.
- (40) Since the ANC is banned by Pretoria, with a leadership either in jail or exile, the exact level of support for the organization inside the country is nearly impossible to determine. Inside the country, the ANC is clearly only one of many anti-apartheid organizations, most of which have overlapping followings and/or memberships. However, as an organization, the ANC clearly appears to command the loyalty of a significant majority of black South Africans. In a March 1985 poll conducted by the City Press newspaper in Johannesburg, 56 percent of the respondents favored the ANC. Other polls conducted inside the country by local as well as foreign institutions confirm that finding. Other black leaders such as Desmond Tutu and Chief Buthelezi, more to the liking of major Western countries as possible choices for a post-apartheid South Africa, have consistently lagged far behind Nelson Mandela of the ANC in these polls. Bishop Tutu, for example, does not even consider himself in opposition to the ANC and, thus, one can be both pro-Tutu and pro-ANC. Even Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, despite tensions with the ANC,

is required occasionally to make friendly overtures towards it. For a discussion of the degree of black support of the ANC inside South Africa, see Roger Omond, *The Apartheid Handbook: A Guide to South Africa's Everyday Racial Policies*, 2nd edition, Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, 1986, pp. 217 – 218.

- (41) This Committee was founded in 1960 to conduct "solidarity" activities with Africa. This later was expanded to include Asia as well and since 1973 has been officially called the "Solidarity Committee of the GDR". It coordinates all solidarity functions of the GDR and spends roughly 200 million Marks annually on various solidarity activities and materials.
- (42) For a fuller discussion of how these 'solidarity' activities inside the GDR are both coordinated and executed, see Brigitte H. Schulz, *East German Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa: Proletarian Internationalism vs. "Mutual Advantage"*, Boston University African Studies Center Working Paper No. 100, 1985; "The Road to Socialism in the Periphery: East German Solidarity in Theory and Practice", in: *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik*, Vienna, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1986.
- (43) The commitment to assist anti-colonial movements is anchored in the East German constitution and one of the ideological cornerstones of relations between the East and the South. As I have argued elsewhere, this commitment was never as absolute as ideologues in either East or West would have liked us to believe and is likely to decrease even more in importance in the years to come. See Brigitte Schulz, "The Politics of East-South Relations: The GDR and Southern Africa", in: David Childs, et al. (eds.), *East Germany in Comparative Perspective*, London, 1988 (forthcoming).
- (44) Black Africa, with the exception of Malawi, stands united in its opposition to apartheid and its refusal to maintain diplomatic relations with Pretoria. When Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited several African countries in November, 1987, the FRG's close ties with Pretoria were always the largest point of disagreement between the Chancellor and his hosts. See, for example, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 13 November 1987.
- (45) This distinction is important because movements seeking to overthrow existing neo-colonial governments have not received the open and unambiguous support of the East. Thus it is not surprising that all recently overthrown dictatorships in the Third World, from Marcos in the Philippines to Baby Doc in Haiti, occurred without the complicity of the East. Even the Sandinista government came to power without the active assistance of the socialist countries, although it subsequently turned to them in order to defend its revolution from US aggression.
- (46) This is argued, for example, by Andre Gunder Frank in Schulz and Hansen, *The Soviet Bloc*, op. cit. Marie LeVigne, on the other hand, argues that the case is not as simple as that, although in the end she too is forced to admit that in economic terms the Eastern bloc's interests are "linked to those of the developed market economies in an objective collusion". See "East-South Trade in Primary Products: A Model Borrowed from the North-South Pattern?", in: *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik*, Vol. 2, Nr. 2, Vienna, Summer 1986.
- (47) Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, recently called Mozambique "the most cooperative partner we have in Southern Africa", *General-Anzeiger*, 23 November 1987.

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Andrea Wurm REGIONALE WIRTSCHAFTSKOOPERATION ALS ENTWICKLUNGSOPTION FÜR AFRIKA SÜDLICH DER SAHARA: Das Beispiel der Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

*To plan is to choose,
Choose to go forward. (Julius K. Nyerere)*

It would appear that over the past 20 years or so, economic co-operation could have moved faster, with fewer failures, if those responsible for organizing cooperation were not always led by traditional models ... Those models did not always take into account regional and sub-regional realities. (Philip Ndegwa, 1985)

*Regional self-reliance is not inconsistent with our desire and need to seek the cooperation of the peoples and governments of the many countries who are interested in promoting welfare, justice and peace in Southern Africa and the international agencies who share this interest.
(Seretse Khama, SADCC Chairmain, 1980)*

1. Einleitung

„Entwicklungskrise in Schwarzafrika“

Angesichts der gegenwärtigen politökonomischen Situation in den meisten afrikanischen Staaten kann von „Entwicklung“ kaum die Rede sein.

Die ärmste Region der Welt ist noch ärmer geworden. In einer Reihe von Staaten ist die de facto Ressourcenverfügbarkeit, gemessen am Brutto sozialprodukt und bereinigt um die Terms of Trade-Änderungen, niedriger als 1970. In einigen Fällen – wie Mosambik, Zaire, Ghana und Uganda – ist sie wahrscheinlich niedriger als in den frühen 60er Jahren (1). Die gegenwärtigen Prognosen lassen in den meisten Fällen keine Trendwende erwarten.

Die ökonomische Misere Schwarzafrikas in Makro- (oder Mega-) Wirtschaftsdaten zu beschreiben ist zwar notwendig, um einen richtigen Überblick zu erhalten – zugleich aber auch irreführend und nicht genügend informativ. Die ökonomischen Fakten vermitteln einen sehr unzureichenden Eindruck über das tatsächliche menschliche Elend, das hinter den Zahlen steht: Hunderte Millionen unterernährter Menschen, Hunderttausende, die jährlich – bedingt durch Hunger und