Judith Taylor behandelt die äußerst interessante Frage nicht tarifärer Handelshemmnisse und deren Auswirkungen auf die Peripherie. Wegen ihrer geringeren Transparenz trifft die seit langem praktizierte Verschiebung der Handelsbehinderung von Zöllen in den nichttarifären Bereich PL in besonderem Maße.

István Dobozi trägt einen Artikel zu einem Bereich bei, der in westlichen Zeitschriften leider zu oft ausgeblendet bleibt. Der Autor untersucht Art und bestimmende Faktoren der Ost-Süd-Beziehungen.

André Gunder Frank liefert einen stimulierenden Diskussionsbeitrag zum Thema der internationalen Verschuldung, wobei er ökonomische Betrachtungen mit Überlegungen juristischer Art verbindet.

Last, but not least, berichtet *Gottfried Mazal* über die Ergebnisse der UNCTAD VII und zieht eine Bilanz der diesjährigen Konferenz, deren Schlußakte er als Plattform für die Zukunft und als neuen Anfang sieht.

Kunibert Raffer

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Paul Streeten

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND GLOBAL JUSTICE

Many of the problems in the international relations of interdependence arise from a combination of the free rider problem, Olson's problem (1), and the prisoners' dilemma. Indeed, the free rider or contributor's dilemma, is a special case of the prisoners' dilemma. The free rider problem exists because some of the solutions of international difficulties consist in the provision of public goods (2). A public good is one from whose supply all those who value the good benefit, irrespective of whether they have contributed to its costs. The concept can readily be extended to cover common goals or common interests, the achievement of which benefits all, irrespective of whether they have contributed to the costs of achieving these goals or interests. The enjoyment of the good or service by one person does not detract from the enjoyment by others. In this sense international cooperation and the prevention of international wars are public goods. So are markets and a working international monetary order with an international central bank as a lender of last resort and as a provider of liquidity. Scientific research is of this kind. An international income tax or the coordination of international fixed investment decisions fall under the same heading. But these public goods will be systematically undersupplied, because any one country will not find it worth its while taking the appropriate action, relying on others to do so, even though the benefits would exceed the costs, were all to contribute. And each country knowing that others act that way, will not have an incentive to be the only one which contributes to something that benefits others. As a result international cooperation, peace, research, international monetary stability, and world development will be undersupplied. No one contributes and everyone is worse off. The Invisible Hand, which, according to Adam Smith, coordinates the independent decisions of a multitude of individuals, could also be applied and has been applied to the unintended coordination of the actions of nation states. But this Invisible Hand that is supposed to guide the self-interest of each agent, whether individual or country, to the common good is not to be seen in the cases discussed above (3).

It is true that free rider problems are not ubiquitous. Individuals may be afraid of the sanctions attached to such behavior. Or they may avoid free riding because they believe that their contributions will make others contribute. Individuals sometimes do behave according to Kant's categorical imperative, in a manner that can be universalized. Otherwise why should anybody clap after a theatre performance (assuming you don't get pleasure from clapping), or vote in a democratic election? But Kant's categorical imperative, or the notion that we should behave in the way we should want others to behave, may apply less to the actions of nation states than to those of individuals. Leadership, and even hegemony, particularly by a strong superpower, and enlightened self-interest can contribute to such Kantian behaviour by nation states.

The prisoners' dilemma arises because each country, in promoting its own national interest rationally, contributes to a situation in which all countries are worse off. Just as public goods are undersupplied, public bads are oversupplied. No single actor has an adequate incentive to remove them. This applies to competitive protectionism, beggar-my-neighbour devaluations or deflations, the spread of inflation, investment wars, the arms race, global pollution of the air and the sea, overfishing and excessive exploitation of exhaustible resources to which no property rights are attached, and similar situations. Richard Cooper has likened the situation to a crowd in which each member, wishing to see better a passing parade, rises to his tiptoes, with the result that no one sees better but everyone is more uncomfortable (4). What is needed is either coordination and cooperation or supra-national sanctions that force all countries to act in what will amount to their self-interest. Without such coordinated or enforced action, the outcome of nationally rational actions will be irrational damage and mutual impoverishment. For the damaging action is the best, whether other nations act similarly or not.

