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DEPENDENCY, THE STATE AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA

The state has always been an important subject of political discourse in Latin America. Indeed, society-centred theories have always taken second place in a continent dominated by populist and then military regimes, but where the state has always played a key role. The present article advances a theoretical framework for understanding the dependent state in general and then focuses on the populist and military states. Finally it examines the recent tendencies towards democratization and the emergence of new social movements less oriented towards the state than previous ones. Theda Skocpol and a recent volume aimed at "bringing the state back in" to social analysis has rightly commented that: "We do not need a new or refurbished grand theory of 'The State'. Rather, we need solidly grounded and analytically sharp understandings of the causal regularities that underlie the histories of states, social structures, and transnational relations in the modern world." (1) We need to integrate rather than choose between national level analysis and world-system level analysis, and between a state-centred and a society-centred focus. Above all, the endless theorizing on the state needs to give way to a historically grounded analysis which, of course, must be theoretically informed. On the basis, theories of the state may, finally, have some bearing on political strategies rather than an existence in an a-historical and de-politicized vacuum.

The dependent state

In the marxist tradition, the state is conceived as an essential component of the capitalist relations of production determined by the dynamic of the capital accumulation process. According to Engels the modern state is "the ideal personification of the total national capital" (2). The state reproduces capitalist relations of production and regulates the competition between individual capitals. Among the major tasks of any capitalist state, Elmar Altvater notes the following:

1) the provision of the general material conditions of production necessary for capital; 2) regulating the conflict between labour and capital through co-optation and repression; 3) safeguarding the existence and expansion of total national capital on the capitalist world market (3). The dependent

capitalist state must also fulfill these functions, including the representation of total national capital on the world market. It must also regulate the class struggle and strive for the legitimacy of the social order it represents. To the non-productive tasks of providing the basic infrastructure for capitalist accumulation, we might add the development of a productive state sector. The state must act as capitalist in the Third World given the weakness of the capitalist class, even though this may create contradictions within the dominant sectors. As Altvater notes, "if the state acts as a capitalist then it can be explained only through the particular history and particular conditions of a country" (4).

The debate around the specificity of the dependent capitalist state has centred recently around the conception of its "increased relative autonomy". This conception is rather imprecise but with Hamza Alavi it refers to the state apparatus taking on a new and relatively autonomous economic role, with a direct appropriation of a large part of the economic surplus which is then deployed bureaucratically to promote economic development (5). The relative autonomy of the dependent state, for example in periods of imperialist crisis, must however be established for each historical conjuncture in relation to the class struggle and not assumed as a theoretical a priori. The laws of motion of dependent capitalism dictate an increased intervention of the state in the economy in conditions where economic and political crisis lead to a modification in the articulation between nation-states. The "over-determining" role of the world economic system is mediated by the internal process of capital accumulation which has its own relatively autonomous dynamic. This autonomy is accentuated in periods of recession which make imperative the intervention of the state to reorganise the conditions of production. The dependent state, as any capitalist state, is also relatively autonomous from the dominant classes and may take measures in their long-term interest which conflict with their immediate needs. Whether in this respect the dependent state is more autonomous than its metropolitan counterparts, as Alavi suggests, is open to question however. The capacity for autonomous action is not a structural characteristic of the dependent state but depends on specific historical circumstances.

A historically grounded analysis of the dependent state would have to focus on the process of late or delayed development. In his analysis of pre-revolutionary Russia, Leon Trotsky provides valuable elements for an understanding of this process. In Russia, following Trotsky, "the State strove with all its power to accelerate the country's natural economic

development. New branches of handicraft, machinery, factories, big industry, capital, were, so to say, artificially grafted on the natural economic system. Capitalism seemed to be an offspring of the State" (6). We are dealing here with metaphors but they have an unusual theoretical purchase on the reality of late development in Latin America. As in pre-revolutionary Russia the state played a crucial role in forcing the development of social differentiation. The weakness of the socio-economic formation made the state the effective guardian of the process of national economic development. The particular weakness of the proto-industrialist class meant that the state would play a dominant role in the process of industrialization. Turning certain tenets of classical marxism on its head, the state practically created new social classes, rather than the state being a mere agent of the latter. The insights from this approach allow us to understand the relationship between state, industrial bourgeoisie and, of course, the working class in Latin America following the international capitalist crisis of 1929.

