

JOURNAL FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK

vol. XXXIX 1/2–2023

UN/DOING EPISTEMIC VIOLENCE

Special Issue Guest Editor: Claudia Brunner

Published by:

Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik
an den österreichischen Universitäten

Journal für Entwicklungspolitik (JEP)
Austrian Journal of Development Studies

Publisher: Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik an den österreichischen Universitäten

Editorial Team: Monika Austaller, Tobias Boos, Alina Brad, Eric Burton, Antje Daniel, Felix Dorn, Julia Eder, Nora Faltmann, Gerald Faschingeder, Karin Fischer, Daniel Fuchs, Sophie Gleitsmann, Daniel Görgl, Inge Grau, Pedro Gross, Markus Hafner-Auinger, Johannes Jäger, Bettina Köhler, Johannes Korak, Magdalena Kraus, Franziska Kusche, Luisa Leisenheimer, Bernhard Leubolt, Sebastian Luckeneder, Clemens Pfeffer, Stefan Pimmer, Jonathan Scalet, Lukas Schmidt, Gregor Seidl, Shikha Sethia, Nicolas Schlitz, Koen Smet

Board of Editors: Henry Bernstein (London), Patrick Bond (Johannesburg), Dieter Boris (Marburg), John-ren Chen (Innsbruck), Hartmut Elsenhans (Leipzig), Jacques Forster (Genève), John Friedman (St. Kilda), Peter Jankowitsch (Wien), Franz Kolland (Wien), Helmut Konrad (Graz), Uma Kothari (Manchester), Ulrich Menzel (Braunschweig), Jean-Philippe Platteau (Namur), Dieter Rothermund (Heidelberg), Alfredo Saad-Filho (London), Dieter Senghaas (Bremen), Heribert Steinbauer (Wien), Osvaldo Sunkel (Santiago de Chile)

Publications Manager: Clemens Pfeffer

Cover: Clemens Pfeffer

Photo: Emil Widlund, 2019;

<https://unsplash.com/photos/xrbbXIXAWYo>

Contents

- 5 CLAUDIA BRUNNER
Un/Doing Epistemic Violence while Trying to Change the World
- 30 FARIDA GLOBAL WRITING COLLECTIVE
Undoing Epistemic Violence in Academic Knowledge Production
through Survivors' Participation: Learning from the Experiences of
Yazidi Survivors
- 50 CHRISTINA PAULS
Performing Cracks in Public Memory: Undoing Epistemic Violence
Through Artistic Interventions
- 74 MECHTHILD EXO
Democratic Peace Concepts Beyond the Abyss: Examples from
Afghanistan, Nagaland, and Kurdistan
- 100 MELANIE HUSSAK
Exploring Self-in-Relation: UnDoing Epistemic and Ontological
Violence in the Context of Indigenous Peace
- 122 LENA MERKLE
Epistemological Anarchism Against Epistemic Violence? A
Rereading of Paul Feyerabend towards the Decolonisation of
Academic Knowledge Production

139 SIMONE MÜLLER

Undoing Epistemic Violence in Educational Philosophy: Changing
the Story with Donna Haraway's SF

162 URSULA POSRATSCHNIG

Epistemic Violence and the Carnistic Matrix: Intersecting
Oppressive Hierarchies among Human and Animal Others

185 Editors and Authors of the Special Issue

190 Publication Details

URSULA POSRATSCHNIG

Epistemic Violence and the Carnistic Matrix: Intersecting Oppressive Hierarchies among Human and Animal Others

ABSTRACT *Animals are subject to epistemic violence through their definition as other and less than human in the western imagination. Their exploitation is based on anthropocentric and speciesist ideas, and occurs most notably in the global meat industry. Although billions of other animals are subjected to extreme violence, and severe social injustice and environmental destruction are inherent in its production, meat consumption is constructed as a benign cultural practice in the carnistic matrix. The joint oppression of animals and humans in the meat industry and in other contexts shows that ‘species’ is closely connected to other markers of difference including race, class and gender. Considering species equally may facilitate un-doing epistemic violence through a better understanding of the oppression of other animals and how it ties in with oppressive hierarchies among humans.*

KEYWORDS *epistemic violence, othering, anthropocentrism, speciesism, carnism, ethical veganism, animal rights activism, global neoliberal capitalism*

I. Introduction

The creation of binary hierarchies – us and them – constitutes epistemic violence, because a different status and moral value are assigned to each group respectively. The process is known as ‘othering’ and entails knowledge production that justifies the domination and exploitation of the group defined as ‘other’. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault and Edward Said, it was Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) who initiated a discourse of decolonisation by exposing mechanisms through which the colonial subject had been cast as Other.

While, according to Spivak, the human “colonial subject as Other” (1988) is the epitome of epistemic violence, “constituting ‘the animal’ as the Other might serve as an even clearer example” (Wadiwel 2015: 34). The imagined category of ‘the animal’ has served as a fundamental other to definitions of what it means to be human, and has resulted in a long tradition of objectification and domination of other animals. This is true particularly in western contexts, both in the sense of early European civilisations and in “developed, industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, secular, and modern” societies (Hall 1992: 276-77). Section 2 will elaborate on how other animals have been subjugated through their very definition as ‘animals’ and their ensuing categorisation as less than human. The terms ‘other animals’ or ‘nonhuman animals’, rather than ‘animals’, will be used in an effort to counter human exceptionalism and the human-animal dichotomy, as – biologically – “humans *are* animals” (DeMello 2012: 32).

Other animals have been colonised through the occupation and destruction of their natural habitats, and through their legal definition as property, which denies them rights to bodily integrity and bodily liberty (Wise 2013: 243). Section 3 will show that this is true particularly of other animals captive in the animal-industrial complex, which is defined as the “global capitalist economic and scientific-technological-corporate commodification of animal life” (Calarco 2014: 418) that embodies the continuation of western dominance in present-day global neoliberal capitalism (Coronil 2000: 354). Moreover, it is closely intertwined with the ‘carnistic matrix’ (Joy 2010: 133), which is an ideology that falsely romanticises animal husbandry and favours ignorance of the violence inherent in the breeding, confinement, and slaughter of other animals.

