

Certainly the economic issues: we are facing a not very bright economic future, and I think this is one of the ironies of the decade, that the economic situation was better when the decade began than at its end. Also the demographic statistics are important. The fact that there will be 1.3 billion people in the North as opposed to 5.7 billion people in the South by the year 2000 has implications for the role of women.

Are we now facing a situation where the women more and more will be asked what really, what kind of society do we want? Will women be asked what kind of national development plan do you want? Are you in favour of environment: if we industrialize do we take into account environment, migration etc.? In other words, if women become more active in decision-making processes are we in fact going to have a better and a changed society, in which some of the models of growth which we have accepted unquestioningly will be questioned, will be criticized, will be altered, will be revised in order that we can have a better future for our children?

These are some of the questions before Nairobi. And I very much hope that the member governments will recognize the challenges which are there. And I also hope that men and women will see to it that the Nairobi conference will push forward the women's programme in order that the years we face ahead will bring a more just and a more noble society with the collaboration of men.

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DEVELOPMENT, CRISIS AND ALTERNATIVE VISIONS: THIRD WORLD WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES

Systemic Crises, Reproduction Failures and Women's Potential

At the outset let us spell out the distinction between the two types of crisis that afflict us today. The word "crisis" has been so overused that it is important to clarify what we mean by it. When a structure or system reaches a stage when it must either undergo major changes or break down, it is in a state of crisis. Temporary solutions may mitigate some of its effects, but so long as its main structural causes remain untouched, the crisis persists, demanding resolution, and things cannot go back to "business as usual".

In this sense we argue that a crisis now affects both the world economic system and the structures through which the majority of the world's populations reproduce themselves. By reproduction we mean the process by which human beings meet their basic needs and survive from one day to the next. Since most people are part of a larger economic system - regional, national, or international - their own reproduction is not independent of the healthy functioning of the larger system (1). But the two are by no means congruent. The economic system may show vigour and dynamism while people's basic needs remain unmet, or even worsen (2). On the other hand, the basic needs of the poor may be met although the growth rate and per capita income remain low (3). The reproduction of human beings depends to a considerable extent on state policies toward the agrarian sector, toward employment, and toward direct expenditures on basic needs fulfilment and poverty elimination. In the absence of explicit policies to meet the basic needs of the poor, economic growth will improve the conditions of human reproduction *only* if it increases the employment and real incomes of the population at large. For example, export cropping in a previously self-provisioning area may reduce peoples' access to land or other resources without increasing employment, or even if it increases employment, it may

not do so in a way that makes up for the loss of land access. The state may step in under such circumstances to make up the deficit through job creation or subsidised food. But once the onus falls on the state, reproduction of the poor becomes contingent on the exigencies of state expenditures (4). A crisis in state spending under economic and/or political pressures can create a crisis of basic reproduction. This has been the recent experience of a number of countries that have cut subsidies on food and other mass consumption items under IMF pressure as a precondition for obtaining balance of payments loans (5).

In this chapter we establish the links between the current systemic crises and the past history of the systemic crises for the reproduction of the poor, and the importance of recognizing women's potential for mitigating some of these effects through their position as the key human elements in basic reproduction.

The Food-Fuel-Water Crises (6)

It is our contention that although significant changes have occurred in the policy climate - in part because of the devastating impact of the Ethiopian famine - certain crucial aspects of the longterm problems of food availability not only in sub-Saharan Africa but in other parts of the Third World, are not yet sufficiently acknowledged at the highest policy levels. The neglected aspects have to do with women's critical position in societies as food producers, providers, and managers. Neglecting women's work in this case is not only detrimental to women, it also makes it impossible to develop the integrated approaches to the interlinked problems of food-fuel-water that are increasingly being recognized as essential to the success of policy.

For reasons of brevity we do not elaborate here on the policy differences and debates among different international development agencies, aid and research institutions, and national governments over the course of the three United Nations Development Decades. Rather, we focus on broad trends in actual policy and their effects. We argue that there has been excessive emphasis on aggregate food production and the grain trade at the global/national level to the detriment of land and resource availability for regional and local self-sufficiency. This emphasis has made it difficult to perceive clearly the underlying fragility of the ecological,

institutional and social bases of food-fuel-water availability and access in the Third World. Concomitant with this policy framework was the near total neglect of local food producers during much of the 1960s, the links among the availability of food, rural energy sources, and water, and women as the human element in those links. Although this neglect appeared to lessen in the 1970s, policy shifts have not averted such crises as those in the Sahel and Ethiopia.

During the major part of the first and second U.N. Development Decades, there were two identifiable strands in food policy. One strand stressed that efficient use of global economic resources required an expansion of *global* agricultural production and trade based on comparative cost advantages in the production (7). Given that some of the major countries of the North - the U.S., Canada, and Australia - were already large commercial grain producers, while many Third World countries have historically specialized in the production of export crops such as coffee, sugar, cocoa, tea, and fruit, the proponents of this approach argue that production and trade should logically continue along these lines. Thus, world grain production has continued to be dominated by the U.S., Canada, and Australia while Third World farmers were encouraged to expand production of export crops in line with their apparent (historically established) comparative cost advantage. Food aid drawn from surplus grain stocks of the North was supposed to supplement grain availability in the Third World in periods of drought, floods, or other serious disruptions in agricultural production.

The second policy approach shifted the emphasis from global to *national* food production. This took effect mainly in those Third World countries which were already significant producers of wheat, rice, and corn. A "green revolution" was heralded in the 1960s, based on the dissemination of packages of high-yield seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and water. The new technology was developed through a globally linked network of research institutes. It received government backing in the form of credit, marketing, and price supports, and was expanded consistent with an approach of "building on the best". That is, attention was focussed on those regions and farmers within a country who were most capable of helping themselves as individual producers; this was seen as most likely to obtain the maximum return to governmental resources.

Both approaches almost single-mindedly emphasized expanding agricultural production and trade, and providing the incentives for so doing. The difference between the two strands was that one argued for expanding global food production and international trade, while the other stressed national food production and internal trade within a country. This difference has been significant for questions of national self-reliance in food. Those Third World countries which took the former route (many countries in Africa and Latin America) and expanded exports or non-food production for the internal market have found themselves increasingly and uncomfortably dependent on world trade and aid. Since prices of agricultural commodities tend to be volatile in world markets, reliance on trade often means increased reliance on food aid when prices of a country's exports drop sharply. The irony here is that favourable climatic conditions leading to a large world supply of an export commodity and a resulting fall in its price can create the conditions for food aid by putting pressure on the balance of payments. Thus food aid may become necessary both under adverse and beneficial agro-climatic conditions.

Second, the structure of the international grain market, which is controlled by a few "merchants of grain", means that even the *purchase* of food grain in times of national scarcity may not be possible. The large grain traders have lobbied effectively against setting up a multilaterally controlled global food grain buffer stock, since this would reduce their ability to profit from the supply and price volatility of world grain markets (8). Thus, for example, during the severe 1972 - 73 drought in India, the absence of a multilateral stockpile may have contributed to as many as a million deaths, since India could not afford to match the prices offered by China and the U.S.S.R. for U.S. grain (9). Third, excessive reliance on food imports in a country that faces serious balance of payments deficits and an external debt burden makes national food availability vulnerable to these pressures as well.

Countries that have followed the "green revolution" route and expanded national grain production have been able over time to avoid some of these problems. For example, by the early 1980s Indian grain production and national buffer stock had become sizable enough that drought years could now be tided over more easily than before. However, even in such countries, the adverse distributional effects of a policy of "building on the

best" have meant that increases in total national food production have not always been translated into food *access* among poorer regions, occupational classes, or income groups. Thus, while the national capacity for avoiding famines has undoubtedly improved in India, long term undernutrition among the poor has not been eradicated. Nor can it be claimed that the removal of undernutrition is only a matter of time, since overall production has increased. An important distributional effect of the "green revolution" policy is the relative and absolute channeling of resources away from the crops (e.g., millets, pulses), that are the staple diet of poorer regions and groups. Stagnant production means stagnant real income, which in turn means that structural undernutrition may worsen even as the national capacity to deal with the effects of drought improve (10).