The debate on the appropriateness of a national or international focus on development has now run its course. Some interpretations of the dependency approach emphasized the imperatives of the external dimension but others recognised that this was always translated through internal political processes. For Hein and Stenzel "the state in underdeveloped capitalist societies is primarily an agent of transmitting the global dynamics of the international division of labour to the national level and of reproducing the internal class and political power structure according to these dynamics" (7). In this perspective the internal dynamic of capital accumulation, the state and social classes have no autonomy and simply reflect external factors. This undue emphasis on exogenous factors led some writers to stress the endogenous aspects of dependent development. Thus the Brazilian economist, M. C. Tavares argues that "commerce and the flow of foreign capital does not exogenously determine the dynamic of accumulation, they are just articulated with it and modify from within, accentuating the internal shifts that are taking place in the productive structure and in the historical pattern of accumulation" (8). The endogenous perspective can "bend the stick too far" in the other direction and neglect the great weight of the international dimension. For our part, the economic and political interventions of the dependent state can only be understood in terms of the interaction between the internationalization of capital in its various phases and the internal process of capital accumulation and class struggle.

Another false counterposition is between state-centred and society-centred

forms of analysis. Theda Skocpol tends to counterpose the two approaches, equating society-centred theories with the pluralist and structure-functionalist perspectives which dominated political science in the U.S.A. during the 1950's and 1960's (9). Against this approach, which neglects the state, she pits the German political science tradition which "insisted on the institutional reality of the state and its continuing impact on and within civil society" (10). Taking the state seriously in its own right and not as mere epiphenomenon of society is correct. Yet Max Weber for all his emphasis on the state did not neglect the dimension of civil society and the role of social classes. Clearly society-centred theories cannot be reduced to American structural functionalism, and here the growing importance of Antonio Gramsci's theoretical/political heritage would be relevant. The concept of "passive revolution" in which a series of molecular transformations progressively modify the previous composition of class forces is highly relevant to the populist experience in Latin America in which the state played a key role promoting industrialization and controlling the new working class. There is no reason why an emphasis on the role of the state (and its relative autonomy) would preclude examination of the transformations of civil society. The hegemony of particular social classes in Latin America was often mediated through the state, and our analysis cannot be exclusively class-theoretic or state-theoretic.

The populist state

The great crash of 1929 put an end to the old order in most of Latin America. The agrarian sector did not lose its economic predominance overnight, but its leading political role and the oligarchic state were brought into question. Industrialization in the 1930's actually began under transitional regimes in which the old landed interests played the dominant role. There was no revolutionary industrial bourgeoisie storming the bastions of the old regime but an accommodation towards the conditions on the international market which no longer favoured the old agro-export model. This process of state-led industrialization represented a dialectical interaction between internal and external factors. Raúl Prebisch, architect of this policy in Argentina, has stated recently how "in those days we took great care not to speak about an industrialisation policy, since the doctrine of the international division of labour was still prevalent not just among landowners but within the political parties themselves" (11). Industrialization was in short a requirement for developing countries under the new international

economic conditions, even though landowners and socialists alike opposed it on doctrinal grounds. As Gramsci writes in a different context, this was a case in which "a State replaces the local social groups in leading a struggle for renewal", or to put in another way "a State, even though it had limitations as a power, 'led' the group which should have been 'leading' ..." (12).

Following the Second World War a number of populist regimes emerged in Latin America, of which those of Perón in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil were the most significant. A whole series of mechanisms carried out the incorporation of the trade unions into the bourgeois state apparatus. In this way, the capital/wage-labour relation came directly under the aegis of the state, moulded into a class collaborationist structure and subordinated to nationalist ideology. The policy of the state vis-à-vis the working class can be summarized as one of pre-emptive cooptation. The populist state form ensured its legitimacy through the ideology of nationalism and an ill-defined redistributive perspective, summarized in Perón's slogan of justicialismo (justice). It should not be thought however that corporativism was uniformly successful in subordinating workers to the state. In Argentina, for example, the labour movement played a crucial role in the rise of Perón and exerted a major influence on Peronism thereafter. In Brazil corporativism was more effective in controlling a working class which had a much lower level of organization prior to the rise of Vargas. An exclusively state-centred analysis focuses on controls from above and neglects the processes and struggles within civil society. The extent of working class organization, political formation and militancy had a fundamental effect on the ability of the state to carry through its project of preemptive cooption.

The economic intervention of the state also took on a new increased dimension after 1930 and even more so after the Second World War. In Brazil there was a concentrated block of state investment: in 1942 a state mining corporation was established, in 1943 the first car plant, in 1947 an integrated steel mill, in 1952 the state development bank and in 1953 the state petroleum company was set up. In Argentina the Peronist decade (1946 - 1955) saw a concerted drive towards state-led industrialization through the State Export Board which retained a proportion of agricultural export profits, and the state increased its commitment toward infrastructural investment. In Mexico state intervention began earlier than both the above cases and as Fitzgerald notes "in Mexico the scale and scope of this (state) intervention appears to have been greater than elsewhere" (13). In most of

these cases the development of the state sector was related to the following factors: 1) the existence of industrial sectors which were not profitable (or require a long period for maturing) and which are necessary for the expansion of industry as a whole; 2) conditions where the amount of initial capital outlay can only be met by the state or foreign monopoly capital; 3) the expression of nationalist or military/strategic policies; and 4) the need to stimulate new levels of expansion in the downswing of an economic cycle (14). Thus the state, in conjunction with foreign capital, established an internal circuit of capital accumulation in the more developed Latin American countries.

