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VANESA CIOLLI

Shaping the State through Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes: The Role of the Inter-American Development Bank in the Case of Argentina (2003-2010)

ABSTRACT *This paper analyses the role played by the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus in the strategy of the Inter-American Development Bank during the 21st century. The empirical analysis focuses on a cycle of five programmes in Argentina between 2003 and 2010, which concluded with a Conditional Cash Transfer Programme called Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social. This article argues that the IDB's interest in shaping the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus did not disappear, but there were several changes in the manner it intervened that suggested a need to adapt its financing programs so as to face the challenges brought by social struggles. Bureaucracy also became strategic because of its capacity to materialise the condensation of the social relations of forces and thus delimit the framework for the policy-making process through a silent, impersonal, and abstract way – given by the apparent neutrality and rationality of the routine practices.*

KEYWORDS *conditional cash transfer, Inter-American Development Bank, state bureaucracy, Argentina, Plan Familias*

1. Introduction

It is widely known that, during the Washington Consensus, multi-lateral development banks played a major role in shaping the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus by means of implementing programmes

of state reform in Latin America and the Caribbean (Oszlak 1994; Casaburi/Tussie 1997; Corbalán 2002; Orlansky 2005).

These programmes sought to adjust the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus to the requirements of the growing internationalisation of capitalist accumulation, which had been taking place since the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state (Jessop 2016).

During the first decade of the 21st century, the neoliberal hegemony and the Washington Consensus reforms were challenged in many Latin American and Caribbean countries in polysemic and contradictory ways (Svampa 2012; Thwaites Rey/Ouviña 2018). The spread of social conflicts opposed to the consequences of a neoliberal regime favoured the surfacing or consolidation of political projects that clamoured for a change in the current role of the state in social and economic development, and criticised the neoliberal programmes of state reforms. In that framework, multilateral development banks' programmes turned to social policy funding. Consequently, their participation in the configuration of the bureaucratic state apparatus became less clear and their critical study quite unexplored.

Thus, this work deals with some interrelated research questions: has the interest of multilateral development banks on the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus disappeared? Why and how has this interest changed during the first decade of the 21st century? What does this mean for the social relations of forces?

These research questions are based on a critical revision of conceptual approaches about the role played by the bureaucratic state apparatus in capitalist domination – in particular, its capacity to materialise the condensation of the social relations of forces (Poulantzas 2005), and thus, to delimit the framework for policy-making by means of silent, impersonal and abstract way of operation as a result of the alleged neutrality and rationality of routine practices (Weber 1922; Piva 2012).

In that sense, the research questions could contribute to the broad field of critical development studies by interrogating the role played by multilateral development banks in shaping the state apparatus as a key element to strengthen the conditions of global capitalist accumulation.

It is necessary to widen the empirical basis to better understand these processes. Therefore, this research work focuses on how the Inter-Amer-

ican Development Bank (IDB) changed its focus from state reforms to financing Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes (CCTPs) during the first decade of the 21st century and, particularly, the paradigmatic case of the implementation of a cycle of five IDBs' programmes in Argentina.

In the literature on CCTPs, little has been written about changes in the institutional and bureaucratic apparatus promoted by the IDB funding in social policies, which is an aspect highlighted in this paper, focused on IDB funding in Argentina between 2003 and 2010 through a CCTP called *Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social* (PFIS), along with the significance it had for social relations of force, which had changed during the 2001 crisis.

In sum, this research paper is divided into five sections. The first section describes the theoretical and methodological approach. The second section highlights the leadership of the IDB in promoting the implementation of CCTPs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The third section describes the role played by the IDB in the implementation of CCTP in Argentina between 2003 and 2010. The fourth section identifies the institutional and bureaucratic changes in the state apparatus promoted by IDB funding programmes and the influence of domestic factors on their implementation. Finally, the paper concludes that the IDB programmes in Argentina implementing CCTPs promoted changes in the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus, which contributed to shape it in the medium term. But this process was not linear, because a series of domestic factors impacted on the way these changes in the state apparatus materialised. The differing goals and speeches of the IDB and the Argentinian administration regarding the social issue, and the involvement of other social actors converged on the same policy-making process through parallel and complementary devices, where opposite views did not block the implementation of CCTP or of the domestic political dynamics. This process resulted in the material condensation in the state apparatus of the IDB's criteria on social policies, as well as some key elements related to the social conflict that arose with the 2001 crisis. But, in the long-term, IDB's flexibility – by adapting programme implementation to some of the internal constraints – was useful for its own strategy of conducting reforms of the state in Argentina.

2. Theoretical and methodological approach

2.1 A critical approach to the bureaucratic state apparatus

The institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus shapes the framework for the policy-making process by delimiting sources and restraining social actors' involvement, but the development of state policies also changes that initial framework by crystallising social power relations in an institutional way.

Max Weber (1922) points out the paradoxes behind the tendency towards bureaucratisation in the capitalist societies of his time. He considers that bureaucracy is the organisation with the greatest technical superiority because it is based on the objective rational norm, the division of administrative labour, functional specialisation and the professionalisation of officials, which provides predictability and the possibility of rational calculation. Nevertheless, he warns that its impersonal and abstract character reinforces its inevitability by becoming external even to those who execute it. It implies limits for individual freedom, democracy, and the political leadership of the state. Nevertheless, Olin Wright (1983) opines that, in Weber's approach, bureaucracy is conceived as neutral and external to political confrontation.

Thus, Weber paved the way for the articulation between the specific features of the bureaucratic apparatus and the form of political domination of capitalism, which can be critically analysed from the Marxist perspective.