On the other hand, according to Coase's theorem, if, in the absence of transaction costs, and in the presence of a legal framework and full information, one country inflicts damages on another which are greater than the benefits to the first country, the injured country can enter into a contract and compensate the injuring country for not inflicting the injury and be better off, or the injuring country can compensate the injured country for the damage, and still be better off. Such international compensations or bribes are in fact not common but they point, in principle, to the other extreme from that of the prisoners' dilemma. In such a world Pareto optimal allocations would be achieved, for deviation would give rise to joint gains, out of which losers could be compensated for accepting them (5).

The difficulties of reaching Coase-type agreements and the dangers of ending in Prisoners' Dilemma situations are aggravated by four factors. First, there is no longer a hegemonous power, such as Britain before the first World War and the USA for a quarter of a century after the second World War, which is prepared to carry a large part of the cost of the public goods and to exercise leadership to make others contribute. Second, the proliferation of independent nation states to about 160 makes agreements more difficult than in an age when fewer governments could establish a system of mutual trust or enforcement (Olson's problem). It is, however, true that most of these are quite small and that coordination by a few large ones is what matters. Third, the rapid pace of social and technical change makes it more difficult to evolve the stability on which trust can be built. It has been shown that repeated games of Prisoners' Dilemma in similar situations tend to lead to cooperative solutions. Rapid change of the conditions on which cooperation is based prevents the basis for this to be formed (6). And fourth, the absence of world government and world courts makes it impossible to establish property rights, enforce contracts and set the sanctions against breaking agreements.

As Michael Lipton has said (7), if all outcomes were non-cooperative Prisoners' Dilemmas, no government would be possible. If all were according to Coase's theorem, no government would be needed (except for income redistribution). The actual world is between the two extremes. But the relations of nation states are nearer the Prisoner's Dilemma end of the spectrum, for the four reasons given above.

Three systems

In order to set up a framework for a more constructive response to the call of the South for a better world order Kenneth Boulding's distinction between the exchange system, the threat system and the integrative system is useful. The exchange system is based on the principle: "I do something good for you if you do something good for me." It covers the area of mutual interests. The threat system is based on the principle: "unless you do something good for me I shall do something horrid to you". In the integrative or love system the principles of love and duty applied to ourselves and our family are extended to other members of a wider community. We do good neither in the expectation of good in return nor under the threat of harm, but from a sense of unity or solidarity or duty. This sense can derive from a common ideology or from a sense of community and obligation. These not only reduce the danger of too many free riders, so that each contributes voluntarily to the common good that also benefits him, but also lead to some sacrifice for the benefit of others: genuine altruism. The three systems correspond roughly to positive sum games, in which all participants benefit, avoiding negative sum games, in which all would lose in the absence of coordinated action, and zero sum games, in which one side has to make concessions for the benefit of others.

Systems can, of course, be mixed. What appears to be a genuine sacrifice in the short run may turn out to be beneficial to the sacrificer in the long run. Or the removal of the benefit (such as access to markets) can constitute a threat. Or the division of the joint gains can give rise to conflicts. This, in practice, is a particularly important obstacle to the pursuit of positive sum games. The gains come to be accepted and only the wrangles over their division remain.

It is important to distinguish between doing what is right and wishing to be seen to be doing right because this is in the nation's self-interest. The United States is dedicated to a value system, what Myrdal called the American Creed. It adds cohesion to American society and strength to its foreign policy. But it is an entirely different thing to say, as a paragraph in the Kissinger Commission Report on Central America does, that it is in the American national self-interest *to be seen* to be acting right."To preserve the moral authority of the United States. To be perceived by others as a nation that does what is right *because* it is right is one of this country's principal assets." There is all the difference in the world between doing what is right because it is right, and doing it because the U.S. must be seen to do what is right because it is right. It is in the U.S. national interest to be seen to act in a moral way. The first action is moral, disinterested; the second self-interested (8).

The distinction between the three systems is useful for a clear analysis, bot not for negotiations. There we have an interest in pretending that what is truly a benefit to us is a sacrifice, so that we may get concessions on other fronts.

The exchange system of mutual interests has been much promoted, especially by the Brandt Commission, the OECD and the Overseas Development Council. Trade liberalization is the most frequently advocated policy. "Man was born free, but everywhere he is in chains." Similarly, all economists recommend free(r) trade, but everywhere there is protection.