It is necessary to stress that there was a state productive sector, which was profitable, as well as the commitment towards providing the general conditions of production for capital. In their pioneering analysis of the state productive sector and economic cycles in Brazil, Reichstul and Countinho maintain that this sector, composed mainly of the steel, petro-chemical and energy industries, is productive in the sense of producing surplus value (15). The essential transformations of the capital accumulation process after the mid 1950's were based precisely on the consolidation of the state productive sector in the previous decade. The key role of this sector in the process of dependent accumulation can be surmised from Reichstul and Dountinho's finding that the productive state sector began to slow down in 1961 - 62 and this was followed by the private sector in 1963; conversely the recovery from the recession was led by the state productive sector and began to pick up around 1966 - 67, whereas the private sector only recovered its previous growth rates in 1968 (16). This would seem to indicate a leading role for the productive state sector in the dynamic of the whole economy. In a more general vein we can note that the historical rhythms of the creation of state firms coincides with the historical rhythm of the different phases of economic development. The weight of the state sector following the expansive phase after the Second World War suggests that the cyclical movements of the economy acquired a predominantly endogenous character.

Having examined the role of the populist state form vis-à-vis the working class and in providing the basic infrastructure for capitalist accumulation we now need to examine its policy towards the international market. Foreign investment in Latin America took a great leap forward in the mid-1950's: for example U.S. investment doubled between 1950 and 1957. As Tavares notes for the Brazilian case "the intervention of the state, in particular its own potential for internal accumulation had necessarily to expand and precede the

new form of articulation with international capital" (17). It was the decisive intervention of the state in the post-war period which laid the basis for the new mode of "associated dependent" development in the 1960's but, one must also add, this accrued in the context of an overall reorientation within the imperialist system following the Korean War. It is, however, very difficult to assess a priority for either endogenous or exogenous factors in this process. What is clear though is the profound organic complementarity between the state and foreign capital sectors established during this period. During this period the famous tripé (tripod) of foreign, state and national private capital was established in Brazil and the other major semi-industrialized nation states of Latin America such as Mexico and Argentina. Inter-sector complementarity did not preclude competition between these three sectors, and this would sharpen in periods of economic recession.

The increased level of foreign investment in the mid-1950's was marked by a decline in the relative weight of U.S. investment in Latin America which represented 71 % of the total in 1950 and only 56 % in 1959. David Evans argues for the Brazilian case that "the result of dispersion (of the origins of direct investment) is to give the Brazilian state increased manoeuvring room" (18). More generally we can argue that the internationalization of the internal market in Latin America gave increased power to the local state. This is one aspect of the "relative autonomy" of the state and belies any simplistic image of the dependent state as mere transmission belt for the wishes of an undifferentiated "metropolis" (a "satellite" of which by definition lacks any autonomy). As to the other aspect of the state's relative autonomy with respect to the dominant classes, here there was a growing contradiction between the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state. The populist power bloc no longer represented adequately the newly dominant economic sectors linked to foreign and state big capital. Populism had a rhetoric which could mobilize the masses as well as contain them. It represented a concession which the dominant economic fractions of capital felt they no longer needed to pay to ensure the stability of the political order. The 1964 military takeover in Brazil represented a realignment of economy and policy as the most advanced capitalist sectors took over directly the reins of state power through their military/technocratic apparatus.

The modern military state

With the 1964 military coup in Brazil the era of the modernizing military state had begun. Unlike their historical counterparts or even their

contemporaries such as Somoza or Stroessner these had a clear modernizing capitalist project to implement. The disciplining of the working class was a key element for the modern military state to accomplish. When trade unions and strikes could not be simply abolished they would at least be severely restricted. The military regimes following the Chilean coup in 1973 and that in Argentina in 1976 went furthest in the repression of the working class. The Brazilian regime sought to maintain a vestige of legitimacy by carefully fostering some of the trappings of representative democracy. The second major prong of the new military state was a deepening of dependency through an increased integration of their nation-states into the international circuit of capital accumulation. This did not necessarily mean a return to the pre-1930 "golden era" of the agrarian oligarchy. However, from now on the state would begin to dismantle the protectionist measures which made possible the post-1930 "import substitution industrialization" and stress instead the comparative advantages of their traditional exports. Overall the political economy of the new military states would stress the free market and non-intervention of the state, except to ensure that labour did not disturb the operation of the free market as regards the price of labour-power.