Inside the carnistic matrix, the consumption of other animals is celebrated as a benign cultural practice, although the animal-industrial complex not only exploits other animals, but also subjects particular human groups to severe exploitation and social injustice. Section 4 will demonstrate that it is a context in which different forms of oppression are closely entangled, and the argument will be made that species should be included in critical analyses of other important markers of difference, such as race, class, or gender. This would constitute an important site of un-doing epistemic violence stemming both from speciesist ideology and from other forms of oppression.

2. Epistemic violence and other animals – anthropocentric and speciesist thought

Jacques Derrida is often quoted for characterising the term ‘animal’ as an act of violence. He says that “[a]mong nonhumans and separate from nonhumans there is an immense multiplicity of other living things that cannot in any way be homogenized, except by means of violence and wilful ignorance, within the category of what is called the animal or animality in general” (Derrida 2002: 416). In other words, “assimilating an infinite variety of beings into a category in order that we humans may distinguish ourselves from them” (Gruen/Weil 2012: 481) is an expression of epistemic violence. The latter is defined as the “compulsory assignment of subjects and cultural systems to one of two different and discrete spheres: ‘us’ and ‘the others’” (Pérez 2019: 3). The practice of ‘othering’ can be understood more broadly as a process in which others “are constructed through certain practices of knowledge production which legitimize domination” (Thomas-Olalde/Velho 2011: 30). The more powerful entity, or “subject”, asserts its “intellectual superiority” by casting the other as “mere object” that is denied basic agency and the ability to produce knowledge (Pérez 2019: 3-4). Moreover, processes of othering are “almost invisible” and there is “a remarkable lack of attention in the public agenda” to such epistemic violence (Pérez 2019: 9). This is because it entails a “series of privilege mechanisms that favour ignorance or ‘not seeing’” that often make epistemic violence “ignorable” (ibid.). The following will show that other animals experience epistemic violence in all of these ways.

Epistemic violence towards other animals begins where a rigid line is imagined that separates the human from any other animal. In contemporary usage, the word ‘animal’ implies that a being is not human and therefore assumed to lack human qualities and abilities. The term ‘human’, conversely, builds upon its distinction from animal by “celebrating the linguistic and the rational” while “other aspects of being human (such as emotions, feelings, embodiment, mortality, or dependence on a physical environment for continued survival) are marginalized simply because they happen to be shared with other animals” (Stibbe 2012: 3). This distorts the biological reality that humans are also animals and the expression “humans and animals” is thus “as incoherent as saying ‘carrots and vegeta-

bles” (Shapiro 2008, cited in DeMello 2012: 15). However, this linguistic distinction plays a major role in creating a hierarchy of oppression which “legitimizes violence by drawing a single, untenable line of difference between us and them” (Gruen/Weil 2012: 482).

This clear but imagined division between human and animal is an expression of anthropocentrism, which is a form of epistemic violence that can be understood as “a kind of incessant attention to and rotation around exclusively human existence” (Calarco 2014: 416), and that entails the above binary categorisation of human and nonhuman animals. It is marked by a hierarchy in which humans are prioritised over and valued more highly than other animals or anything not human.

It was the same epistemological foundations in western thought (i.e. those dating back to early European civilisations) that continue to construct human groups as others and continue to shape problematic human-animal relationships today. It was rationalists such as Aristotle who ranked citizens over slaves and men over women, and defined humans as superior to other animals based on “human rationality and the hierarchy of Being” (Freeman 2002: 528). Rationality in this context was exclusively attributed to humans, and it was assumed that “man can exercise ‘will’” while “animals act according to instinct” (ibid.: 529). In medieval contexts, the common classification of other animals was such that they had been “placed on earth by God for human use”, which further justified and contributed to their oppression. The beginning of modernity then saw a paradigm shift in which nature was no longer regarded as an organism, but as a machine. Descartes devised the “mind-body dichotomy” and claimed that humans were “both mind and body whereas animals [were] only body”, “purely physical” and “machines” that “lack[ed] not only reason but consciousness” (Freeman 2002: 529). The above contemplations on an imagined human-animal distinction, influential as they continue to be, entail no further analysis of concepts like consciousness, self-awareness, rationality, or sentience, which are highly complex and consequential concepts that have been used with great confidence to justify the exclusion of other animals from the “moral community” (ibid.: 530).

However, a clear dividing line between humans and other animals has not been established, as the distinction “is neither universally found

nor universally agreed upon. It is neither an exclusively behavioural nor biologically determined distinction” (DeMello 2012: 33). Charles Darwin’s observation that the difference between human and non-human animals was actually a matter of degree rather than kind (1859) was an important contribution to un-doing the previously clear but artificial epistemological separation between humans and other animals. His approach was later supported by genetics research that showed “a close affinity” between humans and, in particular, apes (Freeman 2002: 534). Reason, rather than being “a transcendent feature of the universe”, has meanwhile been shown to be evolutionary, in that humans depend on “forms of perceptual and motor inference present in ‘lower’ animals”, and in that reason “makes use of, rather than transcends, our animal nature” (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 4). This refutes the conception of human beings as “uniquely rational”, and a lack of reason cannot be used as a justification to set humans apart from other animals; reason itself “places us on a continuum with them” (ibid.).

A clear distinction between humans and other animals is therefore a social construction that legitimises oppression and constitutes epistemic violence. This particular construction is termed ‘speciesism’ (Ryder 1970), and can be understood as a “bias toward humans and against all other animals” (Dunayer 2013: 27) that is “based on the assumption that there are essential, meaningful differences [between] humans and animals” (DeMello 2012: 25). It is a form of discrimination similar to racism and sexism, in that it operates on the basis of arbitrary prejudice, but is in this case directed at other animals. The latter are denied moral consideration and basic rights, simply for not being human. This exclusion tends to be justified with claims of other animals’ lack of intelligence, reason, or even sentience, which shows the arbitrary and irrational nature of speciesist prejudice that is used as a justification to exclude other animals from moral consideration and to exploit them for profit.