It might be thought that, by and large, people, groups, and nations are very good in detecting and pursuing their self-interest and that not much exhortation is needed. But, as we have seen, there can be important divergencies between reaching for and achieving what is in one's interest. In some cases the self-interested action leads to damage to oneself. We have already discussed the prisoners' dilemma and the free rider problem. The first leads to the infliction of mutual harm, the second to the undersupply of public goods and the oversupply of publics bads. In addition, the national interest may be damaged for several reasons. There can be conflict between groups with different power, articulateness, and influence, so that the more powerful influence policy more strongly, even if their gains are smaller than the losses of the less powerful, less articulate, less influential. Or there may be conflict between dispersed larger and concentrated smaller gains, or between uncertain larger and certain smaller gains, or between larger future and smaller present gains, or between perceived larger but really smaller gains. The last may be one of the reasons why the general public and policy makers are not prepared to surrender national sovereignty, even though its surrender would lead to a more effective achievement of self-interested objectives than the formal adherence to full sovereingty, autonomy and control, in the same way in which the acceptance of traffic regulations enlarges our freedom to drive accident-free, while restricting our freedom of choice. Finally, the gains to some may be much larger than the gains to others, who, though gaining a little, resent this. In any case, the distribution of gains presents quite different problems at the international level from those at the national. For any national community, a central government can tax and redistribute gains if this is deemed desirable. But without a world government, this cannot be done at the international level.

In all these cases, selfish action may not lead to the achievement of the self-interest, and the achievement of self-interested objectives may involve some sacrifice in unconstrained and uncoordinated selfishness. Moreover, it would be only by a fluke of coincidence if the actions dictated by national self-interest were to coincide with our development objectives, whether these are accelerated growth, growth with equity, redistribution with growth, or basic needs. In particular, the poorest groups and the poorest countries will tend to be left out in a strategy based on national self-interest.

Removal of dangers of the threat system, the avoidance of negative-sum games, should have a high priority, for it can lead to mutual impoverishment and even destruction: disarmament, removal of the threat of protection, an end to beggar-my-neighbour deflation and devaluation or inflation, and of "voluntary" export

restraints, are clearly lines of action worth pursuing. They call for international coordination and institutional responses of the kind discussed above and below.

It may be thought that all agreements entered into voluntarily between states must amount to positive-sum games, in which each is better off. But this is not so. Some alliances may be formed with the specific purpose, or with the unintended result, of inflicting costs on outsiders. In this case alliances or pacts can lead to negative-sum games.

One of the reasons why agreements on avoiding negative-sum games, on reducing bads and creating anti-bads, are so difficult, is to be found in the logic of collective action, so well analysed by Mancur Olson (9). The larger the group, the weaker the incentive for any one member to contribute to the action that benefits all. And we now have about 160 countries in the world. As a result, the public goods are not produced, or are underproduced, even though their value is greater than their costs to the group of countries as a whole. It is true that some smaller subset of countries, the Group of 5 or the Group of 7, may take responsibility for the rest, but they may also act in a way that imposes costs on others.

We can build on areas of common national interests, emphasizing mutual benefits to be derived from, e.g., resumption of orderly and equitable growth in the world economy, forswearing self-defeating protectionism, exploring ways of increasing the resources in globally scarce supply, etc. But while there is considerable scope for positive sum games in exploring areas of common and mutual interests, and of avoiding self-defeating, mutually destructive policies of the prisoners' dilemma type, there is also a "higher" interest in a world order that both is, and is seen to be, equitable, that is acceptable and therefore accepted, and that reduces conflict and confrontation.

All societies need for their self-regulation and for social control a basis of moral principles. Individuals are ready to make sacrifices for the communities they live in. This forms the basis of the integrative system. Can this principle stop at the nation state? A belief in the harmony between self-interest and altruism is deep-seated in Anglo-Saxon thought and action. One is reminded of the eighteenth century Bishop Joseph Butler: "when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness ..." (10). The only question is why it appears to be easier to identify, or at least harmonize, individual happiness with the national interest than with that of the world community. It is odd that a moral, disinterested concern by rich countries with the development of the poor is hardly ever conceded. As hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue, so professions of national self-interest in the development of poor countries may be the tribute that virtue has to pay to vice.

In the present fashion of stressing common and mutual interests, we run the danger of underestimating the power of moral or humanitarian appeals. Holland, Sweden and Norway, which have put international cooperation squarely on a moral basis, have hit the 0.7 % aid target. It is the countries in which aid has been sold to the public as in the national self-interest where the effort is lagging.