Nicos Poulantzas (2005) redefines the concept of the state as a strategic place and centre for the exercise of power, where the social relations of force are 'materially' condensed. Social conflicts are registered in the state apparatus after the mediation of administrative procedures, and in the formal and informal rules of state activities. From this perspective, the role of bureaucracy does not lie in merely executing policies, but rather in participating in policy-making processes. Its specific political role is different from that of political parties or other representative institutions, since it structures the field of action for policy-making processes from the crystallisation of practices and procedures that frame state action.

Guillermo O'Donnell considers that "the fetishised character of capitalist domination gives rise to the state tending to objectify itself in state institutions" (O'Donnell 1984: 202). Thus, the mediations of the rational-legal authority, the routine activity and responses to crises or social imbalances of the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus contribute to the state appearing external from class domination. Moreover, Adrián Piva (2012) points out how "[...] bureaucracy has been the historical way in which that demand for the structuring of domination as impersonal and abstract domination took shape" (Piva 2012: 34), in such a way that "[t]he illusory autonomy of the state only exists through its bureaucratic organisation as a separate body from all social groups, including the ruling class" (Piva 2012: 40). From this, it is configured as a "social practice specialised in the reproduction, improvement and extension of an impersonal domination, which is presented to the same bureaucrats as an empire of the objective norm" (Piva 2012: 41).

Within the state apparatus, public policies produce "institutional crystallisations" (Oszlak/O'Donnell 1981) when they change the responsibilities, competencies, resources, or functions of some state agencies. Institutional crystallisations also include the creation, modification or cancellation of agencies, the overlapping of functions, or a new division of tasks between agencies. Furthermore, the practices of the bureaucratic apparatus and its agents are the result of sedimented 'geologic' layers, historically constructed. In that sense, the implementation of a package of canned neoliberal reforms of the state during the Washington Consensus, or the ideological perspective of a government after that period, were not enough to build a new state apparatus. From this general historical structural perspective, this paper also considers studies on bureaucracy from different theoretical approaches.

Let us take Crozier (1974); for example, he claims that the power of bureaucracy is not only in the hierarchical officials but also in every level of the organisation. Consequently, some research works examine formal and informal rules that shape the civil servants' routines, tasks and motivations (Bendix 1947; Downs 1965; Crozier 1974). Other studies focus on the relationship between politicians and technocrats (Brown/Erie 1984; Aberbach/Rockman 1999; Thwaites Rey 2005). The latter were related to the emergence and strengthening of the new institutionalist perspective, which recovers the studies concerning the state apparatus. Based on

that, researchers looked to overcome the rigidity of bureaucracies so as to create state capacities based on technical knowledge, which would allow improving their productivity and efficacy. The second generation of structural reforms promoted by international organisations were based on that theoretical background (Lora/BID 2007; Charnock 2009; WB 1997, 1998). Another group of studies analyses the role played by street-level bureaucrats in re-making public policies (Subirats 1989; Lipsky 1996) by creating different ensembles of socio-political actors on the territorial scale (Chiara/Di Virgilio 2005; Perelmiter 2016).

Taking into account these contributions to the study of changes in the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus, it is possible to identify some analytical dimensions for empirical research, such as institutional crystallisations, the civil servants' routines, tasks and motivations, and the relation among the 'geologic' layers', the role of technical assistance in streamlining bureaucratic processes, and the ensemble of socio-political territorial actors and their role in policy feedback. In this work, we propose to identify this set of dimensions from the perspective of the strategic role played by the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus in the material condensation of the social relations of force in a specific historical context.

With globalisation, policy-making became a multi-scalar process (Jessop 2008), given the increasing relevance of global problems and actors within the boundaries of the countries, which facilitate the configuration of epistemic communities (Haas 1992). In the frame of global social policy studies, Bob Deacon (2007) argues that epistemic communities codify the debate around the social issue using language and narratives. So, international institutions –such as multilateral development banks – have a greater capacity to “travel between scales” (Deacon 2007: 18), which allows them to enter bureaucratic state structures through different channels. Then, state bureaucracy is shaped by a “complex scalar articulation” between mechanisms aimed at the homogenisation of the state apparatus promoted by international organisations, as well as mechanisms aimed at the institutionalisation of social conflicts on the territorial scale, especially in the field of social policies (Ciolli 2018). From this global approach, the internalisation of epistemic communities into the state apparatus and their re-appropriation according to domestic factors is another analytical dimension with which to guide the research.

2.2 Methodological research strategy

The methodological research strategy was a case study based on a qualitative approach, including quantitative data analysis.

The selected case covers a cycle of five IDB programmes for technical and financial assistance to Argentina approved between 2003 and 2010, which promoted the implementation of a CCTP called *Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social* (PFIS). It was a paradigmatic case because this cycle was developed while official speeches repeatedly criticised the role of financial institutions in the policy-making process and highlighted the development of autonomous, original, charitable and work-based social policies (claimed to be opposed to the social programmes promoted by international organisations since they emerged from domestic issues). In addition, the cycle began with two emergency loans to help the government face the social conflicts related to the 2001 crisis.

The period under analysis goes from the approval of the IDB programme cycle to its implementation. Although the PFIS was created in 2005, in 2003 the IDB funding cycle was already promoting crucial changes in the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus for PFIS implementation. The period ended in 2010, when PFIS was closed and the IDB funding cycle was interrupted, with 97 per cent of payments made to the final programme. In 2009 PFIS was replaced by *Asignación Universal por Hijo* (AUH), which was not supported by the IDB, but included some of its distinguishing features. The methodological decision to analyse five IDB programmes within a cycle allowed the researchers to identify the dynamic analytical dimensions along the policy-making process and the re-shaping of strategies from a mid-term perspective. The scope of the research is the national state apparatus, which received and managed IDB funding.