The ideology of the new military regimes was decidedly antistatist and favourable to private enterprise. In practice however the economic role of the state increased, most dramatically in the Brazilian case where the share of state enterprises of the assets of the largest 300 corporations increased from 17 % in 1966 to 30 % in 1972. In Argentina we find that although public expenditure as a portion of the Gross National Product fell from 39 % in 1975 to 34 % in 1977 it recovered and reached the former level in 1979. In Chile, where the anti-statist rhetoric was strongest, public expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product declined from 36 % in 1974 to 26 % in 1979 but recovered to 35 % in 1982. In spite of early rhetoric by the economic advisors to the Southern Cone military regimes, the major productive and service concerns run by the state have not been affected, often for the very good reason that they are not profitable and would not attract private buyers. Taking a long-term view it is clear that an element of state capitalism is inevitable in a situation of late dependent industrialization. The reduction and rationalization of public spending is one thing, the wholesale denationalization of state companies quite another. However, the ideology of privatization was to prove more effective in its bid to dismantle the welfare elements of the state in a bid to reverse the concessions of the populist states.

The recomposition of capital under the new military state leads inevitably to the restructuring of labour. In Argentina, Brazil and Chile national level trade union organizations were banned or suspended and their leaders imprisoned, persecuted or exiled. In the workplace, in the wake of the military takeovers, the "dull compulsion of economic necessity" which Marx referred to was joined by the sharper and more forceful compulsion of bayonets and machine-guns. Direct repression was matched by a broad attack on the very fabric of working class life. Liberal economic policies led to deindustrialization and unemployment, with the partial exception of Brazil where the industrial working class expanded during the 1968 - 73 period. The workplaces which remain are increasingly subject to technological change, resulting in redundancies and deskilling. Wage differentials have increased dramatically, driving a wedge into the working class. As the labour market is reshaped, hundreds of thousands of workers and employees are shifted around geographically, adding to the disorganization. If the modern military states of the Southern Cone sought to reorganize the conditions for capital accumulation in fundamental prerequisite was the disorganizing and disciplining of the working class and to achieve a dramatic reduction in the power of the labour movement.

Labour is, of course, a peculiar commodity on the capitalist market because it has the capacity to organize and fight back. As Thomas Skidmore has written "variations in the character of the labour movement (which may in turn be attributable to the level of economic development) is the most important single variable in explaining the success or failure of (economic) stabilization programs" (19). In its defensive and offensive capabilities the labour movement is a key actor in the modern military state. In Argentina the 1966 military coup was followed in 1969 by the semi-insurrectionary events of the Cordobazo. In Brazil, by contrast, the military state had a remarkably quiescent labour scene between 1964 and 1978 (barring a slight hiccup in 1968). In the latter case the military state and its capitalist backers were extremely fortunate. When asked by a visiting sociologist about the Brazilian model and its relevance to Argentina, a prominent industrialist replied: "It's an industrialist's paradise. (But) the Argentine trade unions are too strong; they would resist. There might be a civil war and we don't know who would win, how it would come out." (20) When a new military coup in 1976 launched a virtual civil war on the working class of Argentina, the latter emerged battered but with its organizations intact in the demilitarization process following the dictatorship's defeat in the South

Atlantic war of 1982.

We turn now to one of the major contradictions in the policy of the new military regimes regarding state intervention in the economy. In theory this was a bad thing but in practice it was necessary. In Brazil these contradictions reached such a pitch that around 1974 a campaign against statism (Estatizaçao) was launched by various fractions of capital. Due to the international economic recession there was a general reorientation of state and private investment towards the capital goods sector. This was necessary given the end of the cycle of substitution of durable consumer goods but those sectors which no longer occupied top priority perceived the shift as a direct attack on themselves. Thus, in spite of the fact that the government's policies were to step forward for capitalism as a whole, and could lay the basis for a renewed and intensified accumulation of capital, some major capitalist sectors opposed these policies. An inter-bourgeois conflict was portrayed by part of the economic press as a dilemma between state capitalism and private enterprise, totalitarianism or democracy. Part of the left, on the other hand, tried to portray the state, and more specifically the state productive sector, as a potential ally of the working class in a bid to re-create the illusions of the pre-1964 state form.

Around 1981 the anti-estatizaçao campaign restarted in Brazil as many local industrialists feared that any further opening of the economy would benefit foreign firms most and sought instead an orientation towards the internal market. The three way partnership between state, local and foreign capital was becoming even more shaky as each looked to their own particular interests. In fact the choice was not between nationalism and further integration into the world capitalist economy. The economic activities of the state do not result from the intentions of a "state bourgeoisie" but are dictated by the movement and restructuring of capital as a whole as determined by the international economy conditions and the reaching of the limits of the famous "Brazilian miracle".

A more limited conflict over statization also occurred in Argentina and Chile. In Argentina, following the 1976 coup, there was a serious clash between the monetarist principles of the Economy Minister and the armed forces over the proposed privatization of the crucial Fabricaciones Militares (Military Equipment) complex. In Chile there was tension, following the 1973 coup, over the precise limits of the "strategic" activities deemed immune to privatization: the 'Chicago boys' economics school called for a minimal definition, whereas the military argued for a comprehensive definition of a

state sector necessary for national development and security, which included communications, transport, electricity, etc. as well as the largest state industry, that of copper.