The common interests must also be defined in terms of different time horizons: the next year, the next five years, the next twenty years. There may be conflicts and trade-offs between these different time spans. For example, concessionary aid to the poorest may involve economic sacrifices in the near future but, by laying the foundations for a world in which all human beings born can fully develop their potential, it contributes to the long-term interest of mankind.

One difficulty is that in democracies adults have votes, but children and the unborn have no votes. The fight is not only against powerfully organized vested interests, but also against all our own short-term interests, that neglect the interests of future generations.

Any attempt to build cooperation for development on moral principles has to answer three questions. First, do the rich in a community have an obligation in social justice (not only in charity) to the poor and do the poor have a just claim on the rich? Second, does mankind constitute a community in the relevant sense or do communities stop at national boundaries? Third, does the existence of national governments not interfere with the discharge of the obligations of the rich, if such obligations exist, to the poor in the world community, if there is such a community?

The first question cannot be answered without an analysis of various theories of moral philosophy. But both utilitarianism and various types of entitlement theory would provide a basis for and obligation of the rich to contribute to improving the lot of the poor in a community. Perhaps more difficult ist the case for saying that mankind does constitute a community in the relevant sense. Social contract theories might say that we need not do anything for the world community because the world community does not do anything for us, whereas the state provides protection, security and certain other services. But even if the first two questions were answered in the affirmative, the third question presents the difficulty that the discharge of the obligation may take the form of what opponents of aid-giving have called, "a redistribution of resources from the poor in rich countries to the rich in poor countries". To meet this difficulty we have to exercise our institutional imagination in finding procedures and institutions that avoid, or at least minimize, this possibility.

The "higher" interest in an acceptable world order can be defined either in moral terms or in terms of the desire to avoid negative sum games, to avoid breakdown and wars. Whatever the definition and justification, its aim is to transform adversary relationships into cooperation. When interests diverge or conflict, the task of statesmanship is to reconcile them. This is a task quite distinct from, and more important than, that of exploring areas of common or mutual interest. It is in this light that cooperative action to eradicate world poverty and to restructure the international economic order have to be seen.

What, then, are the requirements of a sensible international order? It will consist of negative rules of what national governments must not do, and agreements on certain positive cooperative sum games, and the rules of action to create some public goods and avoid public bads. Ralph Bryant has called these rules "supranational traffic regulations" (11). Some critics have accused the developing

countries of wishing exemption from some general rules (such as reciprocity in tariff reductions or the banning of preferential trading arrangements) to which the developed countries should adhere. The discussion about appropriate rules for international economic relations has suffered from a long-standing confusion. It is the confusion between *uniform* (sometimes also called *general)* principles or rules (the opposite of specific ones, and therefore necessarily simple) and *universal* principles or rules (which may be highly specific and complicated, provided that they contain no uneliminable reference to individual cases). Further confusion is caused if a third characteristic of rules is added: *inflexibility* over time, and confused with either uniformity or universality. A rule is capable of being *altered,* though it remains either uniform, i.e. simple, or universal, i.e. may have a lot of "exceptions" written into it. The "equal" treatment of unequals is not a principle of justice, and a general rule commanding it is an unjust rule. In order to prevent partiality and partisanship, rules have to be universal, i.e. not contain references to individual cases. They may, and indeed should not, be uniform. They should pay attention to the varying characteristics and circumstances of different countries.

Those who charge the developing countries with asking for exemptions from rules are guilty of this confusion between *uniform* and *universal* rules. Thus a differentiated system of multi-tier preferences according to the level of development of the exporting countries, may be best and most just for a group of trading countries at different stages of development. A fair system of rules also points to the differentiation in responsibilities and rights according to circumstances. Middle income countries would not have the responsibility to give aid, but neither would they receive it. They would not have to give trade preferences, but neither would they receive them. Even finer differentiation would be possible. A country with a large balance of payments surplus might be asked to contribute to loans because of its foreign exchange earnings, and, if its citizens enjoy high incomes, to aid because of its income per head, but might receive trade preferences, if its level of industrialization is low. The 0.7 % aid target would be replaced by a system in which those below a certain income per head are exempted, and the percentage target rises with income per head.

There is, of course, a practical and tactical case for *simple* rules, which might overrule the case in fairness for universal (though complex) rules: they are less open to abuse and easier to police. And there may be a tactical case for uniform rules; they may be easier to negotiate. It is for such pragmatic reasons rather than on theoretical grounds that one may advocate that rules should not be too complex, and should not be changed too often (12).