These distributional inequities have been especially harmful in Latin America and Asia. In many parts of Latin America the traditional co-existence of large estates and small tenancies has increasingly given way to capitalist and corporate farming with wage labour via dispossession of small farmers (11). The result has been large scale population shifts to urban slums, rural impoverishment, and the growing dependence of the landless on seasonal migratory or contract labour on export farms. Land reform is therefore a major popular demand. In Asia the presence of large-scale unemployment and underemployment among the rural landless have made employment generation a major need, though here too land reform is essential (12).

This leads to the wider question of food policies in the presence of large regional inequalities as well as inequalities in landholding. In Brazil, which claims to be the world's fourth largest grain producer, it is the poor who appear to have borne the main burden of the last six years of drought in the northeastern part of the country. The presence of extreme inequalities in landholding and politico-economic power in the region have meant that most drought relief measures and resources have been appropriated by the large landowners (13).

The Sahel famine of 1968 - 73 brought some of these problems into sharp focus. Partly as a result there has been growing recognition in the policy-making community over the past decade that droughts are not purely "natural" disasters to which short term relief measures are an adequate

response. A significant number of them appear, rather, to result from longer term structural factors thrown up by the regional patterns of development and land use. Resulting from this recognition, the Club du Sahel and the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Region (CILSS) agreed that food self-sufficiency should be the main goal of national and regional development (14). Similarly, some research efforts supported by the U.N. and even bilateral aid agencies are now underway to explore the impact of cash cropping on subsistence food production. These efforts would do well to take account of the reasons for the continuing crisis in the Sahel.

Critical among those reasons is the lack of *integrated* policies toward farming, timber use, and water management. The crises of food, water, and rural energy are linked together through environmental and demographic processes, themselves the result of shortsighted policies and existing power structures. While drought is the single most important cause of food failure, drought is not caused exclusively by a shortage of rainfall. At least three types of drought can be identified: precipitation drought, runoff drought, and aquifer drought (15). Even in years of normal or good rainfall, drought due to poor runoffs or low aquifer levels may have a devastating impact.

These two latter types of drought often result from deforestation and soil erosion caused by poorly planned and unbalanced tree cutting for industrial uses (pulp and paper mills, furniture factories, etc.), tree cutting for urban and rural energy or domestic energy needs under conditions of shortage, damming, and diversion of perennial rivers or streams for hydro-electric purposes, and overgrazing or unsound agricultural practices. Two major agroclimatic features characterizing large parts of the tropics exacerbate these problems: the thinness and poor quality of topsoils and the severity of seasonal rainstorms. The latter tend to wash away and compact even the existing soils in the absence of adequate vegetation and tree cover. Severe droughts now appear to have become endemic in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1984, according to the FAO, severe food shortages prevailed in Ethiopia, Sudan, the Sahel, and the southern African countries of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and Zambia (16). The underlying processes are in operation outside Africa as well (17).

Not all of the problems are attributable to excessive industrial use of forests. The privatization of previously waste and common lands reduces the availability of wood biomass (twigs, small branches, deadfall, and crop residue) that is the dominant form of domestic energy, especially among poor households in Africa. This leads to severe rural energy shortages, which are worsened by rapid rates of population increase (18). In addition, the poor and landless also tend to lose access to forest produce as food and as sources of income.

A related effect of all these pressures on rural energy and water is growing soil erosion and declines in food production and productivity. The three crises - food, fuel, and water - are therefore interdependent and require integrated and longer term solutions. The need for such solutions is now beginning to receive systematic acknowledgment. For example, with funding from the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), the Swedish Red Cross and Earthscan (a London based international environment and development information service) have collaborated to produce the report by Wijkman and Timberlake cited earlier. Their main argument is that so-called "natural disasters" are to an increasing extent structurally caused by humans. While this is a depressing thought when one considers the scale of human misery involved, it also offers the hope that long-term policy solutions and options do exist and can be identified and implemented (19).

The report sharply criticized from an insider's perspective the practices and motivations of agencies engaged in disaster relief. One of the main criticisms is that - like the proverbial bull in a china shop - relief agencies often disrupt existing social mechanisms for coping with disasters, foster external dependence rather than self-reliance and treat the poor (those usually affected most severely by disasters) as helpless victims. The report argues strongly, therefore, for the need to work out long term solutions in conjunction with local people, drawing on both their experience and stated needs, with policy and programme support from higher levels of decision-making.

If there is a fault to be found in this thoughtful and perceptive document, it is that it does not take the final and critical step implicit in its own argument. Namely, if food-water-fuel crises are interlinked, and if local

people are to be the backbone of development efforts aimed at their resolution, then women (especially poor and landless) must be explicitly recognized as the key human elements in those linkages, and as active agents in any resolutions. What has been called a generalized reproduction crisis in the provision of "basic needs" has poor women at its centre, as the principal providers of those needs.

The importance of women to the solution of the generalized reproduction crisis is multi-dimensional. *First*, a large literature now shows that in many parts of the Third World women are important, often the main producers of food crops (20). *Second*, even where women do not actually cultivate crops, they are almost universally the main food processors and cooks. *Third*, in addition to being food providers, women are usually also responsible for water and fuel collection, even though the labour of children is often quite important to the latter (21). The less available are rural fuel and water, the more time women must spend in their collection. Evidence from national level sample surveys also now shows that poorer women perform these tasks in disproportionate numbers (22). *Fourth*, the reproduction crisis is reflected in women having to make trade-offs among different basic needs in the use of such resources as their labour time, their cash income, or land over which they have some control. Where women have little earning power or effective control over cash income or land use (and this may be due to both traditional gender hierarchies and biased state policies toward land reform), their own labour time and that of their children (especially daughters) is the only resource over which they have any control whatsoever. Thus women's work hours, as the only mechanism for attempting to cope with the crisis, lengthen considerably. *Fifth*, the nutritional and health impact of these pressures operate through switches to less nutritious but less labour and fuel intensive foods, e.g., from yams to cassava, from millet to manioc, from whole grains to purchased processed foods (23). This particularly affects the nutritional status of growing children. *Sixth*, women as managers of intra-household food distribution usually eat after men, and sometimes after children, thereby consuming smaller and less nutritious amounts. Also daughters are often discriminated against in favour of sons in food distribution (24). In conjunction with increased work burdens, this leads to an absolute and a relative decline in women's nutritional and morbidity status (25).

It is clear that women, as the main workers in basic needs provision, are central to an understanding of the linkages in the reproduction crisis. And it follows that women must be key potential actors in any resolution of the crisis. Indeed, with or without international or governmental recognition, women have already been organizing themselves. In India, for example, there is a spreading movement of women organizing against forest contractors to prevent deforestation (26). Traditional kin and community based systems of mutual aid and self-help, e.g., "harambee" in Kenya, are vitalized for collective solutions to fuel and water problems. The existing women's groups tend to be local and participatory, as well as highly flexible in their ability to switch from one project to another as needed (27).

A major barrier to the effective functioning of these groups is that the interests of poor men and women are not always identical, because of the existing sexual division of labour and resources. For example, men may be more interested in cash crops than in food crops if they control money income; they may be willing to sell forest rights to timber contractors; or they may be indifferent to labour-reducing technological improvements in cooking or fuel and water use. Some men may also fear the growth of women's power through collective organization and decision-making. The activation of women's organizations is key to the potential betterment of *all* the poor, and this is a critical argument in raising the consciousness of poor and landless men.

Governments and international agencies also continue to blithely ignore the mounting evidence that women, as the main providers of basic needs, are crucial to understanding and resolving the crisis of rural reproduction in the Third World. It is more than time to reverse this indifference. In a recent workshop on women's role in food self-sufficiency the working group on macroeconomic policies concluded that key regional requirements were: for Africa, the linking of food policies to women producers' access to land, credit, technology, and markets with greater overall emphasis on traditional grains and mixed cropping; for Asia, ensuring that food processing technologies do not continue to displace women, and that women be aided to set up co-operative rice mills, for example; for Latin America, that women be given equal status with men in land reforms and co-operative farming strategies (28).

