Journal für Entwicklungspolitik 2, 1986, S. 18 - 31

Marie Lavigne

EAST-SOUTH TRADE IN PRIMARY PRODUCTS: A MODEL BORROWED FROM THE NORTH-SOUTH PATTERN?

Among the requests addressed to the group of the socialist countries by the Third World countries (expressed in the memoranda of the Group of 77 at UNCTAD IV (1976) and UNCTAD V (1979) meetings), one of the most insistent is the increase of the share of manufactures in the exports to the East. However, the commodity pattern of East-South trade has been structurally marked by the high share of primary products, all along the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, in the imports of the East (see Table 1). It also seems that the USSR and the Eastern European countries are not granting especially favorable price conditions to the developing countries, as compared with the world prices for primary goods. Is it then possible to assert, as it is widely done in the Western and Third World literature, that the East-South commodity pattern of trade does not substantially differ from the North-South one? This note is an attempt to clarify this question. Our conclusions are two-fold: first, the East-South pattern has specificities not to be found in North-South trade, even if the general scheme is similar; second, because of their marginal insertion in the international division of labor, the developed socialist countries cannot replicate the "Northern" approach to the commodity markets of the Third World (1).

Let us first state the framework of this essay. By "Third World" we understand the developing countries as listed in the Soviet and Eastern European definitions, that is the non-communist countries (or developing market economies in the UN formulation): the CMEA developing countries are excluded (Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam), as well as China, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia. The "East" is defined as the group of the "rich" socialist countries (the expression has been used by D. Nayyar, 1979): the USSR and the "Six" smaller European CMEA countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania. The primary goods are taken as the 0-4 SITC commodity classes (food and agricultural goods, crude materials and mineral fuels).

1. The Structure of Soviet and East European Primary Goods Imports from the Third World

The share of the primary products has been steadily increasing since the beginning of the seventies. In the Soviet import trade with the Third World it has moved from 75 per cent in 1970 to over 80 in 1979-80, slightly declining afterwards. In the Eastern European imports, it has increased from 81 per cent in 1970 to 93 in 1982 (Table 1).

The higher share of manufactured goods in total imports is not the sole distinctive feature of Soviet trade as compared with that of the "Six". The inner structure of the primary goods trade is also different.

While the Soviet Union is growingly importing food products, the share of which has increased from one third of total imports in the beginning of the seventies to circa one half in the eighties, the Six have significantly reduced their food imports (from one third to one fifth). Reversely, the share of fuels has always been much higher for the Six than for the USSR, and is thus much closer to the corresponding figure in North-South trade (with fuels accounting for about 60 per cent of the imports of the Six and slightly under 70 per cent in the imports of the developed market economies from the Third World in the early eighties). Finally, the USSR as well as the Six are importing non-agruclutlral and non-fuel commodities, but along strongly different patterns.

The impact of declining oil prices since the end of 1985 is likely to significantly affect the fuel trade of the whole Soviet and Eastern European bloc. This is why we are going to elaborate on it in a last section, after dealing with the distinctive features of the commodity trade for the Six and the USSR.

1.1. The Six: A Long-Term Strategy in Supplies from the Third World, or a stop Go-Policy?

The non-fuel purchases of the Six from the developing countries are specialised by supplier areas. Latin America is the main supplier of food and agricultural products. Grain, contrary to the sales towards the Soviet Union, is not the main item; most of the supplies are made of feeding stuff for animals (soya concentrates, fish flour) and of raw materials (cotton, wool). Latin America is also a significant supplier of some minerals (iron ore, non ferrous metals). Asia and sub-Saharan Africa provide Eastern Europe with rice, tea, coffee, cocoa, tropical foodstuffs, with large fluctuations in purchases, due to the fact that the relevant goods are not a strong priority in the import trade of the Six. When the commercial policy requests cuts in imports, as was the case in the early eighties, purchases of coffee, cocoa, fruit are curbed in the first place. One has however to mention that the bilateral trade statistics between Eastern European and Third World countries do not igve an accurate image of the trade in such products. The Six are often prone to import these goods through Western traders rather than from the producer countries if they find a price advantage in that. The GDR imports most of its coffee through FRG traders. Poland has been buying its cocoa mostly through London trade houses since the mid-seventies (Veyrat 1985: 220). Such a policy has been justified by a Czechoslovak author in the following terms: "the imports of raw materials and agricultural products from the developing countries to Czechoslovakia are connected with a specific issue of a high participation of intermediaries whose services are used to effect purchases. Czechoslovakia is interested in the expansion of direct trade relations with the developing countries. The efforts in these relations are faced, however, with a considerable inertia of former, traditional commercial links of many developing countries to some developed market economies ... Czechoslovak trade organisations are forced to purchase from the organisations of the state sector at the so-called minimum prices which are often considerably higher than prices paid by firms from the sphere of convertible currencies. *It then happens, not unfrequently, that a purchase through an intermediary is more advantageous than a direct purchase ...*" (Angelis 1978: 180 and 182, italics mine).