Any specific proposals, such as non-reciprocity in trade concessions, or trade preferences would, of course, have to be examined on their merits. But the distinction between "exemption from rules" and "drawing up new rules" is logically untenable, to the extent to which the call for examption is really a call for a set of universal rules that pays attention to the different characteristics and circumstances of different countries, just as income tax allowances for dependents or lower rates on earned than on unearned income, are not "exceptions" but reflect our notions of fairness.

Those who are concerned with changing the rules of international relations are aiming partly at removing biases in the present rules, partly at the exercise of countervailing power where at present the distribution of power is felt to be unequal, and partly at counteracting biases that arise not from rules but from the nature of economic processes, such as the cumulative nature of gains accruing to those who already have more resources, and the cumulative damage inflicted on those who have initially relatively little.

In so far as the call for new rules is about strictly economic relations, there is scope for positive sum games. But in so far as it is about national power relations between sovereign states with different and conflicting aims, power is by its very nature a *relative* concept, and what is at stake are *zero sum games*. The demand for greater participation in the councils of the world and for corrections by the developing countries in the biases of the international power distribution are bound to diminish the power of the industrialized countries in conditions of conflict.

In addition to rules there is a need for institutions. Let me give five illustrations of the kind of institutional reform I have in mind. First, there is the creation of an international central bank that would be able to create (and withdraw) international liquidity, both for transactions and for precautionary reasons. A panic run on the banks would cause an international financial breakdown unless an institutional arrangement existed that provided the liquidity. The General Arrangements to Borrow do this now to some extent, but a Central Bank would do this on a more solid and reliable basis.

The Central Bank would also be responsible for the growth of global reserves at a pace which gives neither an inflationary nor a deflationary bias to the world economy. In the absence of such a global authority, the competitive actions of nation states will tend to be either too restrictive, transmitting unemployment and unused industrial capacity, as each country scrambles to accumulate scarce reserves, or too expansionary, transmitting inflation throughout the world, as the reserve currency country incurs large balance of payments deficits to pay for economic or military ventures abroad.

Second, there is the institution of an international income tax, levied progressively on GNP according to incomes per head, or, better, consumption per head so as to encourage saving, with a lower exemption limit, collected automatically, but disbursed to developing countries according to agreed criteria. The monitoring of the fulfillment of the criteria should be done either by the developing countries themselves or by a mutually accepted transnational body.

Third, there is an international body to provide information on decisions for fixed, durable investment with long construction periods, so that we avoid the lurches from scarcity to excess capacity in steel, shipbuilding and fertilizers that we are suffering now. It should obviously not be a super-cartel that goes in for market sharing agreements, but a method of coordinating investment decisions.

Fourth, there is an international investment trust that channels the surpluses of the surplus countries in a multilaterally guaranteed scheme to the developping countries. It would have guarantees against inflation and exchange rate losses for the lenders, the loans would be on commercial terms to middle income countries. At the time of writing, Japan has become the largest lending country with a large surplus in its balance of payments on current account. This surplus is in search of good and safe investment opportunities which call for the creation of appropriate institutions that convert these surpluses into long-term loans to the developing countries. This would be in the interest of Japan, which could continue her export-led growth without having either to reduce her rate of savings or find domestic, lower-yielding alternatives; it would be in the interest of other OECD countries on whose exports some of the loans will be spent; it would be in the interest of the capital-hungry developing countries, whose resources are waiting to be mobilized by such capital flows; and it would be in the interest of the world economy which could maintain its expansionary momentum. An interest-subsidization scheme could be grafted onto this for the low-income countries.

If this argument is accepted, the general call for Japan to raise its level of consumption or divert investment to the domestic market is seen to be misplaced. Higher consumption should not be applauded in a world that is short of savings and in need of capital. And higher domestic Japanese investment is not desirable if it is subject to declining returns. Instead of calling on Japan to reflate, we should mobilize its excess savings and channel them on acceptable terms, by long-term lending or equity capital, thorugh either the private or the public capital markets to the developing countries.