Although insofar as Third World countries are concerned, a crisis exists in the form of unmanageable debt burdens and balance of payments deficits, these are but symptoms of a larger crisis in the post-war world financial and monetary system, as well as in the related mechanisms of international trade and capital flows. In the Bretton Woods system, despite the intentions of at least some of its founders (29), the onus of adjustment to imbalances in international payments falls entirely on deficit countries. Given the structural weaknesses with which most Third World countries were saddled in the colonial era, their role has been one of perennial "adjuster". The U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) has extensively argued the need for inward-oriented, import-substitution strategies to reduce balance of payments pressures, and to give economic growth an internal momentum (30). Simultaneously, ECLA favoured land reform as a mechanism for increasing agricultural productivity, reducing income inequality, and expanding the domestic market for industrial commodities. The mixed results of the land reforms undertaken during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s have been documented (31). On the import-substitution side the mid-1960s saw the beginnings of a growing disillusionment and even reversal of earlier policies. It was argued that the "easy" phase of substitution in consumer goods would have to give way to a much "harder" phase of technology intensive capital goods production.

Most important, the import-substitution phase did not appear to have improved the balance of payments position of Latin American countries as had been its intention. Although the growing requirement of imports of capital goods and intermediates for domestic industrialization was blamed for this, insufficient attention was paid to another contributing factor, that by setting up protective barriers against imports, multinational corporations began to locate and expand industrial production in these countries. The extent to which the growth of industrial imports can be directly attributed to MNC production, the extent to which import bills were inflated by "transfer pricing" (32), and the extent to which attempts to deepen domestic industry were weakened by multinational control and commercialization of technology are not fully known. Certainly all three did occur. But even apart from the imbalance on trade, the outflows due to profit repatriation and other such payments were considerable by the late

1960s. Thus, development strategies aimed at controlling trade while allowing relatively free capital movements could neither control trade nor improve the balance of payments.

By the late 1960s and 1970s export promotion was again becoming a dominant priority. After 1973 the recycling of petrodollars by commercial banks through lending to Third World countries is well known. While banks were eager to find profitable outlets for these funds, the loans were usually allocated according to priorities negotiated between governments, private lenders, and private borrowers (whose borrowing was sometimes guaranteed by governments). Rarely was there any accountability to the needs or interests of the people. Thus, as with other development policy making, neither the investment priorities nor the mechanisms were democratically determined. The loans were often spent for militarization, for infrastructure projects with long gestation lags, and in some instances for social services. There was also some leakage of the funds into foreign bank accounts.

With the slowing down of the world economy and world trade, the adjustment pressures on Latin American countries faced with large debt burdens became severe (33). The rapid growth of the debt burden and the inability to repay are due in part to the current worldwide recession and the resultant decline in exports from Third World countries, a problem worsened by protectionism in industrial countries. But the ballooning of the debt is also due to the operation of variable international interest rates, which are affected by the U.S. policy of managing its own domestic and balance of trade deficits through high interest rates and capital inflows. The consequent instability in the international monetary and financial system not only makes it difficult to service the debts in the short run, but makes long-term planning well nigh impossible. It is in this context that the structural adjustment packages being negotiated by the IMF and the World Bank, operating in tandem, must be understood.

First of all, the structural adjustment packages are unlikely to lead to the required increase in exports in the face of growing protectionism in the advanced countries. Second, if the export promotion programmes do succeed, especially in agriculture, they are likely to reduce domestic food availability to the poor. Third, this will have a detrimental impact on human survival because of the cutbacks in consumer goods imports, in domestic

subsidies for items like food and fuel, and in expenditures on health and education. Indeed, the international agencies and the business community are well aware that the "hard" phase of debt management lies ahead, and that there will be considerable civil and political turmoil occasioned by their structural adjustments programmes.

Furthermore, although there is considerable pressure on Third World countries to "structurally adjust", there is precious little openness in the multilateral agencies or the governments of the advanced countries to structural adjustment of the system as a whole (34). And unless adjustment burdens are shared between surplus and deficit countries (35), and unless the most powerful countries stop living beyond their means, the crisis of the system will not be resolved.

As already mentioned, the roots of the Third World's balance of payments crises go back to *before* 1973 and debt expansion. The structural roots lie in the openness to private capital flows and the large outflows resulting therefrom (36). Balance of payments weakness was therefore built into the production and trading system during the import-substitution phase and thereafter (37). The debt overhang only heightened and precipitated the crisis.

It is equally clear that the basic needs of the majority of the population will now be a low governmental or multilateral priority. Although it is too soon for a systematic assessment of the effects of "structural adjustment" in the 1980s, informed guesses of the negative impact of cutbacks on nutrition, morbidity, mortality, child survival, sanitation, transport, and education are unlikely to be far off the mark (38). Budgetary cutbacks will also be felt directly in public sector employment. If the experience of Chile after 1973 is an indicator, the further opening of the economy to free goods and capital movements, and increases in prices of imported inputs, will have a recessionary impact as small and medium-size firms go out of business (39). Large-scale unemployment combined with reductions in social services led to rapid and severe impoverishment in Chile, while capital flight worsened the pressure on the balance of payments.

For women the "structural adjustment" programmes are likely to have a number of effects. The effect of stabilization programmes on women's

employment will probably be mixed. Their employment in small and medium-size firms producing for the domestic market will tend to decline as these firms go out of business. On the other hand, if export-oriented industries expand under governmental stimulus, women's employment is likely to expand as well, since female workers tend to predominate in this sector. As is well known, although wages and working conditions may sometimes be somewhat better in the larger factories in free trade zones, the work is temporary with high turnover and severe discipline. Many women in export units work under sweatshop conditions with low pay and high job insecurity (40).

In response to the debt crisis, international agencies have advised some countries to generate foreign exchange through further expansion of export agriculture. Women's employment in this sector has grown as a result. This employment, in agribusiness plantations or estates, bears strong similarities to Third World women's factory employment, in terms of working conditions and vulnerability to seasonal variation. An example is the commercial production of winter fruits and vegetables in Mexico.

Women's employment also tends to expand in services, commerce and in "putting-out" work. These are the so-called "informal" activities that grow together with increased work participation by women (41). While poor women have always worked for wages, the pressures of the stabilization programmes on incomes and consumption force even more women (older and younger) into the search for jobs. Domestic employment also offers an outlet, although the impoverishment of the middle classes may reduce the demand for paid domestic servants. Thus, women's employment may increase as a consequence of the "structural adjustment" programmes, but it does so perforce and mainly under the negative conditions of the so-called "informal" sector.

The specific effects of measures such as import restrictions (adopted as part of structural adjustment packages) on the range of activities encompassed in this sector are difficult to predict. On the one hand, by blocking or reducing the influx of imported consumer goods and other manufactures, the demand for goods that can be produced locally may increase. Yet certain occupations that depend on imported raw materials or goods (e.g., types of vending or trading) would be harmed by import

restrictions. The reduction in mass purchasing power as a result of the structural adjustment programmes translates into reduced demand for many goods, but there may also be a switch to cheaper goods produced in the "informal sector".

A second major impact of the IMF backed programmes on women is through cuts in social service expenditures. These cuts occur at the same time that demand for these services increases, resulting from growing unemployment and poverty. Restrictive fiscal policy implies that services such as education, health, social housing, subsidized food, and transport are reduced, eliminated, or become available only at much higher prices. The implications for women are threefold. *First*, since women are the main household members responsible for tasks such as cooking, cleaning, and health care, their work burden is likely to increase. For example, lower social expenditures on health combined with poorer nutrition will increase the demands on women to make up the difference through health care at home. The time women spend waiting in queues will increase as bureaucratic procedures tighten and service availability shrinks. More time may have to be spent at public water taps, health centres, etc. *Second*, since women are usually responsible for managing the household's basic needs, the pressures to reduce their own personal access to such services as health and education will grow. So also their nutritional status. *Third*, the school dropout rate of young girls is likely to increase as they are forced to substitute for older women in home tasks or as they are drawn into putting-out work or sweatshops in order to supplement the family's real income (42).

As we mentioned earlier, the evidence for these effects is still being researched and collected (43). However, there is already considerable evidence about the impact of governmental service cutbacks on women in advanced countries, particularly the U.S. While Europe differs in a number of respects from the United States, most notably in current unemployment levels and stagnating internal demand, the relative insulation of the social welfare state, and labour and income security policies, there are a number of parallel trends. But we confine our analysis here to the U.S. because it provides the clearest illustration of the negative impact of governmental policies on women and the poor.