The main method for data collection was document analyses, which included contracts and reports of IDB funding programmes in the social investment sector, documents of IDB institutional strategies, Argentinian official speeches, and regulations related to social policies. To complement this, the research included interviews with government officials involved in the negotiation and implementation of the programmes. This allowed for the consideration of whether the conditionalities and activities of the loans were suggested by the IDB, and to find contradictory practices that challenged the CCTP model. Furthermore, the study was completed with

quantitative data, such as the national budgets and the IDB's annual financial and operating reports, as well as a database of the IDB's funding to the Argentine public sector.

3. The IDB promotion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean

This section analyses the changes in the IDB portfolio during the first decade of the 21st century and shows its role in the promotion of Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The IDB was created in 1959 to “contribute to accelerating the process of economic and social development, individual and collective, of the regional developing member countries” (IDB 1996: 5). Its projects give technical and financial assistance across 17 sectors. Although its strategies and priorities have varied over the years, its concern for the state apparatus is clearly a key element for economic and social development. During the last two decades, IDB has become the largest funding provider among the multilateral development banks operating in the region.

A quantitative approach to the historical portfolio by sector shows that the sector called “reform and modernisation of the state” received the largest amount of money. This sector accounted for 17 per cent of the IDB portfolio from 1961 to 2000, and then it dropped to 14 per cent from 2000 to 2010. This represented a minor decrease, but a countertrend from the 1990s, when this sector had concentrated 30 per cent of the IDB portfolio during the peak of Washington Consensus state reforms. However, during the 21st century the sector of “social investment” gained prominence. Historically, this sector had represented seven per cent of the IDB portfolio (from 1961 to 2000), but it significantly increased its average to 26 per cent between 2001 and 2010, peaking at 52 per cent in 2003. The emergency programmes for Argentina in that year explained that number increase. Figure 1 compares the evolution of both above-mentioned sectors.

In this context, most of the financing in the “social investment” sector was funnelled to the promotion of a specific type of state intervention on poverty: The Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes (CCTP). Table 1 shows that the IDB had a key role in providing technical and financial




Figure 1: Participation of “Social Investment” and “Reform of the State” Sectors in IDB Loan Portfolio (2000-2010)

Source: Own illustration based on IDB Annual Reports

assistance to CCTP implementation in the region. Between 1997 and 2015, the IDB supported the implementation of CCTs in 21 countries (IDB 2015), 12 of which started before 2006 (IDB 2006).

Independent States of Latin America and the Caribbean	IDB's borrowing member	IDB's projects of CCTPs (1997-2015)	ECLAC's database about CCTPs (2017)
Argentina	x	x	x
Bahamas	x	x	
Barbados	x		
Belize	x		x
Bolivia	x	x	x
Brazil	x	x	x
Chile	x		x
Colombia	x	x	x
Costa Rica	x	x	x
Cuba			
Ecuador	x	x	x
El Salvador (The Savior)	x	x	x
Guatemala	x	x	x
Guyana	x		
Haiti	x	x	x
Honduras	x	x	x
Jamaica	x	x	x
Mexico	x	x	x

Independent States of Latin America and the Caribbean	IDB's borrowing member	IDB's projects of CCTPs (1997-2015)	ECLAC's database about CCTPs (2017)
Nicaragua	x	x	x
Panama	x	x	x
Paraguay	x	x	x
Peru	x	x	x
Dominic Republic	x	x	x
Suriname	x	x	
Trinidad and Tobago	x	x	x
Uruguay	x	x	x
Venezuela	x		
27	26	21	21

Table 1: Implementation of CCTPs in Latin American and Caribbean countries
Source: Own illustration based on IDB (2015) and Cecchini & Atuesta (2017)

Thanks to this boost, the Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes to impoverished households grew to become the hegemonic instrument to address the *social issue*, achieving a regional status. This took place in an environment marked by many countries challenging the neoliberal hegemony – in polysemic and contradictory ways (Thwaites Rey/Ouviña 2018). Nevertheless, CCTPs were implemented both by governments who identified themselves with neoliberalism and those who conceived themselves against or as an alternative to it.

Within the framework of global social policy studies, the two questions mostly discussed how and why the CCTPs diffusion occurred (Dobbin et al. 2007; Jenson 2010; Fenwick 2013; Osorio Gonnet 2017; Béland et al. 2018; Deeming/Smyth 2018), given the fact that the political, ideological or

discursive scene was more heterogeneous than during neoliberal hegemony (Sugiyama 2011; Borges 2018). Moreover, they encouraged many research works, whose explicit or implicit main debate revolved around the continuities and breakups between CCTPs and the neoliberal matrix of social policies in different national contexts (Barba Solano/Valencia Lomelí 2011; Midaglia 2012).

The IDB and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) have stressed the successful performance of these social programmes from a macroeconomic perspective by virtue of their wide coverage by means of a relatively low investment level (Levy/Schady 2013; Cecchini/Atuesta 2017; IDB 2015): “In 2015, the investment in CCTPs was 0.33 per cent of the regional GDP” (Cecchini/Atuesta 2017: 29). Nevertheless, some authors did not consider it a signal of efficiency but merely the result of the very low amount of cash transfers (Barba Solano/Valencia Lomelí 2011; Lo Vuolo 2011).

In sum, if we only concentrate on quantitative data about the IDB’s portfolio we would conclude that state reforms were not relevant during that period. However, despite the decreasing relevance of programmes in the reform of the state sector during the period, this article argues that the issue remained strategic in IDB funding through the inclusion of goals and conditionalities⁴ of loans for CCTP implementation related to institutional and bureaucratic changes in state apparatuses.