It is also considered as a form of speciesist prejudice, however, to focus on similarities between humans and other animals in an effort to demand rights and equal treatment for them. It has been defined as another, newer form of speciesism, because it gives an advantage to those animal species that more closely resemble the human norm while it discriminates against less similar animal species. It means that “equal consideration and respect” continue to be reserved for animals that can resemble or live up to the

human standard, although sentience has been proven in both vertebrates and invertebrates, regardless of whether they are primates, insects or worms (Dunayer 2013: 34-38). There is a range of impressive findings on intelligence, emotional and cognitive abilities, communication and social skills, and even virtue in nonhuman animals (see Balcombe 2010), but it has been argued that they should not have to prove what they are capable of, or how similar they can be to humans, in order to be morally relevant or granted rights (see Bekoff 2000).

Many of the above findings stem from the fields of Human-Animal Studies (HAS) and Critical Animal Studies (CAS), which “have been inserting ‘the animal’ into the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences” since the early 1990s (DeMello 2012: 7). They have been using multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to investigate the social construction of other animals in human societies after it was noted that “*not* examining [human-animal relationships] within the context of academia seems bizarre” (ibid.), given the important role that other animals have been playing in human societies, and given that several forms of oppression have been shown to be closely connected to speciesism.

CAS, however, is the field of academic study that is more specifically “dedicated to the abolition of animal exploitation, oppression, and domination” through its political agenda to “eliminate the oppression of nonhuman animals in all social contexts” (ibid.: 17). Its goals also include the advancement of “a holistic understanding of the commonality of oppressions, such that speciesism, sexism, racism, ableism, statism, classism, militarism and other hierarchical ideologies and institutions are viewed as parts of a larger, interlocking, global system of domination” (Nocella et al. 2014: xxvii), which will be further discussed in section 3.

Outside these fields of academic study, however, anthropocentric and speciesist biases continue to exist. Although several academic fields of study seek to decolonise knowledge and education, knowledge production in academia is often “based on epistemologies that seek to confirm western hegemonic structures”, and that frequently reproduce otherness by defining “which knowledge [is] worth distributing” (Thielsch 2020: 230). The misconception persists that epistemic violence is “nonexistent in the academic realm”, except maybe as “an unfortunate ideological aberration” (Brunner 2021: 194), but deeply anthropocentric bias as a form of epis-

temic violence continues to “found and reproduce a privileged space for the human” (Calarco 2014: 416), even in academia. There, “whole branches of the university system such as the humanities and social sciences are constituted upon a sharp nature-culture and human-animal distinction that re-institutes and reinforces [...] anthropocentrism” (Calarco 2014: 418-9). It is therefore imperative “to integrate nonhuman animal advocacy as a serious educational issue” (Kahn 2009: 179).

3. The suffering of other animals in the animal-industrial complex and the destructive cultural hegemony of the carnistic matrix

The most urgent justification for considering epistemic violence towards other animals is the unfathomable nature and scale of suffering that is imposed on particular species of other animals in the animal-industrial complex. Anthropocentric prejudice, and particularly speciesism, serve as justifications for the exploitation of other animals in a variety of contexts, including “scientific research, hunting or the clothing and entertainment industries” (Leenaert 2017: 8). However, it is the livestock industry and the production of meat (i.e. the flesh of other animals) that “is the most far-reaching and consequential form of animal exploitation” in the world today, as it “accounts for 99 percent of the animals killed by humans” (ibid.). It is estimated that “more than 160 billion animals are killed every year for food production” including “around 60 billion terrestrial and more than 100 billion aquatic animals” (Brels 2017: 113). This is billions, not millions (one million seconds equals 12.57 days, while one billion seconds equals 31.71 years).

The animal-industrial complex is the economic manifestation of a cultural construct that Melanie Joy has called the “carnistic matrix” (2010: 133). She uses the term ‘carnism’ to refer to an invisible, but pervasive ideology in which eating other animals is constructed as “normal, natural, and necessary” and “just the way things are” (ibid.: 96). The concept is based on the observation that eating other animals is actually a choice in contexts where it is not a matter of survival, which applies to most industri-

alised and affluent areas of the Global North today. However, rather than seen as a choice, eating other animals is constructed as a societal norm. Carnism is also a violent ideology, as meat cannot exist without killing an animal. The violence is such that individuals who are exposed to the slaughter process experience symptoms including “nightmares, flashbacks, difficulty concentrating, anxiety, insomnia” and even “PTSD” (ibid.: 33).

Inside the carnistic matrix, however, the consumption of meat continues to be constructed as a mundane and benign cultural practice, or even celebrated as something that privileged (human) elites naturally do. Farms continue to be imagined as romantic and secluded abodes in pristine rural environments, much like they are depicted in children’s books and advertisements, where animals always enjoy each other’s company and the outdoors, generally lead very happy lives, and are happy to offer their flesh, bodily fluids and eggs for human consumption. Their painful lives and violent deaths, however, are usually omitted in this construct, where violence is disguised successfully by “an authorizing system of rationality and truth that tells us that violence against animals is either justifiable or, at its most diabolical, a knowledge system that denies that this violence is occurring” (Wadiwel 2015: 27).

In this knowledge system, it is easy to ignore or deny the violence against other animals, because the livestock industry actively seeks to hide its cruel standard practices. Consumers may thus regularly choose to eat other animals “without actually seeing a live farm animal” or “witnessing acts of cruelty or neglect” (Linzey 1989, cited in Heuberger 2003: 102). Simultaneously, the public depends on mainstream media for information, which is “filtered through, if not directly propagated by, powerful capitalists”, rendering any knowledge of the issue essentially corporate (Nibert 2002: 208). This means that smiling animals are used routinely to advertise the consumption of their bodies and secretions (meat and dairy) or eggs, while they are constructed as “consumable commodities” (Glenn 2004: 71).