With Africa and Asia, the share of mineral imports has declined during the past decade along with the increase of fuel imports: metal ores (particularly tin from Malaysia), phosphate rock, bauxite, are the main items.

Is this pattern duplicating the usual North-South one?

If we exclude the fuel trade which follows a specific rationale, the main aim of the Six is to secure stable supplies for a narrow range of goods. The case is very different for minerals and agricultural products.

For mineral raw materials, the Six are highly import-dependent, but their major supplier remains the Soviet Union. The Third World is a residual supplier insofar as the Soviet Union has been reducing its sales since the mid-seventies, or is not able itself to export such goods (tin, bauxite, phosphate rock).

For agricultural products and especially food, the Six are much less

import-dependent than the Soviet Union. We have already seen that some items belong to the category of non priority goods, the import of which is easy to curb. The most important type of goods in this class is foodstuff for animals. This item is quite critical for the husbandry of the Six, and more particularly for the meat exporters (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria). There is still a long way to self-sufficiency in this field, although the strategy of the concerned countries is to increase the crops of such cereals as soya or maize.

In this respect, two different strategies may be conducted.

According to the first one, and considering the very low share of the Six in world trade of primary goods, the best policy is just "to buy in the country where the conditions are the more favourable to the buyer" (Paszynski 1982: 74). This strategy implies a very high supply elasticity and a very low risk of shortages in the long run. Both conditions seem to be valid if we consider the present state of the markets for most of mineral raw materials or of agricultural goods. Should a reverse tendency prevail, with shortages for some goods, it would not be useful to envisage a strategy of industrial cooperation, considering the weak investment potential of the socialist countries. If we relate this to the austerity policies conducted in all those countries since the end of the seventies, it is clear that a sharp decline in domestic investment does not allow for a dynamic expansion of foreign investment.

Nevertheless, some other authors, such as the Hungarian I. Dobozi, advocate a long-term strategy of foreign investment and all types of cooperation agreements: compensation deals, joint ventures, mixed enterprises, etc. (Dobozi 1982: 48). These suggestions go along with projections of an increased share of the Third World in the supplies of Eastern Europe.

These two strategies are opposed. The first one, just because it is linked with a large recourse to indirect trade, is not adapted to a strengthening of direct cooperation links between Eastern European and Third World countries. But in the short run it seems easier to implement. The limited experience of most Eastern European countries in direct productive investment abroad as compared with the expertise and practice of the capitalist multinationals is a strong obstacle. Joint actions of several Eastern European countries in the Third World might increase their potential, but the usual policy of centrally planned economies is the bilateral negociation; the regroupement of firms belonging to different socialist countries for conducting a multilateral cooperation in the South is not possible in the present state of CMEA integration. In addition, the smaller CMEA countries have limited transport capacities which by themselves impede the development of more intensive relations with the Third World as far as ponderous commodities requiring maritime transportation are concerned (Dobozi 1983: 38).

But the main obstacle is probably the lack of financial means. This has to be related to the fact that for the Eastern European countries trade with the Third World is as much a source of hard currency as a way of obtaining basic supplies. Especially since the end of the seventies, those countries have desperately tried to increase their positive balance with their developing partners, or at least to maintain their gains. In Latin America where the opportunities for industrial cooperation are potentially high, all the Eastern European countries are structurally in deficit, and despite their willingness to develop joint ventures, the lack of external finance has brought about the failure of most of the projects (this has in particular been the case for the joint ventures of Romania with Peru and Chili for copper extraction).