4. The role played by the IDB in Argentina’s Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes

This section contextualises the IDB funding cycle to Argentina in the social investment sector, which concludes in the implementation of a CCTP called *Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social* (PFIS). The IDB’s involvement in local social conflicts through the promotion of CCTPs is reviewed here to analyse the impact on social relations of force.

The IDB funding cycle was composed of five programmes approved between 2003 and 2009, which amounted to a total of US\$ 3950M to be implemented in 10 years, which accounted for 28.4 per cent of IDB’s projects in Argentina in the period. All the programmes were funded by the bank’s ordinary capital and were transferred to the national state.

Name of the Programme	Approval year	IDB Funding (US\$)	Counterpart Funding (US\$)	Execution period	Disbursements
Programme for Social Protection and Crisis Impact Mitigation on the Poor	2003	1,500m	Not-quantified	5 months	2
Programme for Social Protection and Crisis Impact Mitigation on the Poor (II)	2003	400m	Not-quantified	2 months	1
Social Sector Programme: "Argentina Advance"	2004	500m	Not-quantified	22 months	2
Support for Programme Families	2005	700m	300m	29 months	3
Programme to Support Argentina's Social Protection and Inclusion System - Phase I	2009	850m	10m	49 months	3

Table 2: IDB Programmes in Argentina on Social Inclusion Sector Approved between 2003 and 2009 *Source: Own illustration based on IDB data*

The beginning of the IDB funding cycle in February 2003 had specific conditions related to the Argentinian crisis of 2001², the social consequences of which were a poverty rate of 57 per cent and an unemployment rate of 21 per cent.

These programmes marked an inflexion point in the IDB loans portfolio to Argentina. Before the crisis, projects in the social investment sector had had a minimum portion of IDB funding, accounting for only 6.9 per




Figure 2: IDB Funding to Argentinian National State (2000-2010)

Source: Own illustration based on IDB data analysis

cent (IDB 2003a) because the country had good levels of social development in comparison with other countries in the region. However, in 2003 the IDB prioritised Argentina, granting it 30 per cent of the overall approved project budget and 30 per cent of payments. And, considering the Bank's allocations solely in the social investment sector, Argentina accounted for 54 per cent of the portfolio. Conversely, the reform and modernisation of the state sector had represented 43.6 per cent until 2003, when allocations started being considerably less significant, as figure 2 shows.

The trend of both sectors in the IDB's portfolio in Argentina during this period is consistent with that of the overall portfolio. However, it was more intense in Argentina, due to the emergency loans in the social investment sector after the crisis.

This funding cycle materialised the coordination between international organisations during periods of crisis, in this case, involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). On December 23rd 2001, right in the middle of the crisis, the Argentinian government defaulted on 65 per cent of its public external debt (which accounted for 53 per cent of the GDP). The amount indebted to international institutions was 30 per cent, and the rest was in the hands of private investors, who had bought treasury bonds. During 2002 the country was not able to meet the requirements of the IMF. So, financial institutions declined new financial programmes. In February 2003 the IDB was the first financial institution to support Argentina after the default. However, the first two loans would be granted provided the country entered into an agreement with the IMF regarding macroeconomic stabilisation. In this sense, the IDB coordinated its loans with the IMF: one of the conditions of both emergency-lending facilities was to achieve "agreement on an effective operation of a stabilisation program with the IMF" (IDB 2003a: 15).

All of those special characteristics impacted on the speedy disbursement of the projects, which took place immediately after the approval. Then, in 2003, Argentina received 30 per cent of IDB payments, reaching an all-time high IDB payment allocation. After that, during 2004 and 2005, IDB approved loans in the social investment sector with a view to improving social and economic conditions and consolidating the legitimacy of the new administration. As table 2 shows, they had longer periods of execution and payments.




Figure 3: Budget of the Ministry of Social Development (2003-2010)

Source: Own illustration based on Argentina's Annual Budget Laws

Figure 3 shows that external funding was especially relevant to the social policy area in 2003, when it reached 18 per cent of the MSD's budget. From 2004 onwards, the budget allocated to implement CCTPs was not only provided by international organisations, but was also derived from resources from the Argentine Treasury.

After the crisis, the funding cycle developed under the main premise of participating in the policy-making process of long-term social policies based on CCTPs, was established with the creation of *Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social* in 2005: "The purpose of the program is to support Argentina with the implementation of its social policy as a transition from emergency interventions designed to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis of 2001-2002 [...] to a permanent social inclusion policy." (IDB 2004: 9)

Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social was the first CCTP in Argentina³; its budget was 0.09 per cent of the GDP in 2005 and 0.14 per cent of GDP from 2007 until 2010.

Its most relevant component was the non-remunerative monthly cash transfers to vulnerable families (with children under the age of 18) and to pregnant women. The (amount of the) cash transfer was lower than minimum wage. The conditionalities were child attendance to school and healthcare institutions, and in the case of pregnant women, to attend medical check-ups. Among supplementary and non-compulsory components were their participation in workshops on communal and family development, and support for children's homework. This programme was implemented by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), and the first group of families came from previous social programmes, such as *Ingreso para el Desarrollo Humano* (IDH) and *Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados* (PJHD).

Then, although PFIS was created in 2005, this article claims that IDB funding from 2003 prepared the institutional and bureaucratic conditions for the implementation of a CCTP in the country.

Given these explicit goals, one cannot help but wonder how the IDB was planning to achieve those long-term social policies. The following section attempts to answer this question by focusing on the role played by the IDB in shaping the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus, while highlighting the domestic factors and how these impacted on the achievement and/or implementation of those promoted changes.