The denial of violence in the carnistic matrix relates directly to the conceptualisations of ‘pernicious ignorance’ or ‘situated ignorance’ in the literature on epistemic violence. Both are related to “one’s social position and/or epistemic location with respect to some domain of knowledge” (Dotson 2011: 248). In this context, ‘epistemic difference’ is defined as the

“gap between different world views”, which “produce differing understandings of the world, differing knowledges of reality” (Bergin 2002, cited in Dotson 2011: 248). Because situated ignorance is based on one’s social location – in this case the carnistic matrix –, it cannot be resolved if the individual remains in that situation; rather, they must actively seek to address the issue. Leaving the carnistic matrix thus requires an active effort that entails the rejection of fairytale versions of animal farming in return for what is not accepted as truth in mainstream society, namely the “war against animals” (Wadiwel 2015) and their victimisation in a highly problematic system of food production. It means tolerating the “psychological distress” (Joy 2010: 82) of learning about the violent realities of factory farming.

For the reasons outlined above, the general public tends to know very little about the ‘standard practices’ to which animals are subjected on factory farms, where 99% of food animals in the US and 90% of food animals worldwide are estimated to be held captive (Sentience Institute 2019), and where they experience severe physical and psychological violence.

Chickens in the egg industry, for instance, are often unable to move freely or escape from aggressive peers; they also suffer foot injuries from the wire floors of their cages and are routinely ‘debeaked’ so as not to engage in cannibalistic behaviour (McCance 2013: 10–11). They may undergo ‘forced moulting’, which is commonly done to “‘encourage’ another laying cycle” and means that the birds “are denied food for ten to fourteen days” (Regan 2004: 97). They have been bred to lay vastly more eggs than their wild ancestors, which makes their bones brittle and after only about a year they are sent to slaughter (Joy 2010: 59).

Chickens in the meat industry live for a span of only seven to eight weeks in conditions that are “intensely crowded, dimly lighted, poorly ventilated” and cause “ulcerated feet, crippling and deformities, lung damage from inhalation of dust and ammonia [and] breast blisters” (McCance 2013: 12). The latter is due to “selective breeding”, through which the birds grow very quickly, but their skeletons are unable to support their weight, which leads to “vertebra injuries, broken bones, and inflamed joints” (Regan 2004: 96–97), causing severe pain and often rendering the animals unable to move.

Severe cruelty is involved in the production of *foie gras*, where geese or ducks have metal pipes inserted into their gullets and their stomachs filled with up to one kilogram of feed several times a day, which is intended to fatten the livers of these animals. They are kept in small cages so that they cannot escape the procedure (VGT 2022).

Cows in the dairy industry may either be “chained by the neck” or confined otherwise “in areas without grass” and on surfaces “coated with urine and manure”, often leading to foot rot and chronic lameness (McCance 2013: 12-3). Other painful experiences include tail docking (which is amputation without anaesthetics) for hygienic reasons, or mastitis due to genetically increased milk production. Cycles of artificial insemination, birth and having the calf taken away shortly after birth also take a heavy toll and cause severe emotional trauma (Joy 2010: 61). Cattle raised for beef are also removed from their mothers quite early and undergo branding, dehorning and castration, which are excruciatingly painful, without anaesthesia (McCance 2013: 14).

Pigs on factory farms are confined in crowded and poorly ventilated enclosures on concrete or slatted floors (McCance 2013: 16). Their lifespan is four to six months, during which they suffer “[f]oot and leg injuries as well as skin abrasions and bruises” which tend to be left untreated (Regan 2004: 94). Pregnant pigs are confined even more intensely in gestation crates for the duration of their pregnancies (McCance 2013: 16). Piglets who are very small or “do not grow fast enough” are “killed by having their heads ‘thumped’ against the concrete floor” (Regan 2004: 94). The others are castrated without anaesthesia (in front of their mothers) soon after they are born, and have their tails ‘docked’, which is intended to reduce tail biting as they grow in close confinement; these are conditions under which many pigs develop porcine stress syndrome, which is very similar to post-traumatic stress disorder in humans (Joy 2010: 42).

On the way from the factory farm to the slaughterhouse, animals are transported “over long distances in cramped conditions without food or water, resulting in many deaths from heat or cold” and “cruel treatment [...] during loading and unloading” (McCance 2013: 17). When cattle are slaughtered, prior stunning may be ineffective so that “many are hung upside down on conveyor belts and skinned or dismembered alive” (ibid.).

Because of the very high speeds at which the conveyor belts move, and because workers often lack training, pigs may also be stunned insufficiently and remain conscious when their throats are cut and they are submerged in scalding water (which is intended to facilitate the removal of their hair) (Joy 2010: 46). This is also something that routinely happens to chickens (*ibid.*: 54).

These standard practices are not *per se* intended to be as cruel as they are, but to be cost-effective. They are the consequences of the anthropocentric and speciesist mindset that underlies the animal-industrial complex and the carnistic matrix, both of which are “motivated primarily by economic interests” that “have intensified with the development of capitalism” (Nibert 2002: 15). These economic interests have deeply colonial roots and are extensions of previously western economic dominance in present-day global neoliberal capitalism (Coronil 2000: 354). They are “supported by a powerful state apparatus” and “considerable public support” (Nibert 2002: 196) cultivated by dominant anthropocentric and speciesist ideologies perpetuated in the carnistic matrix.

Such ideologies are enabled by epistemic violence in the sense that other animals are constructed as less than human others (see section 2), and in the sense that “a given group’s ability to speak and be heard” is being curbed through “silencing” (Dotson 2011: 236). Other animals as a group are silenced through their construction as voiceless, while important sites of resistance and un-doing epistemic violence – namely ethical veganism on a personal level, and animal rights activism on a political level – are also systematically silenced in the carnistic matrix.

Silencing has been achieved very easily and consistently with other animals, who tend to be constructed and perceived as voiceless, although many animal species are certainly very vocal. However, they are denied a voice, although several animal species have been shown to be able to communicate by using human language (Gruen/Weil 2012: 480). They are also subject to a whole host of speciesist stereotypes that construct them as lacking reason and the ability to know or articulate what is happening to them, which is frequently used as an excuse to kill and consume such animals that are culturally constructed as edible (Joy 2010: 14).

Silencing also affects ethical vegans, who refuse to participate in carnism. Their choices reflect the desire to challenge the status of other

animals as property by refraining from the consumption of all animal-based products (Francione 2008: 15-16), and thus represent an immediate response to how “human and animal oppression have escalated with the rise of capitalism as an economic system” (DeMello 2012: 272). Thus, ethical veganism is considered as “more than ‘just a diet’ and is better seen and practiced as a systematic and intersectional mode of critical analysis and a useful lived philosophy counter to anthropocentrism, androcentrism, hierarchy, and violence” (Twine 2013: 85), as well as “a consumer-based site of resistance” (Wrenn 2011: 16).