Thus, although long-term structural strategies are advocated as most desirable, the access to primary goods is mainly secured, in fact, through current trade. Whenever more lasting links are established, industrial compensation is the usual form: the socialist country provides equipment, technical assistance, against supplies of raw materials (phosphate rock, iron ore, non ferrous metals are mostly concerned).

1.2. The USSR: A Priority for Food Supplies

The share of food and agricultural products has always been high in the imports of the Soviet Union from the Third World, but it suddenly increased in 1980, due to two sets of circumstances. First, beginning from 1979, a succession of bad harvests has strongly increased the dependence of the USSR on grain imports. Second, the grain embargo decided at the beginning at 1980 by the United States has induced the Soviet Union to diversify its purchases. In 1980 and 1981, the USSR thus became the first purchaser of Argentina; this country was in 1980 the first Third World exporter to the Soviet Union and remained since then in the second or third rank (alternating with India and Libya). Indeed, the long-term agreement signed in 1980 and renewed in 1986 between the Soviet Union and Argentina for the supply of 4.5 million tons of grain (soya included) annually has

established a lasting interdependence between both countries, even after the lifting of the grain embargo (in 1981) and the revival of the grain trade between the USSR and the United States.

Africa is, like Latin America, a major source of food supplies (mostly for cocoa from sub-Saharan Africa, and citruses from North Africa). Contrary to the Six, the USSR is generally buying its cocoa directly from the producing countries, but vis-à-vis the individual suppliers (Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, sometimes Cameroon) sharp fluctuations of purchases are to be observed. This probably reflects price negociations. While the Six are generally paying higher prices than the world average when buying directly from the producers, the USSR is paying lower prices, which may be due both to quality differentials and to bargaining over price conditions linked with the amounts negociated.

In the field of raw materials, the strategy of the Soviet Union is much more selective than Eastern Europe's. The USSR is a major producer and exporter of most of the minerals. Whenever it appears on the market as a buyer, the reasons for it may be twofold. First, for a range of commodities (especially non ferrous metals) the USSR acts erratically. These are strategic purchases the amounts of which are widely fluctuating from one year to the other (and cannot be traced through Soviet statistics as such data have disappeared from the foreign trade yearbook since the mid-seventies). Second, for a small number of minerals, the Soviet Union has developed a long-term supply policy on a much broader range than the smaller CMEA countries. This applies mainly to phosphate rock and bauxite.

The USSR depends on imports for about 45 - 50 per cent of its needs for bauxite. Its first move in this field has been an agreement with Guinea concluded in 1969. According to this agreement, the Soviet Union was to develop bauxite extraction in Kindia; 90 per cent of the production were to be supplied to the Soviet Union up to the year 2005, of which 55 per cent as a compensation for the supply of equipment and the construction of a railway from the mine to the coast. The Soviet trade with Guinea reflects the implementation of the agreement. During the construction of the mine the Soviet Union had a surplus in trade; beginning from 1974 the imports of bauxite increased regularly and the Soviet Union has been in deficit from 1976 on. Along the same line, the Soviet Union has concluded cooperation agreements with other bauxite producers such as India and Indonesia.

Unlike bauxite, phosphate rock is abundant on the territory of the Soviet Union, but the costs of extraction are growing due to the un-favourable location of the fields, and the USSR is becoming a net importer of this mineral (Nappi 1985: 14). The most impressive agreement concerning phosphate has been concluded in 1978 with Morocco, for a 30-year duration, with a credit of 2 billion dollars (partially in hard currency, which is quite exceptional in Soviet practice). This agreement, however does not seem to have been implemented (B.A. 1980: 38).

Another mineral in short supply in the USSR is tin, and one may wonder why the same strategy is not put into action. But the main producers of this mineral are countries politically strongly oriented against the communist regime, and the cooperation with them is very limited. This may explain the Soviet interests in the tin reserves of Vietnam.

1.3. The oil trade

The Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have been importing oil from the Third World in significant amounts since 1973(see Table 2).