No matter how poverty is measured, the number of poor Americans grew by more than nine million in just four years, with the greatest concentration among minorities and low-income white women. This represents the largest increase since the Government began collecting poverty figures in 1960. Female-headed households comprise the bulk of recipients affected by government fiscal and monetary policies. Well over one-third of all female-headed households are below the poverty line, and more than half of all black and Hispanic households headed by women live in poverty.

Even before the Reagan Administration took office in 1980, poverty programmes contained serious gaps. While the popular view in the U.S. is that substantial benefit increases were provided over the previous 10 or 15 years to the poor as a whole, the reality is that major increases during this period were to the elderly and to a small number of white male-headed households. Benefits in major programmes plummeted because they were not adjusted for inflation, and eligibility requirements changed such that many in need of assistance were excluded. During this period, the purchasing power of poor female-headed households declined, and many lost access to subsidized services.

Today, programmes targetted to low-income individuals and families comprise less than one-tenth of the federal budget. Yet, under the Reagan presidency, these programmes have received the deepest cuts. Sizable reductions have been made in the public assistance programme for poor single parent (primarily female) families, programmes providing basic health care coverage for low-income families and the elderly, low-income housing, public service employment and job training, and unemployment insurance benefits. Contrary to the claims of this Administration, these cuts do not represent actual reductions in overall spending by the federal government, but rather a shift from spending in domestic to military sectors. Military spending has increased by over 40 percent from 1980 to 1985, larger than the total of all decreases in domestic spending since 1980 (44).

While the majority of recipients of public assistance programmes are white, these programmes serve minorities in large numbers. Thus, while about 12 percent of the overall U.S. population is black, over 40 percent receive public assistance in the form of income transfers, food stamps, medical coverage, etc. In the past four years, black families lost more than three

times as much in benefit reductions as the average white family (45). Hispanics have been affected by the budget policies in much the same way, and poverty has been rising more rapidly among Hispanics than any other group.

These budget cuts were accompanied by a major realignment of the tax system favouring high income tax payers and large corporations. The tax benefits that were supposed to accrue to low-income families were more than wiped out by inflation (which pushes families into higher income tax brackets) and by rising social security taxes. Until 1981, the U.S. Congress had cut taxes to offset some of the effects of inflation in the tax burdens of the poor, but ended this pattern in 1981. Low and moderate-income working families have always paid a larger share of income taxes, but this share now greatly exceeds that paid by large corporations. In the 1950s and 1960s, corporate income taxes contributed 25 percent of all federal tax revenues. By 1983, corporate taxes provided just 6 percent of such revenues (46).

These policies were justified as a means to break the cycle of inflation and recession, and to produce a long-lasting surge of economic growth. However, many analysts believe that the key structural weaknesses of the U.S. economy which produced the recession will also prevent a sustained economic expansion. Any positive upturns in the economy must be seen in the light of the low-depths of the recession from which they began. Many economic indicators have not rebounded to their pre-1981 position. While capacity utilization rose initially, it is still well below its usual peak. Unemployment in 1982 was at its highest in 40 years, and although the current rate has dropped back to 1981 levels, the number of long-term unemployed remains high (47). The U.S. trade deficit has reached massive proportions, due in part to the long-run decline in the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing and to more recent factors such as the overvaluation of the dollar and high interest rates (products of the Administration's right monetary policies). For the first time since the New Deal, the U.S. has become a debtor nation.

The economic growth that has occurred has been due primarily to the expansion of service industries. The long-term shift toward a service-sector economy has resulted in a greater relative share of low-wage jobs than has

been the case in an economy dominated by a heavily-unionized manufacturing sector. Federal tax laws favouring the substitution of machines for workers have also reinforced technological changes that both upgraded and downgraded a vast array of middle level jobs, and resulted in what some have called "the disappearing middle". There is now an even greater polarization of low-wage and high-salary jobs and hence, wide inequalities in the income distribution of workers. The effect of this shift for women has been mixed. Their employment has increased because of the growth in non-union plants, sweatshops and industrial homework characterizing the reorganization of older manufacturing industries. However, women's jobs are on the whole low-wage, low-status, and dead-end. In addition, there is increasing documentation of the growing importance of "informal sector" activities for women in urban and rural areas (48).

If the cutbacks and trends have been so inimical to women in an advanced country, they will be even worse for poor Third World women who begin from a much lower level of basic needs fulfilment. However, women, individually and collectively, have been discovering mechanisms for coping with these problems (49). It should be remembered that women are neither responsible for the crisis in the world system, nor can they be expected to resolve it. Such a resolution requires concerted action through multilateral negotiations among countries. But the solutions to the systemic crises that are being put into place (viz., structural-adjustment programmes) are creating a major reproduction crisis, especially in the indebted Third World countries. Since women are responsible for the basic needs of households, they are affected both as producers and as consumers of the means to fulfill those needs. It is not our intention to glorify women's role in household labour or in the "informal sector". Particularly in the context of the debt crisis, the interests of poor women appear to lie in joining their voices to the struggle for a more structurally sound international and national economic order. This is of particular importance given that the supposed scarcity of resources has not prevented spiraling military expenditures in both the advanced countries and the Third World.

According to a recent United Nations study (50), since 1945 armed conflicts have taken up to 21 million lives. Most of these casualties have occurred in the Third World; and where a meaningful distinction could be made, three out of every five fatalities were civilians. Children, women, and the aged/infirm are dominant among civilian casualties, and among the refugees resulting from armed conflict (51).

This frightening increase in global violence has a number of related aspects: (1) a growing potential for armed conflict between nations as a consequence of growing military expenditure; (2) further growth of an industrial structure geared to armaments production and trade; (3) a growing number of military controlled governments, most of which have as their main *raison d'être* the suppression of internal dissent, (this must be seen in the particular context of widespread popular resistance to IMF-backed programmes for "structural adjustment" through domestic austerity); and (4) the mushrooming of a culture of violence against women in which "macho-ness" and brutality are dominant; its flip-side is contempt for women expressed through reactionary notions of women's proper place in society.

Military expenditure (52) has become the Pandora's box of the twentieth century. Since the mid-1930s the volume of military activity has increased thirteenfold. According to a recent U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs report (53), the largest military powers constitute the main engine of the arms race, due to their virtual monopoly of the development of advanced military technology, their overwhelmingly large share of world military production and exports, and the global character of their political and military interests. Six main military spenders (54) account for threequarters of the world arms trade, for virtually all military research and development, and for nearly all exports of weapons and military equipment. All significant developments in armaments originate in the developed countries, and spread to the developing with greater or lesser time lags; in recent years the time lags have diminished for many types of conventional weaponry. Of the six major spenders, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. account for the largest share in the global total of military spending and the international arms trade.

Since 1960 the buildup for forces, the growth of military expenditures, and the investment in advanced military technology through arms imports proceeded at a faster pace in the Third World than in the industrialized countries. Two-thirds of the arms trade is now conducted between developed and developing countries (55), and virtually every developing country has had armed forces trained by major powers. The thirteen OPEC countries alone accounted for over 40 percent of the arms imported by all developing countries between 1975 and 1980. These purchases, plus those by Taiwan and South Korea, included weapons as sophisticated as those in the NATO-Warsaw Pact armouries (56). In the four years between 1978 (the year of the first U.N. Special Session on Disarmament) and 1982 (the year of the second), world military expenditures exceeded \$ 1.6 trillion (57). It is estimated that roughly one-fifth of total military outlays go into the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

There has been considerable debate in the industrialized countries about the economic effects of militarization, specifically on the inflation rate, employment, and productivity/growth (58). According to studies by Sivard and others, military spending creates specific inflationary pressures peculiar to it, via cost plus-profit contracts, large-scale waste, and rapid product obsolescence. To ensure first claim on scarce materials, labour, management and scientific talent, military buyers operate under less price restraint than civilian buyers, especially in the U.S. Few economies can prevent this privileged demand from spilling over into other markets (59).