However, because the consumption of other animals is constructed as “natural, normal, and necessary” (Joy 2010: 96), prevalent controlling images cast ethical vegans as extreme, ascetic, picky eaters, hypersensitive, hostile, psychologically ill, or as suffering from an eating disorder, and they experience severe prejudice in public discourse, as shown by a 2015 survey in which only drug addicts were perceived more negatively than vegans (Bendl et al. 2019: 207-8). Unfair treatment they experience includes being mocked and ostracised, being demanded to eat non-vegan food, and experiencing regular microaggressions (ibid.). These documented attacks on ethical vegans contribute to their silencing in a knowledge system that normalises violence against other animals, or denies that it even occurs (Wadiwel 2015: 27).

The controlling images that undermine animal rights activists greatly overlap with those undermining ethical vegans, but additionally include their representation as criminals or even terrorists in public discourse. Discrimination they experience includes the literal criminalisation of their work in the form of intimidation through government bodies (Potter in Eng 2014; Bendl et al. 2019: 211).

The ‘Tierschützerprozess’ (a well-known case of wrongful prosecution of animal rights activists in Austria), for instance, which occurred in Vienna in 2010, saw the arrest of 13 animal rights activists by a special task force at gunpoint on charges of forming a Mafia-like criminal organisation pursuant to the anti-terrorism law §278a (originally created to target arms and human trafficking), a 14-month trial that drained them personally and financially, and their eventual acquittal, as the ‘evidence’ produced against them actually proved their innocence. The trial has been called one of Austria’s most horrific legal scandals, in which a government that has

internalised and relies heavily on the exploitation of other animals used its judicial and executive means to exert severe repression on civic resistance against such exploitation (Bendl et al. 2019: 211).

4. Species as a marker of difference – other animals and the analysis of entangled forms of oppression

The suffering of other animals itself is reason enough to investigate the nature and scale of oppression exerted by the animal-industrial complex. However, including the species dimension in critical analyses of anthropocentric knowledge systems is crucial, not only in an effort to counter the oppression suffered by other animals, but also in order to better understand the entanglement of other forms of oppression in human societies. The argument has been made that human supremacy over other animals may have served as the blueprint for other forms of oppression, and that the imagined clear-cut distinction between humans and other animals is a social construction which fosters the perpetuation of “hierarchical human-human relationships such as racism, sexism, and class privilege” (DeMello 2012: 6).

The concept of human supremacy over other animals and nature is thought to have originated with the evolution of human language and, more specifically, the domestication of plant and animal species during the agricultural revolution about 11,000 years ago (Patterson 2002: 5). The latter is celebrated by humans as the ‘great leap forward’ in human evolution, as it allowed them to build great civilisations, but it also marks the beginning of the relentless exploitation of other animals and the creation of oppressive hierarchies in human societies. In previous hunter-gatherer societies, human-animal relationships were characterised by kinship, as illustrated by totemism and mythical creatures that were part human and part animal. The ensuing enslavement of other animals in the course of their domestication, however, led to the social acceptance of violence and required an attitude of domination towards other animals (ibid.: 11).

Humans thus began to transcend and control other animals and nature, as agriculture emerged in tandem with patterns of oppression among human groups (DeMello 2012: 257). The use of human slaves, for

instance, may have been inspired by the use of other animals as sources of food and labour (DeMello 2012: 245), as the emergence of animal agriculture and slavery seem to coincide. This can also be seen in the similar ways in which other animals and slaves were dominated, which include the practices of “castration, branding, whipping, chaining, [and] ear cropping” (Patterson 2002: 14). The status of women, which had been “relatively equal to men” before agriculture, also changed with the domestication of other animals, when women’s “role in domestic and reproductive labor increased” (DeMello 2012: 258). The oppression of women thus also seems to have emerged in parallel with the oppression of other animals. Disparities in wealth and social stratification can also be traced to the domestication of other animals. It appears that societies that practiced animal husbandry were able to “generate greater agricultural surpluses”, which in turn led to a higher degree of social inequality in those societies (Kohler/Smith 2018: 306). Colonialism itself could be construed as the “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom”, as Europeans regarded themselves as superior to indigenous peoples in the same way that humans had started to assume their superiority over other animals (Patterson 2002: 26).

Based on the observation of these entanglements, the compelling argument has been made that species should rank equally among other markers of difference including gender, race, or class (Deckha 2013: 58). An individual’s or group’s marker as human is of equal relevance to processes of privilege and oppression that hinge on these other ‘classic’ markers, because “so many human claims to injustice pivot on experiences of dehumanization and the stigma of being perceived as subhuman or animal” (ibid.). African slaves, for instance, were dehumanised and treated “like animals”, in that they suffered many of the same abuses as animals, including being bought and sold, or beaten and killed (DeMello 2012: 265). A more recent example is the dehumanisation of Jews under the Nazi regime, where they were likened to “vermin, rats, and cockroaches”, “transported in cattle cars”, “tattooed with identification numbers as are livestock”, and “slaughtered en masse, with their humanity and individuality completely extinguished” (ibid.: 267). It can be argued that at least one underlying rationale for these atrocities is the long tradition of constructing other animals as strictly sepa-

rate from, and intrinsically inferior to, humans. Likening human others to animals has thus been used successfully to rationalise the oppression of human others, which shows how closely species as a category is linked to other markers of difference and how “productive including species as an analytic can be for unpacking marginalizing dynamics” (Deckha 2013: 58).

The effects of such marginalising dynamics can be observed in several social justice issues that are directly connected to the construction of other animals as inferior and their consumption as meat in the carnistic matrix. The selection of examples below illustrates instances of epistemic violence and its expression in the animal-industrial complex, where species as a category is closely entangled with other markers of difference including race, class and gender.