The new democratic state

The 1983 elections in Argentina symbolically launched the process of redemocratization in the Southern Cone (21). That year the Chilean military regime was shaken by unprecedented demonstrations and strikes, in 1984 there were elections in Uruguay and in 1985 the opposition finally came to power in Brazil. It is necessary to separate for the purposes of analysis the process of demilitarization from that of democratization itself. Demilitarization begins with a crisis of the military regime and a move towards "de-compression" of the dictatorship. Democratization, on the other hand, reflects the positive task of constructing the state of law (*estado de derecho*) and consolidating a stable institutional framework for democracy. Under the first rubric we find different patterns depending on whether 'decompression' is sudden and caused by regime collapse as in Argentina, or is a gradual process carefully managed by the outgoing regime. When we move from the macro level of society to the micro level of everyday life we find that the vestiges of militarization persist well into the new democratic era. The "habits of authoritarianism" have penetrated into all areas of society, and simply cannot be unlearned in a year or two. Under the modern military states of the Southern Cone, what Foucault calls the "micro-physics" of power had elevated the discourse of order and authority to a new level.

The experience of the military dictatorships, following the failure of the guerilla strategy, led the left in Latin America to reconsider the question of democracy. One of the most popular slogans amongst progressive political scientists in Argentina is the need to develop a "new way of doing politics". A major emphasis is placed on the shift away from the corporations - seen primarily as the armed forces and the trade unions - as the main actors in the political process. The hopes for democracy are focused instead on parliament and the political parties. There is a plea for new pattern of sociability, for the political actors to learn the virtues of citizenship. The previous zero-sum conception of politics is seen to be giving way to compromise and negotiations as the basis for politics, with parliament representing the privileged arena of that process. One writer, Lilian de Riz, urges the trade unions under the new democratic state "to subordinate the logic of their sectoral interests to that of a party politics which must

conciliate the exigencies of the trade unions with the demands of other social sectors" (22). Whatever the bureaucratization of the trade unions and their orientation towards the state they simply cannot be equated with the armed forces as equally noxious corporatist institutions. While the capital/wage-labour relation remains the basis of society trade unions will seek to defend the interests of workers.

Indeed, this has rationalized a system of "democracy for democrats only" because the people, when allowed to practice it have elected "authoritarian" figures such as Yrigoyen and Perón. This analysis serves also to justify a peculiar republicanism which is not democratic. It reflects, furthermore, the failure of the right to achieve a stable and credible political formation in Argentina. The rightist Unión del Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre), after achieving 1.28 percent of the presidential vote in the 1983 elections, pledged itself to defend democratic institutions, but within a year it became an advocate of *golpismo* (*coup d'état*).

The recent unqualified endorsement of democracy by progressive intellectuals in Argentina has been questioned by José Nun among others. Nun argues for an essential distinction between 'governed democracy' (*democracia gobernada*) which exists, and the 'governing democracy' (*democracia gobernante*) which is required (23). The present constitutional regime in Argentina cannot be considered a genuine democracy. At one level, the authoritarianism of the political system persists, with President Alfonsín representing what has been called a "caudillo democracy". In this sense "Alfonsinismo" has all the potential for creating a paternalist and passive politics, as did earlier populisms. Furthermore, there are different levels of democracy as Markovic explains: "the realm of democracy is not only the political sphere but the whole sphere of public life - production, education, scientific research, cultural activities, health service, etc. (24). It is necessary for democracy to permeate all these spheres to become more than a formal devise, a restricted participation by the masses accepted reluctantly by ruling class which saw its 'military party' reduced to impotence. The current revalorization of democracy has overall been a healthy tendency, but it has tended to fall into a "stages theory": first we get democracy established and then we go on to other things.

In practice, the "new social movements" of the late 1970's have deepened our understanding of democracy. During the recent military dictatorship in Argentina, for example, various single-issue campaigns focused on non-economic issues: above all the human rights campaign, but also an

incipient ecology movement, a small feminist movement and a diffuse urban renewal campaign. As Mainwaring and Viola explain in a pioneering essay "The new movements responded to the dual closing of political and social space by attempting to find forms against the authoritarian abuses and new forms of sociability ... They tried to recover some of the space 'lost' because of the closing of civil society, yet they also tried to create some new spaces" (25). It were these new social movements which helped to overcome the dictatorial discourse by providing an alternative rationality, something the traditional labour movement was unable to do. Populism is by no means dead in the Southern Cone, but a new element of participatory democracy, anti-authoritarianism and breadth of vision has achieved a foothold. As yet the new social movements are a minority phenomenon and the main one focused on human rights will recede in importance as democratization proceeds. Nevertheless they have influenced some political parties and the new sensibility to social issues may well lead to new forms of associative life developing in the future.