5. Shaping the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus

In this section, it is argued that the IDB funding cycle was not limited to executing the specific social investment programmes, but that it also developed mechanisms to create conditions for long-term changes. In IDB's words: "The goal (...) is to assist the MSD with the implementation of a new framework for the modernisation and streamlining of social assistance programs" (IDB 2004: 11). And, it is claimed that these mechanisms were focused on shaping the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus as a key element for the material condensation of social relations of forces.

5.1 The architecture of social policies

For this purpose, it is interesting to analyse the budget distribution within the loans. The available public information about the three loans approved in 2003 and 2004 did not include a budget breakdown. According to the explicit execution goals, cash transfers to the population were not mentioned in the first two loans and they were scant in the third loan (a cash transfer to 210,000 individuals). However, in the fourth and fifth – approved after the PFIS had been created – they accounted for 85 per cent and 63 per cent respectively. Hence, it seems relevant to analyse the other activities developed under the IDB funding cycle.

Table 3 summarises the activities involved in the loans based on the analysis of the agreements. The fact that certain activities seemed to repeat themselves might be a sign of their relevance from a strategic point of view, which might have shaped the bureaucratic and institutional state apparatus.

First, as mentioned above, following the crisis, IDB funding for social programmes was coordinated jointly with the IMF, with which the country had to enter into macroeconomic stabilisation agreements as a condition for the approval of the programme. This meant that the IDB took part in issues beyond the scope of social programmes.

Second, during the execution of the first loan, a team integrated by IDB and government officials collected data on every social programme developed by the national state in order to select those considered 'priorities' in the national budget (IDB 2003a, 2003b). IDB technical assistance selected programmes based on two main criteria related to global epistemic

Activities	Programmes of IDB according to their approval year				
	2003a	2003b	2004	2005	2009
Macroeconomic stabilisation	x	x	x		
Protection of the social expenses in national budget	x	x	x		
Design, re-shape and coordination of social policies	x	x	x	x	x
Design and execution of information systems about social policies	x	x	x	x	
Design and execution of information systems about beneficiaries of social programmes	x	x		x	x
Establishing and applying focalisation mechanisms	x	x	x	x	x
Design and execution of mechanisms to promote social participation and control.	x				
Implementation of bank transfers to pay benefits in social programmes			x	x	x
Cash transfer to focalised population				x	x
Training to beneficiaries				x	x
Millenium Goals Audit			x		
Institutional strengthening	x	x	x	x	x
Diffusion y promotion of social programmes				x	x

Table 3: Activities included in IDB loan projects

Source: Own illustration based on IDB loans proposals and contracts

communities in the field of poverty reduction: one, focusing explicitly on the poor population; and second, requesting compensation in exchange for a subsidy (IDB 2003a, 2004). Thus, the first three IDB loans covered the social expenses (excluding state employees' salaries) dedicated to those 'priority social programmes', and the money was non-transferable.

Consequently, under Nestor Kirchner's presidency, social programmes were reorganised (adapted, removed and merged) into three main national plans executed by the MSD: PFIS, *Plan Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria 'El hambre más urgente'* (PSA), and *Plan de Desarrollo Local y Economía Social 'Manos a la Obra'* (PMO). Through this restructuring, the new government left its own mark on the social issue by managing and reformulating the uncoordinated policies. First, the IDB named the first two 'priority social programmes' to be developed within the MSD. The latter one was related to a widespread and innovative phenomenon during Argentina's post crisis: the emergence of a number of communal and voluntary work projects to be carried out by the unemployed, and the creation of workers' cooperatives that replaced companies that were shut down. These were not isolated and unconnected initiatives. They developed dynamic networks by involving researchers and university professors, which built an interest group demanding an active role from the state in supporting social economy and cooperation (Ciolli 2015). In that context, the new President understood the promotion and support of the social solidarity economy as a strong social demand with legitimacy.

In the context of a government critical of the role played by international financial institutions in policy-making and their negative consequences for the political sovereignty and for the population's needs (Kirchner 2003), the social policy discourse neither referred to IDB participation in the PFIS nor criticised the 'canned' programmes, along with their conceptual bases (Kirchner 2007). Instead, they emphasised the PMO because it was an autonomous creation of the national government and it had some ground-breaking elements, such as the promotion of a solidarity social economy. Nevertheless, as figure 4 shows, the implementation of CCTPs and the food programme had a greater budget than that for autonomous social policies, such as the PMO.

Thus, IDB assistance promoted institutional crystallisations in the field of social policies, but one of its three pillars was developed out of the scope of IDB. The then Vice-Minister of Social Policies said that neither




Figure 4: Budget of the Ministry of Social Development (2003-2010)

Source: Own illustration based on annual national budget laws

IDB nor WB agreed with social policies promoting or supporting social and solidarity economy or social entrepreneurship because they were confident of conditional cash transfers based on the employability criteria⁴. In this case, domestic interest groups asking for state assistance in the promotion of social economy influenced those crystallisations, but it meant the creation of a parallel structure (with a lower budget) instead of shaping the the area of CCTP execution.

Third, part of IDB financial support was diverted into the creation of a strategic plan in order to audit and increase database systems of the recipient population of social programmes. To that end, the databases of *Sistema de Identificación y Selección de Familias Beneficiarias de Programas y Servicios Sociales* (SISFAM) and *Sistema de Identificación Tributario y Social* (SINTYS) were integrated, and a record was created with the recipient population of every single social programme. According to IDB documents, the databases would guarantee that nobody would receive more than one subsidy or would continue receiving it while the requirements were not met (IDB 2003b). Additionally, one of the conditionalities of the loans was to increase the population registered in those databases. In order to adapt this conditionality to the government's discourse, the MSD gave the survey form a friendly name (*Las familias cuentan*) and carried out the survey through ground visits across the country. Both systems (SISFAM and SINTYS) had been created with the WB and the IDB funding in 1998 in the frame of the structural reform and modernisation of the state. These IDB loans contributed to the legitimacy of the systems by connecting different governmental and judicial offices at the national and subnational level, which became users of the data services in policy-making and court proceedings. Nowadays, these database systems remain ruling elements in social policies.