Fifth, there should be a better way of dealing with the oil price problem than the erratic zig-zag movements that we have experienced since 1973. Oil producing and oil consuming countries would get together and agree on a small, annual increase in the real price of oil, say 2 per cent. This assumes agreement on the best guess as to the real price of oil in twenty years' time. The balance of payments surpluses generated by such an increase could be channeled into the investment trust proposed above. The incentives to explore more oil, alternatives to oil, and conservation would be gradual but steady. The incentives for the oil exporting countries to use their revenue for investment in alternative productive assets would be gradual and steady. Incentives to consumers of oil would also permit a foreseeable and gradual adaptation. There would be neither debt crises nor the sloshing around of large funds in search of remunerative and safe returns. And the world economy would be spared at least one major source of shocks and instability. Both inflation and unemployment rates would be reduced.

There is also a need for reforming the institutions charged with North-South cooperation. What has the Marshall Plan to teach us for current relations with the South? It is now generally agreed that the Marshall Plan loans to Europe were given on too soft terms, perhaps in too large amounts, but they achieved their objective of rapid European reconstruction. It has also become a platitude to say that the lessons are not applicable to the developing countries because in Europe the human capital existed and to reconstruct with a skilled and well motivated labour force is a much easier task than developing an underdeveloped society. But one important lesson can still be learned. Critics of both the Left and Right have pointed to numerous faults of aid, and in particular that it has not achieved its intended objectives, whether they are poverty alleviation, redistribution or economic growth. They conclude that we should get rid of aid. A better conclusion might be to get rid of the faults and to evolve mechanisms that ensure that the objectives of the aid donors are achieved. The intervention of donor governments for the purpose of applying performance criteria to development aid has been regarded as inconsistent with national sovereingty, has been dismissed as intrusive, and has bred acrimony. It has also been difficult to separate objectives of accelerating development from objectives in the narrow national interest such as export promotion, gaining votes in the U.N., forming political alliances or getting strategic support. Performance criteria imposed in bilateral relations by donor governments have therefore been suspect and counterproductive.

The task is then to evolve institutions that achieve the objectives of the donors and the recipients and are trusted by both sides. It is to resolve the dilemma between avoiding instrusiveness and paying respect to national sovereingty on the one hand, and responsible accounting for taxpayers' money on the other. Here the Marshall Plan has still something to teach. It is not about the speed of development, which, for European reconstruction was much faster than for the structural changes needed for development; nor about the terms of the aid, which were too soft compared with today's terms for development aid, but about monitoring procedures. The European powers were encouraged to monitor one another's performance, and the heavy hand of the US government was kept out of it. Each government submitted a plan which was inspected, vetted and monitored by other European governments in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.). Control by peers rather than supervisors is also a principle advocated in business management. A similar procedure could be adopted for groups of developing countries.

There are at least two other options. It would be desirable to create a genuine transnational secretariat whose loyalty would be only to the international community, that would be trusted by both donors and recipients. The staff of the present multilateral agencies does not quite achieve this, partly because the system of country quotas emphasizes national origins rather than merit, partly because the organizations are intergovernmental institutions, and partly because the recruitment, training, location, etc. of the staff of these organizations to some extent conflicts with the ethos of a staff serving only the global community. In addition to having technical competence, the staff would be trained to be sensitive to social and political factors.

Finally, we might consider setting up a council of wise men and women whose task it would be to monitor the performance of both donors and recipients, and who again would be trusted by both sides. The existence of national governments that insist on the exercise of their full sovereignty at present interferes with the moral and enlightened self-interest objectives of development cooperation, and not until this obstacle is overcome can we make progress.

NOTES

(1) Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action, 2nd. ed., Harvard University Press, 1971.

(2) Kindleberger, C. P., Government and International Trade, Essays in International Finance, 129, Princeton University, 1978, p. 15 and "International Public Goods Without International Government", Presidential Address to the Ninety-Eighth Meeting of the American Economic Association, December 29, 1985, New York. American Economic Review, March 1986.

(3) Related problems have also been discussed under the concepts of "tragedy of the commons" (each agent, acting in his self-interest, contributes to social losses, such as overgrazing on a common pasture or overpopulating the globe), and "social traps" (no driver has an incentive to install a gadget that reduces pollution). These, as well as prisoners' dilemma, "collective action", and Olson's problem, are special instances of "market failure".

(4) Cooper, Richard N., The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community, New York, McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968, pp. 160 – 73.

(5) Lipton, Michael, "Prisoners' Dilemma and Coase's Theorem: A Case for Democracy in Less Developed Countries?" in: Matthews, R. C. O. (ed.), Economy and Democracy, Macmillan, London 1985.