Concertación social

The essential element in the democratization strategy of the Radical government was the process of *concertación social* (social contract). The theoretical emphasis on mediation by the authors cited above had its practical counterpart in the government's policy of *concertación social* designed to bring the trade unions, employers and the state into a united front. After various ups and downs, caused by some reluctance by the trade unions to be absorbed by this corporatist project, an agreement was reached in February 1985. The anti-inflationary package agreed to include a commitment to a wages freeze which caused serious unrest among trade union members. Government promised a tax reform to "avoid the worsening of social inequalities" but inevitably it was perceived as an IMF austerity plan. One cannot prejudge the prospects of the government's 1985 - 1989 economic plan, but 'social pacts' have been tried before in Argentina (as elsewhere) and failed.

The economic tasks facing the new democratic states of the Southern Cone are considerable. The massive foreign debt inherited from the previous military regimes weighs like a millstone round the necks of the new democracies. The continuing high levels of inflation betrayed, at least in Argentina, a virtual inability of the state to control the key economic variable. It was in this context that the Plan Austral was introduced in

Argentina in 1985 freezing prices and wages. A similar economic orientation has since been adopted in Brazil. What we find is the new democratic states taking an economic orientation which is not different in principle from that practised by the monetarist advisers to the previous military regimes. Even the emphasis on privatization was continued by the new democratic states, with the regime in Argentina selling off much of the steel and petrochemical industries, to the disquiet of even their own supporters. The new democracies retain a high level of legitimacy in spite of their failure to deliver on their economic promises. Fajnzylber notes that "Democratization and endogenous modernization are possible axes for a new development strategy in Latin America" (26). Yet endogenous modernization seems a remote possibility in the Southern Cone after a period of de-industrialization and the subsequent turning by many sectors of capital to speculative rather than productive investment.

The justified revalorization of the democratic state form in Latin America has not been matched by sustained attention to the economic and social aspects of democratization and the need to democratize the state itself. The new democracies have introduced an ethical dimension into politics, in part due to the example of the new social movements. The choice between democracy and authoritarianism/corporativism is however an impoverished one which does not recognize the fundamental social contradictions of dependent capitalism. The new democracies represent, if one takes a long-term view, a new bid by the bourgeoisie to create hegemonic rule and a new pact of domination with the subaltern classes. They seek to reorganize the state on the basis of a modern bourgeois republic, with an effective party system, a depoliticized labour movement and more accountable armed forces. The twenty year cycle of the military states in the Southern Cone is now effectively closed (the case of Chile notwithstanding) and the historical conditions which gave rise to the populist states cannot be recreated. The initial popular enthusiasm for the new democracies is now beginning to give way to a call for democracy and social justice. The various social pacts created during the process of democratization cannot contain for long the inherent social contradictions they repressed and represented.

Notes

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- (2) Engels, F., Anti-Dühring, Moscow, Progress Publishers 1969, p. 330.
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- (4) Ibid., p. 108.
- (5) Alavi, H., "The State in Post-colonial Society", New Left Review, No. 74, 1972, p. 62.
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- (8) Tavares, M. C., Acumulação de Capital e Industrialização no Brasil, Ph.D. dissertation, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 1976, p. 119.
- (9) Skocpol, T., "Bringing the State Back In", pp. 4 - 8.
- (10) Ibid., p. 7.
- (11) Prebisch, R., "Argentine Economic Policies since the 1930's: Recollections", in G. Di Tella and D. C. Platt (eds.), The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880 - 1946. London, Macmillan 1986, p. 134.
- (12) Gramsci, A., Prison Notebooks, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 105.
- (13) Fitzgerald, E. V. K., "The Financial Constraint on Relative Autonomy: the State and Capital Accumulation in Mexico, 1940 - 82", in C. Anglade and Fortin, C. (eds.), The State and Capital Accumulation in Latin America Vol. 1, London, Macmillan 1985, p. 210.
- (14) This theme is expanded in the author's "State and Capital: Brazil, 1930 - 1980" in Munck, R., Politics and Dependency in the Third World. The Case of Latin America, London, Zed Books, 1984.
- (15) Reichstul, H. P. and Coutinho, L., "O setor produtivo estatal e o ciclo", in C. E. Martins (ed.), Estado e Capitalismo no Brasil, Sao Paulo, HUCITEC-CEBRAP, 1977.
- (16) Ibid., p. 63.
- (17) Tavares, M. C. Acumulação de Capital e Industrialização no Brasil, p. 128.
- (18) Evans, D., Dependent Development. The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil, Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 83.
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- (20) Petras, J., Class, State and Power in the Third World, London, Zed Books 1981, p. 255.
- (21) This theme is expanded in Munck, R. "Democratization and Demilitarization in Argentina, 1982 - 1985", Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 4 No. 2, 1985.
- (22) de Riz, L., "La hora de los partidos", Debates, No. 1, 1984, p. 17.
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KURZBESCHREIBUNG DER FÜR DAS SYMPOSIUM DES MATTERSBURGER
KREISES ("Neue Herausforderungen in der Entwicklungspolitik",
28. - 30. Mai 1987 in Mattersburg) GEPLANTEN ARBEITSKREISE