In those Third World countries which rely on arms imports, the inflationary tendencies operate more indirectly by putting pressure on the balance of payments and hence on the exchange rate. Among the twenty developing countries with the largest foreign debts, arms imports between 1976 - 80 were equivalent to 20 percent of their debt increase during that period; in four of the twenty, the value of arms imports was equal to 40 percent or more of the rise in debt. At least six countries that had to renegotiate their debt after 1981 had spent \$ 1 billion each for arms imports in the five preceding years (60). A recent Rand corporation study (61) found that arms transfers have played a significant role in the growth of Third World debt. During the 1970's, developing countries increased their military spending three times faster than industrialized countries. By 1980 Third World countries accounted for over two-thirds of the world's armed

forces, and imported \$ 20 billion worth of arms. Despite per capita incomes still averaging below \$ 670 in 1979, the non-OPEC developing countries spent \$ 64 billion on foreign arms between 1970 and 1979. The value of their arms imports was equivalent to half of all foreign economic aid received (62). Arms expenditures have contributed considerably to balance of payments crises, pressures for devaluation, and the consequent upward pressure on prices of imported inputs, and hence on domestic prices generally.

In the advanced countries it has also been argued that arms spending carries high opportunity costs in terms of civilian jobs lost; dollar for dollar, more employment is created through public endeavours such as construction, transport, health, and education (63). The latter also create more transferable job skills in the labour force. At a time when 10 percent of the labour force in the Western European countries and over 7 percent in the U.S. is unemployed, a major reevaluation of priorities appears necessary. In Third World countries that import arms, these expenditures have negligible employment potential, at a time when rough estimates put the proportion of the labour force that is unemployed or underemployed at approximately 50 percent (64). Correlations have also been drawn between high military spending and slow productivity growth, but these conclusions are more questionable (65).

As a result of military procurement in the arms-producing countries, the multinational arms industry is one of the most prosperous and powerful in the world. In 1982 alone, aggressive government promotion in foreign markets helped the arms business realize an estimated \$ 150 billion in annual sales. This ranks in size just below the annual incomes of the world's fourteen largest economies (66). An increasing portion of military production consists of weapons for export, to recover at least a share of the soaring costs of research, development, testing, and evaluation. This equipment - increasingly weapons with greater technological sophistication - carries several risks. The more sophisticated the weapon, the less proven and reliable are its capabilities. The equipment is more expensive to develop and test, and is subject to production uncertainties that may drive long term funding upward in unexpected and uncontrollable ways. Finally, when the weapons do come into use, they generate large continuing operation and maintenance costs. When a Third World country with a low level of scientific

infrastructure or technical power acquires such weapons, not only does it divert resources that could go to domestic investment, it also remains dependent for maintenance and operation.

The diversion of resources to military uses applies to vital minerals and land utilization. The arms race is depleting vital mineral reserves in developing countries, which will either be deprived of their future civilian use or will find them much more expensive. Most developed countries are completely dependent on a small number of developing countries for the minerals essential to sustain or accelerate arms production. The degree of dependence among countries varies to the extent that their national reserves and technology might allow substitution, recycling or stockpiling. But the demand side of mineral exports and the supply side of arms imports are closely linked. In several cases the recipients of military hardware among the developing countries also happen to be the suppliers of important strategic minerals to the developed countries. In addition, the increasing military requirements for land are not without consequence. As countries increase their manufacture of modern weaponry and the size of their armed forces, the amount of land diverted for this purpose will grow. To the extent that it destroys croplands, grazing lands, forests, and ground transportation networks, the burdens on the poor in these countries become even greater.

The extent of resource diversion from more productive uses cannot be emphasized too strongly. For example, in the 1970s Peru spent about 20 percent of its government budget (i.e. 4 percent of its GNP), equivalent to \$ 160 million a year, on defense. While 60 percent of this went to military salaries, etc., 40 percent went to import arms (67). According to Sivard's estimates, in 1980 Third World countries together spent \$ 117 billion on the military, \$ 105 billion on education, and \$ 41 billion on health. In the same year their public expenditures *per capita* were: military, \$ 34, education, \$ 31, health, \$ 12 - while only 44 percent of the population had access to safe water. This diversion of resources toward destructive rather than productive ends occurs at the national and the international levels.

In 1982, developed countries spent 17 times more on military expenditures than on foreign economic aid. In other words, at the start of the Third

Development Decade they were devoting 4.5 percent of their GNP to the military and 0.3 percent to foreign assistance (68). By the 1980s, with growing bilateralism and threatened cuts in contributions to the International Development Association (the soft-loan window of the World Bank that lends on easier terms to the poorest countries), the share of aid for the least-developed countries had decreased significantly (69).

A study by Leontief and Duchin (70) employs an input-output model to assess the effects of different levels of global military spending to the year 2000. High levels of military spending lead to lower total output and personal consumption in most regions of the world. A cut in military spending in advanced countries, with increased aid to the poorest countries, would not reduce the gap between rich and poor countries unless accompanied by structural economic and social change: but it would improve the standard of living of the latter. While we are somewhat wary of this argument given the kind of "development" that aid has tended to foster thus far, there does exist a considerable *potential* for a productive diversion of current military expenditures. Indeed, there is an inherent irrationality in a situation where nuclear missiles can go from Western Europe to Moscow in 6 minutes while the average rural woman in Africa must walk several hours a day to fetch water for her family.

In a way, the rapid rise in military spending during the last two decades is not surprising given the large number of Third World countries that have come under military rule during the same period. While it is understandable that countries which had to go through wars of national liberation in order to dislodge colonial regimes or neocolonial dictators (e.g. Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam) might at the outset need time to consolidate control before calling elections, the majority of Third World juntas have not come to power on the backs of popular struggles (71). Indeed, many military juntas have taken power through military coups that repressed mass movements and the aspirations of the poor for a better life (e.g. Chile in 1973). The massive military expenditures of these countries furnish the trappings of power to political leaders, such as jet aircraft, honour guard, and a budget that absorbs hidden luxuries. Actions in the name of "national defense" have unlimited perimeters; the ideology provides the rationale for secrecy and human rights abuses.

In fact, there is considerable reason to believe that the growth in Third World military expenditures contains a significant component intended for domestic repression and violence, rather than for "national defense". The growth in human rights violations, torture, and training schools devoted to the subjugation of civilian populations through physical and psychological violence has been more than amply documented (72). What is insufficiently recognized is the link between domestic unrest, and the inequality, poverty, and rampant exploitation bred by development processes and strategies directed against the poor. No contemporary example is more striking than the political and economic crisis in Central America. It is widely recognised that acute poverty and sharp inequalities have fueled the guerilla movements in the region. Few realise, however, that the poverty and inequality are themselves the result of a rapid expansion of export crops and cattle ranching, and the consequent alienation of large sections of the peasant population from the land (73). This process has accelerated in the last two decades.

The unrest of⁴ dispossessed peasant or tribal populations continues to simmer in various parts of the Third World. An added twist arises if they are ethnic minorities or indigenous populations, such as the Maya in Guatemala. On top of this is the urban unrest occasioned by stabilization and structural-adjustment programmes. There appears, therefore, to be a vicious cycle. Development strategies biased against the poor create the conditions that generate popular opposition, which in turn breeds violence and repression from those in power. The military and paramilitary forces (74) step in at this stage, and in the process increase their share of the domestic budget and external aid. This further squeezes social expenditures and increases discontent. Powerful external forces, such as multinationals, are often involved in supporting domestic repression (75).

Militarization affects at least one part of the Third World in a more direct and dangerous manner. For over forty years a number of South Pacific countries have played a pivotal role in U.S. global military strategy. The continued colonial status of many of these territories has facilitated their use and abuse as a testing ground for nuclear missiles by Western powers. Entire islands have been contaminated and rendered unfit for habitation, populations have been dislocated, and the incidence of cancer, birth defects, and other diseases has increased. Because of their strategic

military interests in the region, Western powers have frustrated the independence struggles of these economically dependent islands by threatening to cut off all aid to them. The popular protests of the region are as much against colonial domination and exploitation that allow for the perpetuation of militarization as against nuclear testing itself.

The effects of militarization on women operate both directly and through changes in cultural norms. We have already discussed the effects of fiscal cutbacks on women. A fortiori these effects would hold when the cutbacks are occasioned by military expenditures. In addition, the use of force to resolve international and national conflicts has led to large numbers of refugees, many of whom are women, children, and the aged and infirm. Refugees are also created by the destruction of crops and food supplies. Women are not spared by military governments' repression of internal dissent. Sexual abuse and rape are standard methods of terrorizing female prisoners, refugees, and the civilian population in affected zones. Militaristic governments often endorse a "macho" ideology that defines women's place as the home, and breed through the modern mass media, the notion of women as weak, corrupting, and corruptible. At the same time, violence against women is increasingly depicted in film, video, T.V., and magazines.