(6) Axelrod, R., The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books 1984.

(7) Lipton, Michael, op. cit.

(8) The point is made and the quotation cited in an article by Timothy Garton Ash "Back Yards" in the New York Review of Books, November 22, 1984.

(9) Olson, Mancur, op. cit.

(10) Butler, Joseph (Bishop of Durham, 1692 – 1752), Five Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Liberal Arts Press, New York 1950, Sermon 11, para. 20.

(11) Bryant, Ralph, Money and Monetary Policy in Interdependent Nations, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. 1980, p. 470.

(12) Of this long-standing confusion between universal and uniform, or general rules even such a clear-headed thinker as David Hume is guilty. Hume contrasts the highly specific reactions when we are seeking our own self-interest with the "universal and perfectly inflexible" laws of justice. He seems, like many others (including GATT), not to make a necessary distinction between general principles (the opposite of specific ones and therefore necessarily simple) and universal principles (which may be highly specific and highly compli-complicated, provided that they contain no uneliminable reference to individual cases). Thus, Hume says, in one place "universal and perfectly inflexible", but lower down "general and inflexible". And the use of the word "inflexible" conceals a confusion between a principle being able to be altered (which has nothing to do with its universality or generality) and its having a lot of exceptions written into it (which is consistent with universality but not with generality). Hume evidently thinks that the rules of justice have to be simple, general ones. He argues that unless the rules are general, people will be partial in their application of them and "would take into consideration the characters and circumstances of the persons, as well as the general nature of the question ... the avidity and partiality of men would quickly bring disorder into the world, if not restrained by some general and inflexible principles". But this is fallacious. In order to prevent people from being partial, the principles have to be universal, i.e., not contain references to individuals; they may, and indeed should, not be general; surely our judgements based on them ought to "take into consideration the characters and circumstances of the persons, as well as the general nature of the question".

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DIE ZENTRUM-PERIPHERIE-BEZIEHUNGEN, DIE TRANSNATIONALISIERUNG UND DIE ENTWICKLUNG VON INNEN

Einführung

Zwischen 1949 und 1951, während seiner ersten Jahre bei der CEPAL, publizierte Raul Prebisch drei sowohl ausgereifte wie bahnbrechende Werke, die Theorie und Praxis der Entwicklungspolitik in Lateinamerika und in der übrigen Welt stark beeinflußt haben (1).

Es handelt sich insofern um ausgereifte Arbeiten, also sie die Anstrengung widerspiegeln, theoretisch und praktisch die traumatische Erfahrung der Großen Depression und der Zeit danach zu formulieren und zu klären, die er sowohl in Positionen öffentlicher Verantwortung in Argentinien, wie als Berater verschiedener Zentralbanken, z.B. in Mexiko, machen mußte. Dazu kommt eine vergleichende Betrachtung der Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen den Staaten der Region hinsichtlich ihrer internationalen Einbindung und ihrer Reaktionen in einer Zeit tiefgreifender Änderungen der Weltwirtschaft.

Es handelt sich auch um bahnbrechende Werke, weil zum ersten Mal eine lateinamerikanische Sicht des Entwicklungsprozesses des Industriekapitalismus präsentiert wurde: ein konzeptioneller Rahmen um wichtige Ausprägungen und geschichtliche Etappen mit der Entwicklung der Ökonomien Lateinamerikas zu verbinden; ein theoretisches und Hypothesengebäude über die Natur dieses Prozesses und eine Reihe von Entwicklungsstrategien und -politiken. Diese Elemente stellen den konzeptionellen Grundriß dar, auf dem sich das strukturalistische Denken Lateinamerikas in den folgenden Jahrzehnten gründet, ausbaut und verfeinert (2).

In diesem Beitrag, der im Hinblick auf die Breite und Komplexität des Themas nur eine erste, sehr vorläufige und schematische Approximation ist, wird versucht, einige Verbindungen zwischen diesem Gedankengebäude und der Thematik der dependencia, sowie vor allem der Transnationalisierung zu erforschen, die seit dem Ende der 60er Jahre zutage zu treten begannen, um sich seit damals exponentiell, wenn auch mit Rückschlägen, zu reproduzieren (3).

Obwohl man des öfteren in diesen letztgenannten Sichtweisen eine Gegenposition zu Prebischs ursprünglichen Vorstellungen sehen wollte, meint dieser Beitrag,

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