1. Helmut Kramer (Institut für Politikwissenschaft, 1090 Wien, Währingerstraße 28, Tel. 34 13 67/16):
"Schwellenländer in Südostasien und die aktuelle entwicklungstheoretische Situation"
In dieser Arbeitsgruppe soll eine unserer Meinung nach in und für Österreich längst fällige Evaluation der Entwicklungs-"Erfolge" der südostasiatischen "Schwellenländer" (Südkorea, Taiwan etc.) vor allem unter drei Gesichtspunkten erfolgen:
- Konsequenzen für die aktuelle entwicklungstheoretische Diskussion
- Bedeutung der Variablen "Agrarstruktur" und "kultur-religiöses Substrat" für gesellschaftliche Entwicklung
- etwaige Erleuchtungen für das "Modell" (?) Österreich
Als ausländische Referenten sind vorgesehen U. Menzel (Bremen) und M. Moore (Sussex).
Die Arbeitsgruppe wird von H. Kramer (Universität Wien), H. Palme (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien) und K. Raffer (Universität Wien) koordiniert.
2. Peter Feldbauer (Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, 1010 Wien, Dr. Karl Lueger-Ring 1, Tel. 43 00/24 48):
"Entwicklungspolitik und Erwachsenenbildung"
Fast alle Mitglieder des Mattersburger Kreises sind als Lehrer, Hochschullehrer, Mitarbeiter des ÜIE etc. in den Bereichen Bildung bzw. Fortbildung tätig. Es scheint daher sinnvoll, die Erfahrungen der letzten Jahre auszutauschen, wobei folgende Diskussionsschwerpunkte im Mittelpunkt stehen könnten:
- Anzusprechende Gruppen: Sind Dritte-Welt-Probleme momentan etwas aus der Mode gekommen? (Besucherschwund bei VHS-Veranstaltungen). Falls ja, warum? Sind unsere Inhalte aktuell?
- Angebotene Inhalte: Sind wir - angesichts der Tatsache, daß die Dritte-Welt-Forschung in den letzten zehn Jahren enorme Dimensionen angenommen hat und manche Lehrmeinungen (z.B. Dependenztheorie, einseitig-externe Erklärungsansätze - Weltsystemtheorie) in Frage gestellt wurden - mit unseren verbreiteten Inhalten am gebotenen Wissensstand?
- Didaktik: Gab es in den letzten Jahren erfolgreiche Neuansätze? Haben sich die beim letzten Treffen in Mattersburg formulierten Hoffnungen bestätigt?
- Organisationsfragen: Welche Typen des Fortbildungsangebots existieren? Wer sind die Träger, wer die Mitarbeiter? Welche Fortbildungsprojekte befinden sich in Planung (etwa seitens ÜIE)? Wo und unter welchen Rahmenbedingungen können sich neue Leute engagieren?

3. Mechthild Petritsch (1070 Wien, Neustiftgasse 93, Tel. 96 19 14):
"Die veränderte Position der Frau in der Weltgesellschaft. Neue Trends in Entwicklungspolitik und -strategie", oder "Frauen in der Entwicklungspolitik - zwei Jahre nach Nairobi"

Fast zwei Jahre nach Beendigung der 1975 von den Vereinten Nationen ausgerufenen Dekade der Frau durch die Weltfrauenkonferenz in Nairobi stellt sich die Frage, ob und wie sich die frauenrelevanten Problemstellungen und Zielsetzungen in der internationalen Zusammenarbeit verschoben haben und welche Position Österreich darin bezieht; ob und wie die aus den "Forward-Looking Strategies" (Zukunftsweisenden Strategien) - dem von der Konferenz beschlossenen Frauenförderungsprogramm - abgeleiteten Verpflichtungen auf nationaler Ebene tatsächlich umgesetzt werden und welche Maßnahmen in Österreich im Rahmen multi- und bilateraler entwicklungspolitischer Zusammenarbeit eine Annäherung an die Zielsetzungen von Nairobi darstellen. Ein weiteres Diskussionsthema entsteht aus der international vorgegebenen Forderung nach verstärkter Einbeziehung von Nicht-Staatlichen Organisationen (NGOs). In Frage stehen dabei die Durchführbarkeit dieser Forderung bei Geber- und Empfängerorganisationen sowie die politischen Implikationen einer Schwerpunktverlagerung der Verantwortung für den Aufgabenbereich "Frauen und Entwicklung" in den nichtstaatlichen Bereich.