For instance, meat was reserved for usually white, male elites before it became a mass-produced commodity, and “[n]ineteenth-century advocates of white superiority endorsed meat as super food” which “divided the world into intellectually superior meat eaters and inferior plant eaters” (Adams 2015 [1990]: 8-9). In this way, meat has been a marker of elevated social rank, and it remains true that the most affluent populations continue to consume the most meat as a matter of prestige and class privilege (Meat Atlas 2021: 12-13).

Industrialisation, however, and the emergence of the animal-industrial complex, have led to a drastic increase in global meat production, which has almost quintupled since 1961 (Ritchie et al. 2017). Meat has thus become a ubiquitous commodity that tends to be even more easily available than other food products in many areas of the Global North. This is true particularly in the US-American context, where economically disadvantaged populations now often depend on very meat-heavy and unhealthy, but cheap fast food for subsistence. It is a phenomenon that coincides with “high levels of racial segregation and income inequality”, as are “urban food deserts”, which are “areas with limited access to healthful food sources” (Hilmers et al. 2012: 1651).

Another example for the entanglement of species with other markers of oppression is the abuse of immigrant workers in major meat businesses, which was first documented in the context of US-American meatpacking plants at the turn of the twentieth century (see Sinclair 1906), and which

continues today. It is often undocumented workers who are employed at will, earn extremely low wages, face injuries, sexual harassment or even death, and are prone to drug use (see Schlosser 2001). They are exposed to the “physical danger of kicking and falling animals” and “demoralizing and brutalizing effects that are conducive to alcohol abuse, family violence, and abusive behavior” (McCance 2013: 18-19). Such exploitation is prevalent not only in the US-American context, but also occurs in European contexts (ORF 2021).

Moreover, in the US, the “disproportionate” presence of factory farms has been documented “in areas populated by people of color or people with low incomes”, where such installations emit pollutants and malodours that decrease the quality of air and water along with property values in such communities, and generally “negatively affect community health and quality of life” (Donham et al. 2007: 318). Overall, “[w]hite people generate 97 percent of all income from the operation of farms. Yet Latinx farmers alone comprise more than 80 percent of farm laborers” in the United States (Foer 2020). Thus, “[r]acism is perpetuated each time meat is thought to be the best protein source” (Adams 2015 [1990]: 10).

The animal-industrial complex is also responsible for the institutionalised exploitation of other female animals’ reproductive capacities on a global scale (DeMello 2012: 263), which falls under the purview of feminist scholarship. Ecofeminist approaches address patriarchal structures in which the oppression of women and animals is intertwined, and draw attention to “hierarchies of domination as the model of relationship between men and women, between human groups, and between humans and other beings” (Radford Ruether 1993: 354).

More specifically, Carol J. Adams (2015 [1990]) examines parallels between the “objectification, fragmentation and consumption” of women and animals in patriarchal culture, and observes conceptual similarities between how animals literally and women figuratively become meat (ibid.: 26-27). In patriarchal cultures, what is constructed as authentic masculinity seems to depend heavily on the consumption of meat, which “has long been used in Western culture as a metaphor for women’s oppression” (ibid.: 29).

The examples above show that marginalised human groups and other animals are jointly oppressed in neoliberal capitalist economies, where the animal-industrial complex is situated. As is symptomatic of neoliberal capitalism, public resources are used to subsidise the US-American livestock industry, while costs incurred in the areas of health care or environmental damage are left to be covered by public funds (Simon 2013: 202-3). The industry also influences legislation to protect its profits, to brand environmental and animal rights activists as criminals or even terrorists, and to outlaw reports on factory farm realities (Potter in Eng 2014; Reese 2018: 28; Bendl et al. 2019: 211). The meat industry has thus been called a “meatocracy” (Joy 2010: 91).

Moreover, raising and killing other animals for food is often justified with the need to provide animal protein to growing global populations. However, it has been shown that meat production actually contributes to hunger, particularly in the Global South, where land is used to grow feed for animals rather than food for humans (McWilliams 2016: 60). Tremendous land and water resources are appropriated, as “almost 70 percent of the world’s agricultural land is currently used to raise livestock”, and “[g]lobal agriculture [...] consumes 70 percent of the world’s fresh water, with more than a third of that going to animal feed” (ibid.: 73). It is a system that is inherently unjust as it destroys livelihoods in the Global South while it produces animal-based products for wealthier countries (Nibert 2002: 116).

It is also a system that threatens intact ecosystems on which the very existence of both human and other animals depends. While corporate media show natural environments that are densely populated by tigers, rhinos, sharks and gorillas, this is “no longer true of the real world” (Harari 2015), where the habitats of free-living nonhuman animals are threatened by various types of pollution and the climate crisis, to which the livestock industry contributes greatly (FAO 2023). Animals confined to agricultural facilities, however, are growing in numbers that radically outweigh what remains of so-called wildlife. The global biomass of mammals has thus been reversed – from zero ‘livestock’ and a global human population estimated to have been between merely five and 10 million people at the time

before the agricultural revolution – to currently consist of 60% nonhuman animals labelled as livestock, 36% human animals, and only 4% remaining free-living nonhuman animals (Carrington 2018).

5. Conclusion

It is important to devote more attention to other animals because “much of human society is based upon the exploitation of animals to serve human needs” (DeMello 2012, 5) and because “the fate of farm animals is not an ethical side issue” (Harari 2015). Un-doing epistemic violence towards other animals, however, is a major challenge because there is a very long tradition of anthropocentric and speciesist thought that defines nonhuman animals as less than human others and justifies their exploitation. The unspeakable violence they experience in human industries, particularly the livestock industry, is rationalised as justifiable or is denied altogether (Wadiwel 2015: 27) in the pervasive knowledge system of the carnistic matrix (Joy 2010: 133). At the same time, important sites of un-doing epistemic and physical violence towards other animals, such as ethical veganism and animal rights activism, experience varying degrees of repression. Although disciplines like Critical Animal Studies are working specifically towards “the abolition of animal exploitation, oppression, and domination [...] in all social contexts” (DeMello 2012: 17), ‘species’ should be established beyond CAS as an analytic category along with race, class, gender, and other markers of difference in order to facilitate a better understanding of the oppression of other animals and oppressive hierarchies among humans.