5.2 Classification and fragmentation of the population

Fourth, on account of another conditionality of the third programme, the Argentinian government issued a decree (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos 2004) based on an agreement between the MSD and the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security (MLESS) to establish the requirements and profiles to classify the poor population according to its 'employability', a key notion in CCTPs following the theory of social capital.

The human capital theory (Becker 1983) suggests that poverty is the result of the family's non-investment in improving conditions for productivity. From that approach, socio-economic and structural problems (deepened after neoliberal reforms) were understood in an individual and micro-social way. In that sense, the binary employed/unemployed that describes the position of a person in a determined socio-economic structure moves into the interior of the subject person through the pair employability/unemployability. This means that the employable status of a person is exclusively determined by his/her skills and social capital that he/she has been able to accumulate. According to that understanding, unemployment problems are the result of an unsuitable labour offer. Bearing this in mind, it could be productive to analyse this distinction in the recipients, taking into account the issue of working class fragmentation and its collective actions at the local level.

The resulting classification was, on the one hand, an employable skilled population that could be injected into the labour market or develop self-employed activities in contexts of economic expansion, which benefitted from the *Seguro de Empleo y Capacitación* (SEyC) executed by the MLESS, as well as other specific labour policies. And, on the other, a poor unemployable population, which was assisted by MSD policies because it did not fulfil the requisite skills for labour market injection. This latter group was divided (implicitly) into two sub-groups: the pure recipients and the mediated recipients.

The pure recipient sub-group received subsidies through CCTPs, food programmes or non-contributory pension schemes. The pure recipient denomination involved explicit and implicit sexist connotations. By recommendation of the IDB, this group included, by default, single women with children or the heads of households because it was considered a factor of "structural inequality in the asset distribution" (IDB 2003c: 6). Nevertheless, 64 per cent of PJHD (the previous labour programme) beneficiaries were women (Arcidiácono 2012), who had played a key role in productive and communal activities within social organisations during the crisis. This participation had also motivated non-traditional forms of politicisation (Merklen 2005) at the local level, combining communal activities with demonstrations and roadblocks. Moreover, in the beneficiaries' migration process from PJHD to PFIS, it was established that in the cases where the

man in a couple was the recipient, the payment should be changed to the woman. This meant that those programmes providing labour training and support for reintegration into the formal labour market were allocated mostly to men, while programmes related to family care were allocated primarily to women. Thus, the classification of the impoverished population according to the employability criteria – and the consequent focalisation of social programmes – reinforced naturalised gender inequality, promoting the ‘return’ of women to domestic chores and caregiving activities.

The mediated recipients, in turn, received their subsidies by means of labour activity promoted through social policies supporting micro-enterprises and cooperatives such as the PMO. These plans put into practice alternative, marginal and/or informal markets. Official speeches about these programmes highlighted the role of the state in providing economic opportunities that part of the population which had been removed from labour markets as a result of the deindustrialisation process that occurred during the previous neoliberal period. In this sense, they promoted new values of solidarity, social economy and cooperation under the goal of this population’s recovering its dignity, since the plans offered not only money but also new labour options. However, this understanding of the problem of unemployment differed from the social capital theory, which claims that it is the result of an unsuitable employment offer, determined by individual skills and the social capital of the workers.

The population classification according to employability was crystallised in the division of tasks between both Ministries. It was not a trivial issue, since the most important social programme created after the crisis, the PJHD, which had been executed single-handedly by the MLESS, overlapped with the goals and focus of the PFIS. Within this frame, the third and fourth programmes of the cycle asked the government for the deactivation of the PJHD. Thus, the recipients of the PJHD declared unemployable had to migrate to the PFIS and the employable ones went to the SEyC, operated by the MLESS.

Nevertheless, as table 4 and table 5 show, migration was not massive and the PJHD was retained as a residual programme during the whole period. It remained in effect in order to contain the non-migrated population. Some mechanisms were created to adapt this residual programme to the three main national plans of the MSD and the SEyC executed by MLESS.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Number of Families	240.000	375.000	520.677	574.876	695.177
Number of Children	661.347	1.035.475	1.528.065	1.767.808	1.988.922
Number of Families migrating from the PJHD	9.800	149.352	300.000	375.438	398.927

Table 4: Beneficiary Families of PFIS (2005–2009)

Source: Own illustration based on Gabinete de Ministros Argentina 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010

Programme	Executing Authority	Population
PF	MSD	695.177
PJHD	MLESS	486.607
SCyE	MTEySS	85.075
Total		1.266.859

Table 5: Beneficiaries of CCTPs (2009)

Source: Own illustration based on Gabinete de Ministros Argentina 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010

Another important issue that table 4 and table 5 highlight is that the coverage of the PFIS did not balance out the PJHD deactivation process, which by 2002 had affected two million beneficiaries. In this sense, the Argentinian case shows an atypical element within the common characteristics shared by the wave of CCTPs in Latin America. Although the PFIS had a lower coverage than that of the social policies created in the middle of the crisis, it was a massive social policy. In this regard, Fenwick (2013) suggests that powerful state-building effects and the interest groups “locked-in” the PFIS successful development. I agree, but for a mid-term

analysis, it is relevant to consider the emergence of AUH in 2009 – when both PJHD and PFIS were discontinued. AUH changed the social protection system, but we can find more continuities with PFIS than with PJHD, such as conditionalities in healthcare and education, a focus on childhood, and beneficiaries' eligibility criteria. Nowadays, these characteristics take part in the routine practices of bureaucracy and continue dominant social policies at the national scale.