Though militarism in some ways represents the ultimate depths of class biased and male dominated cultures, it also calls forth the most courageous and tenacious resistance from women. From small groups of mothers protesting the "disappeared" in Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile in the face of overwhelming odds, to the women protesting the kidnapping of youths by the armed forces in northeastern India, to the women's peace movement in Europe, and women who are engaged in the "parliament of the streets", resistance movement in the Philippines, women's struggles against organized military violence have been growing. It must be remembered, however, that for poor Third World women, peace and the struggle against violence cannot be divorced from the struggle for basic needs, economic justice, national liberation and a development oriented toward these goals. *Peace cannot be separated from development just as equality cannot, because the conditions that breed violence, war, and inequality are themselves often the results of development strategies harmful or irrelevant to the poor and to women.*

A Crisis of Culture

Growing worldwide militarization is being matched by the unleashing of powerful social forces - national chauvinism, racism and sexism - that subdue the most oppressed sections of society and dissipate their ability to resist the policies being pursued. For women the dimensions of the crisis include growing violence within the home, attacks on their civil status, physical mobility and work outside the home, and attacks on their control over reproduction. Simultaneously there has been rapid growth in the dehumanization and sexual objectification of women in the media, as well as sex tourism and prostitution abetted by governments concerned with generating foreign exchange earnings.

These conflicting pressures are enmeshed in the growth of other forces of reaction with strong manifestations in the First World, in some cases perhaps even more virulently than in the Third. Thus it was in the U.S.A. and U.K. that the invasions of Grenada and the Malvinas served to whip up mass feelings of "macho" manhood and national chauvinism. In Europe racism against Third World workers has become rampant with the rise of unemployment and the economic slowdown (76). In the U.S.A. the New Right political movement coalesced with the combined purposes of defeating the Equal Rights Amendment, eliminating women's control over fertility, and increasing military expenditures and foreign intervention and domination.

Third World counterparts to this attempt to return women to their "proper" subordinate position in the patriarchal family are many. Traditional religion is often used for this purpose throughout the world. There has been a sharp upsurge of fundamentalism in most major religions. In the U.S., fundamentalist Christian churches provide finance, personnel, and ideas to the extreme right wing's attacks on women. Popular fears over the breakdown of traditional family structures and culture have been played on, often in a carefully orchestrated manner. It must be remembered that the religious hierarchy often finds this a useful way to regain its slipping authority and control over people's lives. In Iran, an additional twist is the use of anti-imperialist struggles and slogans in which women's role as mother and housewife is once more glorified.

The state is often directly involved in these efforts to subjugate women and suppress dissent. The Reagan administration openly supports the activities of the right-wing fundamentalists. In Guatemala, former president General Rios-Montt (who was a member of an American-based Christian fundamentalist church) launched a counter-insurgency drive which resulted in the large-scale massacres and dislocations of the highland Indian populations. In Pakistan, Zia ul Haq attempts to please right-wing fundamentalist Muslims by sharply restricting women's legal and civil status. In Iran, after the overthrow of the Shah, the government has become a theocracy wedded to the subordination of women.

In each case, the irony is that the attempts to drive women back to their "proper" roles is sharply at odds with the reality that many women have to seek employment in order to feed their children and themselves (77). The creation of an ideological climate against women working outside the home makes it easier for the government to cut back child care or health services, and for employers to justify paying even lower wages to women or to ignore statutory benefits such as maternity pay. There is also a strong element of "blaming the victim". Just as North African, West Indian, or South Asian workers are blamed for unemployment in Britain and France, and undocumented aliens in the U.S., women have also been held responsible for unemployment (78). They are also blamed for not taking proper care of children, and for being responsible for cultural decadence, Western influences, etc. (79).

It is important for us to understand the contradictory impulses behind these phenomena. Historically, in unsettled economic and political times attacks on women often go hand in hand with reactionary tendencies and impulses. This was the case, for instance, in Nazi Germany, a situation now extensively documented (80). In part it reflects male fears and anger over unemployment and loss of prestige in and out of the home (81). It is also a reflection of the class differences among women themselves that act as barriers to understanding between women who work predominantly in the home (whether on family farms or enterprises or as housewives) and those who work outside the home. The needs of these two sets of women (and of sub-groups within them) are often different not only in terms of work, but also in terms of services such as child care, as well as physical mobility and civil status. Even when women's incomes are roughly equal, significant

differences in the issues affecting their lives can be used to pit one group of women against another.

This is not the first time that women have been made pawns in the struggle between the forces of "tradition" and so-called "modernity". A top-down attempt by the state to improve women's civil status as a wedge against "traditional" power blocs in society often creates simmering tensions. If the "traditionalists" gain control over the state, women's rights become one of the first targets of attack. Iran during and after the Shah offers a prime example of this tendency (82).

Traditions have always been a double-edged sword for women. Subordinate economic and social status, and restrictions on women's activity and mobility are embedded in most traditional cultures, as our research over the last fifteen years has shown. The call to cultural purity is often a thinly veiled attempt to continue women's subjugation in a rapidly changing society. But traditions and culture also divide women themselves, since traditions and practices often vary across classes in the same society.

This implications of the above for women are fourfold. *First*, the richness of traditional cultural forms (music, theatre, dance, etc.) have to be harnessed for the struggle to raise the consciousness of both women and men (83). Third World feminists will not then be seen to be at loggerheads with the national and cultural stream. *Second*, the problems of poor women have to be given a central position, since the reality of their daily lives so often belies the fundamentalists' myth. *Third*, men's equal responsibility for upholding cultural traditions must be vociferously articulated. Whether in matters of dress, food and drinking habits, or as consumers of pornography, men are usually further removed than women from traditions and more responsible for cultural decline. Yet it is women typically who are blamed! *Fourth*, counter to the growth of right-wing fundamentalism is the growth of progressive actions and beliefs within the churches as expressed, for example, in the theology of liberation, which links the struggle for a more just economic, political and social order to the spiritual salvation of human beings. While these forces are often in women's interests, they are not without contradictions, particularly because of the opposition of the leadership in the Catholic Church to contraception. Nevertheless, there is considerable support for contraception among lay

Catholics and the lower orders of the Church hierarchy. Alliances therefore could be made on specific issues and at the local levels, but these too vary across regions.

It is in the area of consciousness-raising and mass education that the Decade's projects have been most lacking, although scattered initiatives by women's organizations provide sparkling counterexamples. Mass education must be supported to counter the rapid spread of violent pornography in the modern media (84), and to change the traditional perceptions of masculine and feminine. This can be accomplished through institutional education and mass movements. Support from agencies and governments can play a useful role in many countries, though not perhaps in all (85).

Raising the consciousness of government and agency officials and functionaries is an ongoing necessity as it largely determines their ability to recognize women's potential for developing methods to mitigate and perhaps even resolve the various crises outlined earlier. This is the alternative to the path of growing repression of basic needs and human rights on which so many countries are embarked. Whether in terms of food production and distribution, preservation of sources of fuel and water, regulating fertility, or generating collective forms providing services such as health, women's potential is significant. Further, from a global perspective, women have demonstrated their ability to withstand and organize against violence and militarism. Our hopes, not just for a better world but for its very survival, depend on the broadening and strengthening of these initiatives.