Contrary to the Six, the USSR has always imported crude oil for reexport, and most often the crude imported does not even transit through a Soviet port, but goes directly to a third country. Various reasons support this strategy. The Middle East oil exporters are large trading partners of the USSR (in the first ranks are Libya, Iraq, Iran, in an order which has been varying according to political or military events). The Soviet Union maintains with them high surpluses (this is not the case for Libya according to the Soviet statistics but as Libya is among the first buyers of Soviet arms, and as the trade in arms is obviously not included in the figures of bilateral Libyan-Soviet trade, one is bound to infer that the Soviet sales largely exceed the purchases). Since the beginning of the oil price increases in 1973 a payment in the form of oil has been equivalent to a payment in hard currency. The Soviet Union could thus take advantage of the location of its partners to supply more easily to its Western clients. The Middle East oil supplemented the Soviet capacities; it could provide additional hard currency; between 1975 and 1983 the reexport of Iraqi, Libyan and Iranian oil amounted to an annual gain of slightly less than 700 million rubles - about 900 million dollars (Bahri 1985: 66).

Quite different is the pattern of the oil trade of the Six.

In the mid-seventies, the main motivation of five of the Six Eastern European countries was to supplement Soviet deliveries, the latter remaining the main supplier. Romania was the only country really dependent on these oil-imports as this country began to buy oil from the USSR only in 1979. As

the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries were in surplus with the Middle East oil exporters, because of equipment sales and (in particular for the Southern Eastern European countries) agricultural goods deliveries. Barter deals largely dominated in the first phase; but beginning from 1975 - 76 the oil exporters increasingly asked for payments in hard currency.

The financial difficulties experienced by the Eastern European countries in the end of the seventies induced a shift in the motivations of this trade: the main aim was to obtain a "hard good", securing hard currency returns by reexport in crude or refined form. The purchases increased up to 1979 in volume-terms, then after a substantial slowdown, resumed again in 1983 - 1985. In the early eighties, oil and refined products accounted for 1/5 to 1/4 of total Eastern European exports to the West.

Is such a pattern to last? Carl McMillan (1985: 380) considers it as quite temporary, because "it is dictated by special circumstances, in particular the severe hard-currency balance-ofpayments difficulties faced by most of the CMEA countries".

The fall of the oil prices which started at the end of 1985 may affect this trade in several ways.

One consequence is of course the decrease in the oil receipts of the Middle East exporting countries. Those countries are thus bound to decrease their imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, according to a general policy of curbing imports. For priority purchases of equipment or semi-finished goods, the Western suppliers are likely to be preferred to the East, unless the Eastern partners offer advantageous conditions, such as repayment in kind (e.g. in oil) at implicit prices higher than the market prices. In this scenario which may apply both to the Soviet Union and to the smaller CMEA countries, the amounts of crude oil imports from the Middle East would at least remain at the high level which they reached again in the last years. Reexports would probably occur in a refined form rather than in crude. The Soviet Union has already expressed a shift toward such a strategy (through a statement by the vice-president of Gosplan Leonard Vid at the 27th congress of the CPSU, Tass, March 4, 1986).

Should the oil prices resume an ascending trend, and the settlement conditions with the exporting countries become harder, there might be a reverse policy to cut back on imports from the Middle East so as to save hard currency, along with an increased drive toward domestic energy-savings (PlanEcon, Dec. 1985).

In conclusion, the East-South primary goods trade displays several quite specific features when compared to North-South trade:

- the "East" cannot be considered as a homogeneous bloc. The USSR and Eastern Europe differ widely in their approaches, motivations, and in the effective composition of their trade. Let us just add here that if the export side is considered, the USSR itself may be viewed, in its relations with some "advanced" developing countries, as a less developed partner. For instance, the Soviet Union is exporting mostly fuels and minerals to India (accounting for over three quarters of its sales since 1980); it is buying mostly manufactured (finished and semi-finished) goods, in a proportion of over one half of total imports.
- the high share of primary goods in the import trade is due not only to the import policy of the socialist countries, but also to the nature of their partners in the Third World. Trade is highly concentrated on a small number of countries accounting for an overwhelming share of total imports from the Third World (over 80 per cent for the 10 first partners, in the beginning of the eighties). Among those partners, one finds first the Middle East countries (including non-OPEC countries such as Syria and Egypt, mainly cotton suppliers, and of course the "trinity" Libya-Iraq-Iran), then the Latin American agricultural goods suppliers (Argentina and Brazil); India and Pakistan are the only significant partners which supply manufactures in addition to raw materials. The market share of the South Asian newly industrialized countries is quite negligible, contrary to the regional structure of North-South trade.
- the oil trade has a quite distinctive feature as it is not influenced by domestic demand, but is entirely subject to the policy of trade and finance with the West.
- the desired strategy of long-term access to primary goods supplies lacks the financial means and market instruments (among those, mostly the network of multinational firms) available to industrialized market economies.

2. The terms of trade

Many studies have been devoted to the terms of trade in East-South relations, without any significant overall conclusion (Dimitri 1985). Usually those studies support the thesis that the Soviet Union is selling its goods at high prices compared to the world level, and buying from the Third World at prices equal or lower (see Chandra 1977; Moskoff 1973).

Such conclusions may be challenged mostly on the ground that they do not take into account the specificity of the whole set of trade and

cooperation relations.

First, a still significant though decreasing part of trade is conducted under the regime of clearing agreements, which accounted in 1983 for about one third of the total imports of Eastern Europe (and almost 40 per cent for the USSR). The meaning of a price is different whether the purchase has to be settled in convertible currencies or not.

Apart from the official clearing agreements, there is a wide range of compensation or barter deals on an ad hoc basis organising swaps between specific goods.

Finally, the mechanism of cooperation is deeply interwoven with trade; the usual form is the delivery of machinery or equipment on credit to be repaid in 12 - 15 years by deliveries of traditional export goods or commodities originating from the project for which the credit has been granted (cf. the bauxite Guinea case, above). In this case it is impossible to get a clear picture of the real price paid by a socialist country for a given good, as the import price is linked not only with the (generally unknown) prices for the machinery exported, but also with the other conditions of the deal (interest rate, amount of the technical assistance, etc.).

As a general assumption, one may say that the price paid in convertible currency will always be lower, other things begin equal, than the price paid in the framework of a clearing or cooperation agreement.

All this explains why the authors who dealt with the topic have reached diverging conclusions (see the survey conducted by Alexandre Dimitri, 1985).

A tentative comparison between world and socialist prices may be derived from an analysis of the unit values of trade in basic commodities. A. Dimitri has studied unit values as given by the UNCTAD commodity data bank on the period 1961 - 82, for 25 goods imported by the USSR and 45 goods bought by the Eastern European countries. The results are summarized in Table 3.) For the USSR, about half of the commodities are purchased at prices higher than those paid by the developed market economies, and the other half at lower prices. For almost all the goods purchased at lower prices, the gap is widening from 1973 on. As a rule all the commodities for which higher prices are paid are foodstuffs or raw materials of agricultural origin. The picture is grossly the same for the Eastern European trade with the Third World.

This analysis is very crude and has all the drawbacks linked with the use of unit values. One must add that for most of the commodities entering world trade, the socialist countries are price-takers due to their marginal participation in that trade. The only significant exception might be oil (not reviewed in the UNCTAD data), but here the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe influence the world price not in their quality as buyers but as suppliers (exporters or reexporters): they have the same long-term interests as the oil exporters but in the short term the drive for hard currency earnings may contradict a price strategy and thus lead to a further depression in world prices.

The general issue of terms of trade is dominated by the fact that the socialist countries are increasingly seeking to achieve their own interests in trade with the Third World, even when they support the developing countries in international meetings (especially at the UNCTAD) for stabilized commodity prices at a high level (Lavigne 1984). Subsidized prices are reserved to the trade with privileged socialist countries, and even for those they are mainly granted by the Soviet Union (the best case is given by the pricing of sugar and oil in Soviet Cuban export-import relations). If we combine this with the fact that the Eastern bloc is not in a position to influence world prices, we have to admit that its interests are linked to those of the developed market economies in an objective collusion.