The exploitation of other animals – and particularly their extensive consumption as meat – also requires more attention, first, because it is “the most far-reaching and consequential form of animal exploitation” in the world today (Leenaert 2017: 8), and second, because it is closely connected to other forms of exploitation including racism, sexism and classism, all of which occur in the animal-industrial complex and everywhere under present-day global neoliberal capitalism (Coronil 2000: 354). They

include not only the exploitation of workers in the livestock industry and the erosion of democratic principles and public welfare, but also concerns like “direct environmental pollution, greenhouse gas production, human health impacts of consumption and labor, effects on communities, land use priorities, water consumption, zoonotic disease, and ethical questions around the killing of the animals” (Twine 2013: 78). This system of exploitation has thus been called “a global emergency” (Brels 2017: 133) that threatens the interests of both humans and other animals. Un-doing epistemic violence may begin with a contribution to a knowledge system in which both matter equally.

References

- Adams, Carol J. (2015 [1990]): *The Sexual Politics of Meat – A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory*. New York & London: Bloomsbury Academic. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781501312861>
- Balcombe, Jonathan (2010): *Second Nature – The Inner Lives of Animals*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bekoff, Marc (2000): *Animal Emotions – Exploring Passionate Natures*. In: *BioScience* Vol. 50 (10), 861-70. [https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568\(2000\)050\[0861:AEEPN\]2.0.CO;2](https://doi.org/10.1641/0006-3568(2000)050[0861:AEEPN]2.0.CO;2)
- Bendl, Regine/Delmestri, Guiseppe/Kudelka, Petr (2019): *Vegaphohie: Ein Hindernis auf dem Weg zur Nachhaltigkeit*. In: Luks, Fred (ed.): *Chancen und Grenzen der Nachhaltigkeitstransformation. Ökonomische und soziologische Perspektiven*. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler, 201-229. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-22438-7_12
- Brels, Sabine (2017): *A Global Approach to Animal Protection*. In: *Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy*. 20 (1), 105-123. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13880292.2017.1309866>
- Brunner, Claudia (2021): *Conceptualizing epistemic violence: an interdisciplinary assemblage for IR*. In: *International Politics Review* 9, 193-212. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41312-021-00086-1>
- Calarco, Matthew (2014): *Being Toward Meat: Anthropocentrism, Indistinction, and Veganism*. In: *Dialectical Anthropology* 38, 415-429. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-014-9349-y>
- Carrington, Damian (2018): *Humans just 0.01% of all life but have destroyed 83% of wild*. www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/may/21/human-race-just-001-of-all-life-but-has-destroyed-over-80-of-wild-mammals-study, 04.03.2023.

- Coronil, Fernando (2000): Towards a Critique of Globalcentrism: Speculations on Capitalism's Nature. In: *Public Culture*, 12 (2). Duke University Press, 351-374. <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-12-2-351>
- Darwin, Charles (1859): *On the Origin of Species*. UK/Ireland: John Murray.
- Deckha, Maneesha (2013): Animal Advocacy, Feminism and Intersectionality. In: *Deportate, esuli, profughe* 23, 48-65.
- DeMello, Margo (2012): *Animals and Society – An Introduction to Human-Animal Studies*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Derrida, Jaques (2002): The Animal That Therefore I Am. In: *Critical Inquiry* 28 (2), 369-418. <https://doi.org/10.1086/449046>
- Donham, Kelley J/Wing, Steven/Osterberg, David/Flora, Jan L./Hodne, Carol/Thu, Kendall M/Thorne, Peter S. (2007): Community Health and Socioeconomic Issues Surrounding Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations. In: *Environmental Health Perspectives* 115 (2), 317-320. <https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp.8836>
- Dotson, Kristie (2011): Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing. In: *Hypatia* 26 (2), 236-257. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x>
- Dunayer, Joan (2013): The rights of sentient beings: Moving beyond old and new speciesism. In: Corbey, Raymond/Lanjouw, Annette (eds., 2013): *The Politics of Species - Reshaping our Relationships with Other Animals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27-39. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139506755.005>
- Eng, Karen Frances (2014): Green is the new red: Will Potter on the problem of treating environmentalists like terrorists. <https://blog.ted.com/will-potter-on-of-treating-environmentalists-like-terrorists/>, 20.09.2022.
- FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2023): www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/197623/icode/, 02.04.2023.
- Foer, Jonathan Safran (2020): Meat is not essential. Why are we killing for it? www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/11/jonathan-safran-foer-meat-is-not-essential-why-are-we-killing-it/?arc404=true, 20.09.2022.
- Freeman, David A. (2002): Violence against animals: an epistemological inquiry. In: *The Social Science Journal* 39 (4), 527-538. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319\(02\)00227-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(02)00227-6)
- Francione, Gary L. (2008): *Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Glenn, Cathy B. (2004): Constructing Consumables and Consent: A Critical Analysis of Factory Farm Industry Discourse. In: *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 28 (1), 63-81. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0196859903258573>
- Gruen, Lori/Weil, Kari (2012): Animal Others – Editor's introduction. In: *Hypatia* 27 (3), 477-487. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2012.01296.x>
- Hall, Stuart/Gieben, Bram (eds., 1992): *Foundations of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd. and The Open University.