Notes

1. A crisis in the world economy of world trade can sometimes improve the situation of local people provided they still retain access to some land or other resources with which they can supply their needs. For example, large landowners may be more willing to allow land to be used for subsistence food if the market price for the cash crop has fallen. But for those who are full-time employees, economic downturn usually means increased misery.
2. See Fishlow, A., "The Brazilian Size Distribution of Income", *American Economic Review* LX II: 2, May 1972, pp. 391 - 402, for the case of Brazil.
3. Sri Lanka has been generally acclaimed for having achieved high levels of basic needs fulfilment during the 1960s despite low per capita incomes. So also the state of Kerala in India - see Centre for Development Studies, Poverty, Unemployment and Development Policy, United Nations, New York, 1974. Other societies like Nicaragua have

- given priority to basic needs, but face external pressures that are forcing a diversion of resources to defense.
4. Egypt is among a number of countries that faced such pressures after open door policies were initiated.
5. Jamaica, Egypt, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Brazil, Mexico are among a few recent examples.
6. This section draws heavily on Sen, G., "Changing International Perspectives Towards Women and Food - An Appraisal", paper presented at the International Workshop on Women's Role in Food Self-Sufficiency and Food Strategies, ORSTOM/CIE, Paris, January 1985.
7. "From 1961-65 to 1973-77, the net imports of staple foods of developing countries increased nearly fivefold, from 5 to 23 million tons per year", Mellor, J. and Johnston, B., "The World Food Equation: Interrelations Among Development, Employment and Food Consumption", *Journal of Economic Literature*, 222, June 1984, p. 536.
8. See Morgan, D., *The Merchants of Grain*, New York, Penguin 1980, for a discussion of the world grain trade.
9. It is not clear how much the setting up of the IMP Cereal Import Facility has helped. See Adams, R., "The Role of Research in Policy Development: The Creation of the IMP Cereal Import Facility", *World Development*, 11: 7, July 1983, pp. 549 - 63.
10. For example, in the poor states of Orissa, Bihar, and Karnataka in India, grain production stagnated during the 1970s even as national grain production was increasing. See Government of India, *Bulletin on Food Statistics*, various issues.
11. See Morgan, D., *The Merchants of Grain*, New York, Penguin 1980, for a discussion of the world grain trade.
12. Given the higher population density and greater landlessness especially in South Asia, it is a matter of debate whether a redistributive land reform will provide viable holdings to the agricultural population. This makes rural and urban employment creation all the more important.
13. See Wijkman, A. and Timberlake, L., *Natural Disasters - Acts of god or Man?*, London, Earthscan, 1984, pp. 47 - 48.
14. According to Wijkman and Timberlake (Ibid.), despite such a policy resolution, less than 40 percent of the \$ 7.5 billion given as aid between 1974 and 1980 went to the rural areas. This was in part because peasants lacked political muscle, and in part because the technology for growing sorghum and millet on arid lands is still not very advanced.
15. Ibid., p. 35.
16. Despite past experiences, Zambia is currently approaching agencies for aid to construct 10 large dams in the southern maize-growing area, to be followed by others. While this may increase cereal and root-crop production by 5 - 6 times, it also threatens extensive damage to the land productivity if the dams are poorly designed and managed. See *The Hindu*, February 11, 1985, p. 5.
17. For example, Kerala in southern India - a state known traditionally for its garden lands and ample perennial water supplies drawn from small streams and ponds that are replenished by seasonal rainfall - has begun to experience severe water shortages in years of inadequate rain. It is now being recognized that the effects of poor rainfall are considerably worsened by the rapid and alarming denudation of forest in the high ranges for industrial uses. Denudation is also occurring in the once lushly wooded slopes of the Himalayan foothills, and in the Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela), along with significant dangers of desertification in Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. In many areas, such deforestation started in the colonial period.

18. See Cecelski, E., "The Rural Energy Crisis, Women's Work and Family Welfare: Perspectives and Approaches to Action", Geneva, ILO WEP Working Paper, June 1984.
19. Wijkman and Timberlake, op. cit., p. 122.
20. See Muntemba, S., "Women as Food Producers and Suppliers in the Twentieth Century: The Case of Zambia", Development Dialogue, 1982.
21. See Cecelski, op. cit.
22. See Sen, C. and Sen, G., "Women's Domestic Work and Economic Activity: Results from the National Sample Survey", paper presented at the workshop on Women in the Third World, CEDE Bogota, August 1984.
23. See Bukh, J., The Village Women in Ghana, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1979.
24. See Batliwala, S., "Rural Energy Scarcity and Nutrition: A New Perspective", Economic and Political Weekly, (XVII, 1982, p. 329).
25. See Carloni, A. S., "Sex Disparities in the Distribution of Food Within Rural Households", Food and Nutrition 7: 1, 1981.
26. See Jain, S., "Women and People's Ecological Movement - A Case Study of Women's Role in the Chipko Movement in Uttar Pradesh", Economic and Political Weekly, October 13, 1984, for a discussion of the Chipko movement in India.
27. B. Wisner discusses the strength of such groups in "Energy - Agriculture Conflicts and Complementarities in African Development: Experiences with Method," paper presented at the International Seminar on Ecosystems, Food and Energy, Brasilia, September 1984.
28. The ORSTOM report on these recommendations and others in forthcoming.
29. Block has an informative discussion of the opposing interests that went into the formation of the Bretton Woods System in The Origins of International Economic Disorder, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977.
30. See Traverso, C. A. and Iglesias, E. V. Basis for a Latin American Response to the International Economic Crisis, SELA-ECLA, May 1983, and various issues of the CEPAL Review.
31. A. de Janvry and L. Ground dissect the experience with land reform in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress in "Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America", Latin American Perspectives V: 4, Fall 1978, pp. 90 - 112.
32. Transfer-pricing is when one subsidiary of a multinational corporation sells to another subsidiary at artificially high or artificially low prices for greater financial gain. For an account of how these intracorporate transfers work, see Caves, R., Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981, and Quirin, M., Fiscal Transfer-Pricing in Multinational Corporations, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979.
33. Refer to Traverso and Iglesias, op. cit.
34. See World Development, Special Issue on Economic Stabilization in Latin America: Political Dimension, 8: 11, November 1980.
35. See Dell in Ibid. and Dell, S. and Lawrence, R., The BOP Adjustment Process in Developing Countries, London, Pergamon Policy Studies, 1980, among others. Interestingly the case for sharing the burden is vociferously argued by the U.S. and Western Europe against Japanese trade surpluses.
36. See Thorp and Whitehead, op. cit., for a number of case studies.
37. India with its strongly inward-oriented industrialization offers a counterexample. Up till the late 1970s, Indian policy toward private direct investment and to commercial borrowing remained quite conservative so that debt service as a percentage of exports of goods

- and services in 1981 was only 7.1 percent (World Bank, World Development Report, Washington D.C., 1984). This ratio is likely to increase because of higher commercial borrowing and a large loan taken under the IMF's Extended Fund Facility in 1981.
38. See Dore, E. W. and Weeks, J. F., "Economic Performance and Basic Needs: the Examples of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela", in Human Rights and Basic Needs in the Americas, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 1982, pp. 150 - 187, for the evidence on Chile after 1973. Also see Cline, W. R. and Weintraub, S. (eds), Economic Stabilization in Developing Countries, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1981, and Dell and Lawrence, op. cit.
39. See U.N. Secretariat, Branch for the Advancement of Women, "Resource Paper on Women in Developing Countries and Monetary and Fiscal Matters in the Context of the International Development Strategy", AWB/EGM, 81.2/RP.4, November 1981.
40. Refer Banerjee, N., "Women and Industrialization in Developing Countries", unpublished manuscript, 1984 (eds).
41. See Prates, S., "Women's Labour and Family Survival Strategies Under the Stabilization Models in Latin America", Expert Group Meeting on Policies for Social Integration, CSDHA/UN, Vienna, September 1981.
42. See U.N. Secretariat (1981) op. cit. for the examples of Chile and Sri Lanka.
43. The Latin American preparatory meeting for the NGO Forum (to be held along with the U.N. Decade for Women Conference in Nairobi, July 1985) at Havana in November 1984 strongly endorsed the need for such research.
44. The steep rise in military spending has also contributed, along with the tax cuts, to the record increases in the federal budget deficit (larger than the total of all deficits for the previous 20 years). The national deficit is now so big that interest payments on it have soared to over \$ 100 billion a year - which is more than the combined cost of all low income programmes in the entire federal budget. See Adams, G., Controlling Weapons Costs: Can the Pentagon Reforms Work?, New York, Council on Economic Priorities, 1983, and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, End Results: The Impact of Federal Policies Since 1980 on Low-Income Americans, Washington, D.C., September 1984.
45. See Ibid., Sparr, P., "Re-Evaluating Feminist Economics", Dollars and Sense, No. 99, September 1984, and Palmer, J. and Sawhill, I. (eds), The Reagan Record: An Urban Institute Study, Massachusetts, Ballinger, 1984.
46. Ibid.
47. Black and Hispanic unemployment levels have not declined as much as white unemployment levels and remain higher than they were before the recession began.
48. See Noyelle, T., "American Women Confront the New Technology and the New World Economy: Past Achievements and Future Challenges", paper prepared for the North American Workshop of the Society for International Development, April 1985, Applebaum, E., "Technology and the Reorganization of Work", unpublished manuscript, March 1985, and Sassen-Koob, S., "Notes on the Incorporation of Third World Women into Wage-Labour Through Immigration and Off-Shore Production", International Migration Review, Summer 1985, for analyses of long-term structural transformations in the U.S. economy. Refer to Mattera, P., The Rise of the Underground Economy, London Pluto Press, 1985 for an account of the rise of the "informal sector" in the U.S.
49. Some examples from Latin America include the Casa da Mulher in Sao