Note

(1) This note is derived from a study sponsored by the Commissariat Général du Plan, realized under the coordination of the author by researchers from the Centre for international economics of socialist countries, University of Paris I, mimeo 1985, 292 and 248 p. This report is to be published in French in 1986 (Les Relations Est-Sud dans l'économie mondiale, Economica), and in English end-1986 (East-West Relations in the World Economy, Westview Press).

References

- Angelis, I., "Some Issues Concerning Economic Relations between the CSSR and the Developing Countries", in: Dobozi, I. (ed.) (1978), Economic Cooperation Between Socialist and Developing Countries, special issue of Trends in World Economy, no. 25 (Budapest, Hungarian Scientific Council for World Economy), pp. 191 - 202.
- B. A., "Analyse de l'accord à long terme de coopération économique et technique sur les phosphates entre le Maroc et l'Union Soviétique", Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est, mai 1980, no. 240, pp. 34 - 40.
- Bahri, Sonia, "Les relations économiques entre les pays socialistes européens et les pays de l'OPEP", in: Lavigne, M. (ed.), 1985, pp. 41 - 90, vol. II.
- Chandra, N. K., "USSR and Third World: Unequal Distribution of Gains", Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XII, no. 6, 7, 8, 1977, pp. 349 - 376.

- Dimitri, Alexandre, "Le système des prix", in: Lavigne, M. (éd.), 1985, pp. 122 - 136, vol. I.
- Dobozi, Istvan, "Arrangements for Mineral Development Cooperation Between Socialist Countries and Developing Countries", Paper presented at the Hungarian-Italian Round Table, Nov. 23 - 24, 1982, Budapest (mimeo).
- Dobozi, Istvan, "Economic Interaction Between East and South - the Mineral Resource Dimension", Raw Materials Report (Stockholm), vol. 2, no. 2, 1983, pp. 25 - 41.
- Lavigne, Marie (ed.), Les Relations Est-Sud dans l'économie mondiale, Paris 1985 (mimeo) (see footnote 1).
- Lavigne, Marie, "Long-Term Commodity Agreements and the USSR", in: Kostecki, M. (ed.), The Soviet Impact on Commodity Markets, London, MacMillan 1982.
- McMillan, C. H., "Eastern Europe's Relations with OPEC Suppliers in the 1980's", in: East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980's, vol. I: Economic Performance and Policy, Selected papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Washington, USGPO 1985, pp. 368 - 382.
- Moskoff, W., Benz, G. W., "The USSR and Developing Countries: Politics and Export Prices, 1955 - 1969", Soviet Studies, vol. XXIV, no. 3, January 1973, pp. 348 - 363.
- Nappi, Carmine, "East-West Mineral Trade: Understanding Recent Trends", Cahiers de Recherche de l'Institut d'Economie Appliquée, no. 85-07, août 1985.
- Nayyar, Deepak, "The Interests of Rich Socialist Countries and Third World Development", October 1979, quoted in C. Saunders (ed.), East-West-South, Economic Interactions between Three Worlds, Macmillan 1981, p. 84.
- Paszynski, M., "Economic Relations of Poland with the Third World", Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, 1 - 2, Jan. - Feb. 1982, pp. 51 - 66, translated in: J.P.R.S., East Europe Report, no. 2324, 14 Oct. 1982, pp. 60 - 78.
- PlanEcon Report (Washington), "The Role of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the World Energy Market: Developments during 1970 - 85", vol. I, no. 17 - 18, Dec. 30, 1985.
- Veyrat, Bernadette, "Les relations économiques entre les pays socialistes Européens et les pays de l'Afrique sub-saharienne", in: Lavigne, M. (ed.) 1985, pp. 209 - 236, vol. II.