Die angedeuteten Fragenkomplexe werden in dem Arbeitskreis durch drei Haupt- und einige Nebenreferate zur Diskussion gestellt und sollen unter Teilnahme der Vertreter der zuständigen österreichischen Stellen aktionsorientiert besprochen werden.

4. Gerhard Payr (9500 Villach, Jungnickelstraße 5/3/27):

"Afrika - Schwerpunkt der österreichischen Entwicklungshilfe?"

- Sinkendes Prokopfeinkommen bei rasch steigendem Bevölkerungswachstum, zunehmende Verknappung der Nahrungsmittel, großräumige Vernichtung der Umwelt und Ressourcen, Verschuldung, Kapitalflucht und Entdemokratisierung kennzeichnen die afrikanische Krise, deren Höhepunkt unabhängig von den Ereignissen in Südafrika, noch lange nicht erreicht ist.
- Die zunehmende gesellschaftliche Differenzierung in praktisch allen Staaten Schwarzafrikas führt zu einer Marginalisierung der Masse der Bevölkerung vor allem im ländlichen Raum. Diese wird entweder in die Subsistenzwirtschaft abgedrängt oder vermehrt die Zahl der Arbeitslosen und Slumbewohner in den Städten.
- Maßnahmen multi- und bilateraler Hilfe greifen bisher nur punktuell (z.B. in Malawi). Einem umfassenden Erfolg stehen mangelhafte administrative Strukturen der Nehmerländer, Sekundärinteressen der Geber, unzulängliche Abstimmung der Programme zwischen den Gebern, die schwierige naturgeographische Ausgangsposition und schließlich das geringe Volumen der gewährten Hilfe insgesamt entgegen.
- Die österreichische Entwicklungshilfe für Schwarzafrika ist auch im Hinblick auf das geringe Volumen der bilateralen Hilfe Österreichs im ganzen, minimal. Österreichische Mikroprojekte, wie in Sambia, Senegal, Tansania, zeigen zwar gute modellhafte Lösungsmöglichkeiten auf, könnten aber erst bei entsprechender institutioneller, personeller und finanzieller Ausstattung einen auch quantitativ spürbaren Entwicklungsbeitrag leisten. Eine systematische Evaluierung österreichischer Projekte durch den politischen Auftraggeber und/oder durch unabhängige Gutachter fehlt weitgehend und erschwert eine Bewertung bisher durchgeführter Projektvorhaben.

- Eine Schwerpunktsetzung der österreichischen Entwicklungshilfe für Schwarzafrika begründet sich an den zuvor genannten Kriterien und könnte sich sinnvollerweise in Zukunft auf zwei bis drei Schwerpunktländer, z.B. Äthiopien und ausgewählte SADDG-Länder beschränken. In Abstimmung mit den Ländern und den dort aktiven Gebern wäre so eine sinnvolle Konzentration, die Beteiligung an Gesamtplanungen und die Kombination staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Projekte leichter und effektiver zu leisten.

Vor dem Hintergrund der zuvor genannten Themen könnte ich mir im Rahmen eines dreitägigen Arbeitskreises folgende Vorgehensweise vorstellen:

- a Zu folgenden Themenbereichen werden vorab Aufsätze erarbeitet, im JEP veröffentlicht und in Kurzreferaten (etwa 30 Minuten) beim Seminar zusammengefaßt dargestellt:

(1) Ergebnisse und typische Hemmfaktoren bei Planung und Durchführung von Entwicklungshilfe-Vorhaben im ländlichen Raum in Schwarzafrika.

Mögliche Referenten: K. M. Fischer, Theo Rauch, H. Kordik

(2) Analyse österreichischer Entwicklungshilfe-Projekte in Afrika 1970 - 1986.

Mögliche Referenten: O. Höll, H. Achleitner

(3) Konzept und Kriterien für eine neue Schwerpunktsetzung der österreichischen Entwicklungshilfe in Schwarzafrika.

Mögliche Referenten: NN.

- b In den Arbeitskreisen sollten möglichst viele Personen mit Afrikaerfahrung sitzen (Arbeitstagung von "Experten", keine Fortbildung im herkömmlichen Sinn). In erster Linie sollte an einem Konzept für eine Schwerpunktsetzung Schwarzafrika gearbeitet werden.

Als Teilnehmer sollten neben Personen von IIZ, Volkshilfe und ÜED unbedingt auch österreichische Fachleute gewonnen werden, die für Weltbank, FAO, GTZ etc. tätig waren oder es noch sind (Kiene, Kordik, Kock, Steingruber, Wandler etc.).

Die Arbeitskreise werden zeitlich so angesetzt, daß eine Teilnahme an zwei von ihnen möglich sein wird!

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