- Paulo, Brazil, Flora Tristan and Peru Mujer in Lima, Peru, and the Casa de la Mujer in Colombia.
50. See U.N. Centre for Disarmament, "The Relationship Between Disarmament and Development", Disarmament Study Series 5, A/36/356, New York, 1982, and U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, "Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures", A/37/386, New York, 1983, and Sivard, R., World Military and Social Expenditures: An Annual Report on World Priorities, Washington, D. C., 1983, p. 19.
 51. In 1983, the number of refugees was estimated at 8 million, although many believe this understates the total. See Ibid., p. 19.
 52. Military expenditure estimates by Sivard exclude veterans' benefits, interest on war debts, civilian defense, outlays for strategic industrial stockpiling, national intelligence expenditures and tax-exemptions for military property.
 53. U.N. (1983), op. cit., p. 8.
 54. The six main military spenders are the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, France, the U.K., and West Germany. It should be noted that there are significant differences within this group. Not all are leading in the process of arms innovation or in the production and export of arms; military expenditure (particularly per capita) differs widely within the group, and not all have military capability that give them a global military strategic importance. In addition to these countries, the U.N. reported that other nations such as Israel have emerged as large arms exporters, particularly to military-dominated or repressive regimes in the Third World. By 1980, for example, South Africa had become the largest single customer of arms exported by Israel's arms exports. South Africa alone imported more arms than all the other African states combined throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
 55. See U.N. (1983), op. cit. A host of political and strategic considerations often accompany commercial arms transactions. The actual terms of transfer deals are rarely made public, but according to the U.N., they include concessional modes of payment, periods of delivery, supply of spare parts and supportive equipment, arrangements for colicensing, co-production and training facilities for handling the equipment. Military assistance programmes, training courses for military personnel, provisions for military bases, naval facilities and listening posts, and tacit and explicit understandings for political and military support in situations of internal unrest, are arrangements known to go along with weapons imports.
 56. Sivard's World Military and Social Expenditures, 1981, 1982, 1983 op. cit. provide the data cited in this section.
 57. See U.N. (1983), op. cit., p. 7.
 58. See the studies: Adams, G., The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle, New Jersey, Transaction Book, 1982, Melman, S., Profits Without Production, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1983, Hartung, W., The Economic Consequences of a Nuclear Freeze, New York, Council on Economic Priorities, New York, 1984, Anderson, M., The Empty Pork Barrel: Unemployment and the Pentagon Budget, Michigan, Employment Research Associates, 1982, DeGrasse, R., The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Build-up, A Report to the IAM and the Coalition of Reagan's Military Build-up, New York, Council on Economic Priorities, 1982, and Leontief, W. and Duchin, F., Military Spending: Facts and Figures, Worldwide Implications and Future Outlook, New York, Oxford University Press, 1983.
 59. See Sivard (1982) op. cit., p. 18 and the 1983 report of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office.
 60. See Sivard (1983) op. cit., p. 24.
 61. See Kitchmann, W., Arms Transfers and the Indebtedness of Less Developed Countries, Rand Corporation Study, N-2020-FF, Santa Monica, California, 1983, or Rand Corporation Checklist, Santa Monica, California, July 1984, for a summary of his study.
 62. See Sivard (1982) op. cit., p. 9 and (1983) op. cit., p. 16.
 63. See Anderson, op. cit., and Sivard (1981), op. cit.
 64. See Sivard (1982), op. cit., p. 19.
 65. DeGrasse, op. cit., and Sivard (1981), op. cit., p. 19 found that in 17 and 10 developed countries respectively for which historical data are available, growth in investment and in manufacturing productivity was negatively correlated with the share of military expenditure in GNP. However this simple correlation may well be a spurious one.
 66. See Sivard (1982), op. cit., p. 7.
 67. See Dollars and Sense, a publication of the Economic Affairs Bureau, Boston, Massachusetts, No. 98, July/August 1984, p. 14.
 68. See Sivard (1981), op. cit., p. 16.
 69. Helleiner, G. K., "Aid and Liquidity: The Neglect of the Poorest in the Emerging International Monetary System", Round Table on International Monetary and Financial System and Issues, ICRIER, New Delhi, December 1984, discusses the growing neglect of the poorest countries in share of aid and financial liquidity.
 70. See Leontief and Duchin, op. cit.
 71. Sivard's classification of military ruled governments includes both those that result from coups and those that result from popular struggles.
 72. Amnesty International is the major source of information in this area.
 73. See Williams, R., Cotton, Cattle and Crisis in Central America, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming.
 74. Right-wing death squads are well known to be associated with and often to include members of the military and paramilitary forces.
 75. ITT's involvement in the Chilean coup of 1973 is widely suspected.
 76. The rapid rise of Le Pen in recent years in France's political right is an example. Le Pen explicitly blames North African workers for unemployment and calls for their expulsion from France; he is only the latest of a number of such politicians in Europe.
 77. See Afshar, H. (ed), Iran, a Revolution in Turmoil, London, Macmillan, 1985, for details of the effects of the Iranian theocracy on women.
 78. Gilder, G., Wealth and Poverty, New York, Basic Books, 1981, blames both women and blacks for high unemployment levels in the U.S.
 79. See Afshar, H., "Women, State and Ideology in Iran", unpublished manuscript, no date.
 80. See Bridenthal, R., Grossman, A., and Kaplan, M. (eds), When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1985.
 81. Youth unemployment and the search for national values also fuel the growth of religious fundamentalism, as has been happening in Egypt and Morocco. The effects of an age-structure tending towards youth can be explosive in a situation of mass unemployment and underemployment, because the aspirations of the young turn to frustration, anger and despair.
 82. Khomeini was exiled by the Shah for opposing changes in women's civil status - this is a little known fact.
 83. The examples of Sistren in the Caribbean and Stree Mukti Sanghatana in India are only two of many.
 84. See Bhasin, K. and Agarwal, B., Women and Media, New Delhi, Kali for Women, 1984, for an analysis of an alternatives to women's current portrayal in the media.

85. Thus UNICEF provided funding that allowed Stree Mukti Sanghatana to tour a number of towns in India in 1984 with street theatre, music, and discussion sessions.

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Margarida da Gama Santos

THE IMPACT OF TOURISM ON WOMEN IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

1. Introduction

The main objective of this article is to stimulate discussion on the economic aspects of the tourism industry and on the socio-economic impact of tourism on women.

The economic impact of the tourism industry on the over-all development of a country has been the topic of high controversy and some research has been conducted on the main controversial issues raised by the development of this industry such as foreign exchange earnings, employment effects, capital intensity of the industry, regional development, linkage effects, etc. The results of this research, though contributing to the clarification and better understanding of the impact of tourism on overall development, are far from being conclusive. It, however, emerges that different types of tourism development appear to lead to different effects and that the benefits appear to be higher the more developed and diversified the economy is and the better planned and regulated tourism development is with other sectors of the economy.

The economic impact of tourism development on women is, however, an obscure area since little research has been conducted on this subject. Although the economic effects of tourism development on women do not exhaust this area of research and analysis they are likely to influence the impact and interaction of tourism development and women in other areas of social sciences such as social, cultural and political.

It is felt that the coverage of this paper is somehow unbalanced in what concerns tourism and women. The shortage of available information to a certain extent explains it. However, since the purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussion on this subject it was thought that perhaps its unbalanced structure would not be a limitation to better achieve this objective.