Marie Lavigne
Centre d'économie internationale
des pays socialistes
Université de Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne
90, rue de Tolbiac
F-75634 Paris

Table 1: Commodity composition of Soviet and East European imports from the developing countries, by SITC commodity classes, in %

SITC Classes	Soviet Union 1970	1975	1980	1982	Eastern Europe 1970	1975	1980	1982
0 + 1	33.5	39.6	48.3	46.9	35.8	24.3	25.4	19.2
2 + 4	38.2	20.6	19.5	22.8	40.5	27.6	20.3	13.8
3	2.9	19.2	12.8	8.5	4.7	34.2	43.6	59.8
5	1.9	3.2	2.9	2.0	2.2	0.7	1.1	1.0
6 + 8	22.9	16.7	15.0	17.6	16.0	11.2	9.1	5.6
7	0.2	0.8	0.7	1.2	0.3	1.4	0.4	0.4
0 - 4	74.6	79.4	80.6	78.2	81.0	86.1	89.3	92.8
5 - 8	25.0	20.7	18.6	20.8	18.5	12.5	10.3	6.8
Residual	0.5	1.4	0.8	1.0	0.5	1.4	0.4	0.4

Source: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, UN, May 1984 and Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1985.

Table 2: Crude oil imports by the Soviet Union and the CMEA Six from OPEC countries (thousand metric tons; 1971 - 1983)

	1971	1973	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Bulgaria	980	1740	900	1170	980	670	1000	1870	2070
Czechoslovakia	80	200	1340	400	400	370	230	460	440
GDR	630	3350	1140	1370	1100	1750	2170	3000*	4000*
Hungary	180	600	920	1180	1320	920	480	1720	2700
Poland	0	570	1370	1890	3280	3110	410	280	1520
Romania	2860	4120	8420	11570	13030	11940	9150	6430	5750
Total 6	4730	10580	14080	17580	20110	18760	13440	13760	16480
USSR	750	12010	6870	7300	6440	3520	3970	6730	11990

*) Estimation

Source: Bahri 1985 (in: Lavigne, éd., 1985); UN data (World Energy Supplies, diff. issues), and national statistics

Table 3: Comparison of the import prices of the Soviet Union and the Six with the import prices of the developed market economies, for non-fuel commodities imported from the Third World

Commodity	Ratio of Soviet average annual price to DME import price (%) 1961-82	1961-72	1973-82	Ratio of CMEA 6 average annual price to DME import price (%) 1961-82	1961-72	1973-82
Wheat	-16	-10	-19	-16	-6	-21
Maize	-16	-14	-16	0	+8	-4
Rice	-16	-7	-20	-3	-5	-1
Meat	-44	-43	-44	-40	-36	-43
Bananas	-34	-23	-41	-2	+2	-4
Pepper	-1	-1	-1	0	+2	-1
Groundnuts	+13	+1	+17	-3	+2	-5
Copra	+8	+13	+5	+5	+32	-5
Coconut oil	+9	+8	+10	+11	+8	+12
Palm kernels	-3	+2	-5	-4	+1	-7
Olive oil	+6	+8	+5	+7	+1	+10
Sugar *)	+57	+3	+79	+13	+1	+18
Tea	+11	+16	+8	+11	+19	+5
Cocoa	-2	-2	-2	+7	+8	+7
Coffee	-4	-4	-4	-2	-5	-1
Cotton	+31	+37	+28	+4	+20	-4
Sisal	+6	0	+9	-7	-10	-5
Jute	+8	+23	-6	+6	+7	+5
Rubber	0	+1	0	+4	+6	+3
Tobacco	-3	-26	+9	-11	-10	-11
Timber	+26	+45	+17	+19	+33	+14
Bauxite	-44	-46	-44	-29	-25	-31
Alumina	-14	+9	-21	-1	+23	-14
Copper ore	-9			0	+8	-5
Copper blister				+12	+24	+5
Refined copper	-6	-7	-6	+3	-1	+6
Tin ore (1970-82)	0	-7	0			
Tin metal (1968-82)	0	-2	0	+4	+20	+1
Iron ore (1965-82)				-12	-2	-16
Manganese ore				-26	+7	-46
Phosphate rock				-6	+18	-15
Groundnut oil				-3	+2	-5
Palm oil	+5	-3	+8	+15	+18	+13
Palm kernels oil				+9	+9	+9
Soyabeans				+8	0	+11
Soyabean oil				-2	-2	-2
Sunflower oil				+3	+13	-2
Wool				+18	+38	+8

*) Cuba included

Sources: UNCTAD data bank on commodity prices