- Harari, Yuval Noah (2015): Industrial farming is one of the worst crimes in history. www.theguardian.com/books/2015/sep/25/industrial-farming-one-worst-crimes-history-ethical-question, 14.09.2022.
- Heuberger, Reinhard (2003): Anthropocentrism in Monolingual English Dictionaries: An Ecolinguistic Approach to the Lexicographic Treatment of Faunal Terminology. In: *Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik* 28 (1), 93-105.
- Hilmers, Angela/Hilmers, David C./Dave, Jayna (2012): Neighborhood Disparities in Access to Healthy Foods and Their Effects on Environmental Justice. In: *American Journal of Public Health* 102 (9), 1644–1654. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2012.300865>
- Joy, Melanie (2010): *Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows*. San Francisco: Conari Press.
- Kahn, Richard (2009): Marching Out From Ultima Thule: Critical Counterstories of Emancipatory Educators Working at the Intersection of Human Rights, Animal Rights, and Planetary Sustainability. In: *Canadian Journal of Environmental Education* 14, 179-195.
- Kohler, Timothy A./Smith, Michael E. (eds., 2018): *Ten Thousand Years of Inequality: The Archeology of Wealth Differences*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt2od880i>
- Lakoff, George/Johnson, Mark (1999): *Philosophy in the Flesh – The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*. New York: Basic Books.
- Leenaert, Tobias (2017): *How to Create a Vegan World – A Pragmatic Approach*. New York: Lantern Books.
- McCance, Dawne (2013). *Critical Animal Studies – An Introduction*. New York: State University of New York.
- McWilliams, James (2016). Contemporary Issues. In: Wise, Michael D./Jensen Wallach, Jennifer (eds., 2016): *The Routledge History of American Foodways*. New York/London: Routledge, 59-77.
- Meat Atlas (2021): https://friendsoftheearth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/MeatAtlas2021_final_web.pdf, 03.04.2023.
- Nibert, David (2002): *Animal Rights/Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation*. Lanham/Boulder/New York/Toronto/Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Nocella, Anthony J./Sorenson, John/Socha, Kim/Matsuoka, Atsuko (2014): The Emergence of Critical Animal Studies. In: Nocella, Anthony J./Sorenson, John/Socha, Kim/Matsuoka, Atsuko (2014): *Defining Critical Animal Studies – An Intersectional Social Justice Approach for Liberation*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, xix-xxxvi. <https://doi.org/10.3726/978-1-4539-1230-0>
- ORF – Österreichischer Rundfunk (2021): Europas Fleischindustrie – System der Ausbeutung von Migrant*innen. <https://orf.at/stories/3230308/>, 21.09.2022.
- Patterson, Charles (2002): *Eternal Treblinka – Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust*. New York: Lantern Books.

- Pérez, Moira (2019): Epistemic violence: reflections between the invisible and the ignorable. In: *El lugar sin límites*, 1 (1), 81-98.
- Radford Ruether, Rosemary (1993): *Ecofeminism: Symbolic and Social Connections of the Oppression of Women and the Domination of Nature*. In: Adams, Carol J. (1993): *Ecofeminism and the Sacred*. New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 347-357.
- Reese, Jacy (2018): *The End of Animal Farming – How Scientists, Entrepreneurs, and Activists are Building an Animal-Free Food System*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Regan, Tom (2004): *Empty Cages*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Ritchie, Hannah/Rosado, Pablo/Roser, Max (2017): *Meat and Dairy Production*. <https://ourworldindata.org/meat-production>, 02.04.2023.
- Ryder, Richard (1970): Speciesism. In: *Critical Society* 1 (2), 1-2.
- Schlosser, Eric (2001): *Fast Food Nation*. Boston: First Mariner Books.
- Sentence Institute (2019): *Global Farmed & Factory Farmed Animals Estimates*. www.sentenceinstitute.org/global-animal-farming-estimates, 14.09.2022.
- Sinclair, Upton (1906): *The Jungle*. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co.
- Simon, David Robinson (2013): *Meatonomics – How the Rigged Economics of Meat and Dairy Make You Consume Too Much – and How to Eat Better, Live Longer, and Spend Smarter*. San Francisco: Conari Press.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1988): Can the subaltern speak? In: Nelson, Cary/Grossberg, Lawrence (1988): *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 21-78.
- Stibbe, Arran (2012): *Animals Erased – Discourse, Ecology, and Reconnection With The Natural World*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
- Thielsch, Angelika (2020): Listening out and dealing with otherness. A postcolonial approach to higher education teaching. In: *Arts and Humanities in Higher Education* 19 (3), 227-243. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1474022219832459>
- Thomas-Olalde, Oscar/Velho, Astride (2011): Othering and its Effects – Exploring the Concept. In: Niedrig, Heike/Ydesen, Christian (eds., 2011): *Writing postcolonial histories of intercultural education*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 27-51.
- Twine, Richard (2013): Addressing the animal-industrial complex. In: Corbey, Raymond/Lanjouw, Annette (eds.): *The Politics of Species – Reshaping our Relationships with Other Animals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 77-91. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139506755.009>
- VGT – Verein Gegen Tierfabriken (2022): Tierquälerei für Martini – Wie sehr Gänse und Enten für unsere „Tradition“ leiden müssen. <https://vgt.at/presse/news/2020/news2020110mn.php>, 04.04.2023.
- Wadiwel, Dinesh Joseph (2015): *The War against Animals*. Leiden/Boston: Brill Rodopi. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004300422>
- Wise, Stephen (2013): The capacity of non-human animals for legal personhood and legal rights. In: Corbey, Raymond/Lanjouw, Annette (eds.): *The Politics of Species – Reshaping our Relationships with Other Animals*.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 241-5. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139506755.025>

Wrenn, Corey Lee (2011): Resisting the Globalization of Speciesism: Vegan Abolitionism as a Site for Consumer-Based Social Change. In: *Journal for Critical Animal Studies* 9 (3), 9-27.

ABSTRACT Tieren widerfährt durch ihre Definition als „other“ und „nicht menschlich“ in der westlichen Imagination epistemische Gewalt. Ihre Ausbeutung beruht auf anthropozentrischen und spezieisistischen Ideen und ist in der globalen Fleischindustrie besonders ausgeprägt. Obwohl dort Milliarden von Tieren extreme Gewalt erfahren und soziale Ungerechtigkeit und Umweltzerstörung mit der Produktion von Fleisch einhergeht, wird Fleischkonsum in der karnistischen Matrix als harmlose kulturelle Praxis konstruiert. Die gemeinsame Unterdrückung von Tieren und Menschen in der Fleischindustrie und in anderen Zusammenhängen zeigt, dass „Spezies“ eng mit anderen Markern von Differenz wie Rasse, Klasse oder Geschlecht verbunden ist. Spezies als gleichwertig und -wichtig zu betrachten, könnte zu einem besseren Verständnis der Unterdrückung anderer Tiere und ihrer Verschränkung mit Hierarchien unter Menschen sowie zum Undoing epistemischer Gewalt beitragen.

Ursula Posratschnig
Department of English, University of Klagenfurt
ursula.posratschnig@aau.at