5.3 The territorial dimension of social policies

Fifth, the consolidation of the three plans of the MSD meant a process of social policy recentralisation, in which the national administration concentrated the main tools and budget in order to develop social policies. As a result of this recentralization, IDB funding also focused on the national sphere. This common characteristic of CCTPs implied a countertrend to the neoliberal recommendations about decentralisation, privatisation and the outsourcing of social care (Tussie 1997). Paradoxically, in Argentina, this recentralisation took place in parallel with the territorialisation of the national state apparatus and of the bureaucrats' daily practices, which opens questions about the role of territory in the social relations of force condensed into the national state apparatus.

There is a broad consensus in academia that the 'territory' became a key element in political configurations in the country during the nineties and early 2000s (Svampa/Pereyra 2004; Merklen 2005; Kessler/González Bombal/Svampa 2010). The post-crisis of 2001 had been a time marked by social conflicts, where territorial social made up of unemployed workers represented one of the most disruptive actors (Svampa/Pereyra 2004). These workers had achieved a meaningful influence on managing social policies on the local scale because of their daily activity in communal activities as well as in demonstrations. Thus, the state's capacity to manage the social conflict (that emerged from the problem of unemployment and poverty) was closely related to its capacity to play a key role on the local scale. Analysing the process of territorialisation of the social issue goes beyond the scope of this paper. Besides, there was much diversity among different territories and depending on the specific characteristics of the ensemble of local governments and non-state actors. However, it is possible to identify some characteristics that have contributed to shaping the state apparatus and bureaucratic practices. In particular, social movements, as

well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and confessional institutions, had taken part in selecting recipients, promoting communal and training activities, organising solidarity enterprises, and controlling conditionalities in PJHD implementation. However, this kind of involvement was criticised by public opinion for its alleged lack of transparency and effective control (Sued 2002) and by sectors that tried to stop changes in the *status quo* by questioning social movements.

In this regard, IDB loans promoted a return from the involvement of those territorial actors⁵. The five programmes of the cycle established a highly centralised implementation of PFIS by means of which the MSD kept some operational activities under its control, such as recipients' focalisation, payments (by magnetic cards), design of communal activities, recipients' training, and control of conditionalities, which had been developed by local governments, social movements, NGOs and confessional institutions. However, some of the IDB programmes also considered the participation of other actors in complementary tasks. The second programme coordinated the monitoring activities with the so-called *Social Monitor*, which was "a consortium of 53 civil society organisations selected through a national competitive process, designed to facilitate citizen participation in monitoring and supervising the social emergency programmes coordinated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with financial and technical support from the World Bank and the IDB" (IDB 2003b). However, that consortium was lacked influence in policy-making after 2003.

The fourth programme included workshops for communal development and learning support to beneficiaries, delivered by NGOs under services outsourced by the MSD. The selection of the organisations was based on open and competitive mechanisms, and considered the experience needed in providing those kinds of services. Those requirements impeded the participation of social movements organised from below – some of them with ideological perspectives against the *status quo* – without technocratic human resources. In each town or city, the programme asked the MSD to hire facilitators, who spread available goods and services, monitored the beneficiaries' situation and verified the observance of conditionalities. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) trained the facilitators of the programme (IDB 2005).

The process of hiring NGOs and social organisations, as well as establishing their roles, contributed to shaping the bureaucracy's relationships with other institutional and social actors. As mentioned before, the MSD developed a specific type of relation with the different social actors, but IDB loans only promoted one kind, based on competitive and technocratic criteria which unquestionably privileged international organisations.

Under these circumstances, the territorialisation of the MSD developed three main tools, which were not exclusively connected with the implementation of PFIS. One of them was the spread of ministry delegations named Centros de Integración Comunitaria (CICs) across the country⁶, under the "family and community promotion" component of PFIS. They provided social assistance, developed communal activities and offered training to the poor population. Social participation was not independent but guided by MSD's agents according to their political criteria, and with a view to ensuring role of the national government (as opposed to social organisations or the local government) in the provision of social policies. CICs were neither promoted nor discouraged by the IDB because they did not go against the goals of the programmes, especially regarding the deactivation of the PJHD and the centralisation of the CCTPs, as they could change the territorial relationships and partially countering the power of local governments and the significance of MLESS local offices in social policy management.

Additionally, the MSD created a new kind of ground state agent, coming from social organisations. They were called "territorial promoters for social change" (Kirchner 2007; Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2009) and they were not formal employees of the MSD and only received travel expenses. Their main tasks were to identify and answer requests from the population and to manage local conflicts. Furthermore, bureaucrats in the central office of the MSD increased the number of visits to local territories in their routine practices and also their involvement in answering the requests. In that context, Perelmiter (2016) shows the emergence of a 'plebeian bureaucracy' within the MSD since 2003, which built closer relationships with the social policy beneficiaries and created new ways to procure feedback on population demands. Nevertheless, this did not entail the replacement of the traditional bureaucracy. On the contrary, there was a heterogeneous bureaucracy with different professional expe-

riences, motivations and perspectives about poverty and social policies: some related to technocratic reforms, others clung to traditional meanings of caring, and another group was involved with social movement claims. The integration among these groups was quite weak, which crystallised a fragmented structure between the different programmes developed by the MSD. Consequently, the MSD increased its staff, not only with technocrats associated with global social policies, but also with social activists and graduate social workers related to territorial activities. It was another countertrend from the structural reforms implemented during the nineties, which called for a reduction in state employment. The new configuration of the MSD bureaucracy helped channel and institutionalise social conflict that went beyond the PFIS. As mentioned, this was not the intention of the IDB; however, nothing was done to stop its proliferation. In this sense, the IDB assumed the need to give space to the Argentine state to guarantee a certain balance in the material condensation of the social relations of force by virtue of managing the conflict.

In sum, the implementation of the IDB programmes influenced the state bureaucracy, but it was not a unilateral influence. On the one hand, the recentralisation of social policy management was a convergent goal between the IDB's purpose of improving the efficiency and coordination of the social protection system within the country, and the national administration's political interest in leading the social assistance and dialogue with the population (surpassing the historical role of local administrations). As was mentioned, the other side of the re-centralisation process was the territorialisation of the national state apparatus. On the other hand, the implementation of CCTPs promoted by the IDB shaped the institutional and bureaucratic apparatus of the MSD, but this coexisted with other domestic influences. The peculiar characteristics of the social conflict after the 2001 crisis also played a relevant role. The PFIS was flexible to the ensemble of socio-political actors that acted at the territorial level, which also had an impact on the configuration of a fragmented MSD bureaucracy.

Sixth, according to the IDB's mission, every programme should include components for "institutional strengthening". The state agents involved in the negotiations of the programmes stated that the "institutional strengthening" component of the programmes was an unavoidable condition for endorsement. This component had different focuses along

the analysed cycle. The first two IDB programmes invested the funding for “institutional strengthening” in the National Coordinating Council for Social Policy (NCCSP) (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos 2002). This managed database systems, such as SIEMPRO, SINTYS and SYSFAM, and it was supposed to coordinate international cooperation. The third IDB programme (2004) dealt with the institutional strengthening component enhancing the data systems and healthcare statistics employed in the offices. In the fourth and fifth programmes, this component provided funding to hire consulting services focused on communication and diffusion strategies, beneficiaries’ monitoring, and database improvement to enlarge coverage of the target population.

Finally, the IDB programmes encouraged subsidies to be wire-transferred through magnetic cards delivered by banks in order to avoid corruption in subsidy distribution and to promote a new kind of social inclusion: the financial one (IDB 2017). In this regard, Lavinás (2014) argues that the expansion of credit markets across income levels improves the social risk management (in the sense of social control), so it is a new element in the complete commoditisation process of the contemporary societies. Utilising the banking system for the payments was a useful move, but it contributed to the poor families’ indebtedness and increased their vulnerability in the mid-term.

The description of the objectives and conditions of the cycle of IDB financing programmes in the social investment sector – through the design and implementation of a CCTP – showed the relevance of those aspects aimed at producing changes in the state institutional and bureaucratic apparatus. These changes, far from being complementary or secondary elements, became vectors of long-term transformations, the validity of which exceeds the implementation of the PFIS itself. Indeed, some of them can still be found (Logiudice 2021).

The type of reforms in the state apparatus promoted through the CCTP have a distinctive characteristic that was not so evident in the reforms implemented during the Washington Consensus: most of the institutional and bureaucratic changes pointed to the fragmentation of the different factions within the subaltern class. This fragmentation was materialised by the employability criteria for beneficiary distinction, and the reassignment conditionalities to the domestic tasks – thus favouring the disarticu-

lation of territorial spaces of sociability and conflict. At the same time, it sought to reinforce the rational, impersonal and neutral character of these political definitions by improving the databases relating to the population.

6. Conclusions

This paper provided empirical evidence for the analysis of the research questions regarding the role played by the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus in the strategy of multilateral development banks during the 21st century, when the hegemony of the Washington Consensus was being challenged in Latin America and the Caribbean.

First, the paper focused on changes in the portfolio of the Inter-American Development Bank during the 21st century; programmes in the 'reform and modernisation of the state' sector decreased, while programmes in the 'social investment' sector – where the CCTP are included – grew significantly. Nevertheless, the reform of the state in Latin American and Caribbean countries remained strategic but hidden. Its implementation was materialised through programmes of technical and financial assistance in different sectors, combining specific development goals with the promotion of institutional and bureaucratic changes in the agencies involved in the programmes, which was the case for the IDB funding for CCTP implementation in the region.

The leading role of CCTP promotion in the 'social investment' sector can be understood as a peculiar response to the wave of social conflicts that arose in the region; i.e a kind of intervention into the social relations of force that crystallised in the heat of workers' anti-neoliberal revolts. In this sense, CCTPs were put forward as a device to restore or consolidate (depending on the case) the balance of the social relations of forces in a post-Washington Consensus capitalism.

The IDB portfolio in Argentina followed the regional trend, but the two emergency loans approved in 2003 – to manage the social consequences of the national crisis – marked an inflection point. The analysis of their components showed that the programmes promoted changes which were key factors in the implementation of the first Argentinian CCTP, called *Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social*, in 2005. Specifically, this

involved the internalisation of epistemic communities so as to prioritise the existing social policies and to select the beneficiaries, which meant institutional crystallisations in the distribution of responsibilities and resources among ministries. Besides, the technical assistance for the ‘institutional strengthening’ of the NCCSP and the role given to database systems were the starting point towards streamlining bureaucratic processes with an impact on the bureaucrats’ routines. Nevertheless, these changes entered the Argentinian context, which was out of the scope of IDB, with a new government developing autonomous initiatives related to the characteristics of domestic social demands and conflicts, among which the role of territorial social movements and the spread of cooperatives developed by the unemployed added new significance to the social issue.

The remaining three loans of the cycle which were focused on PFIS showed the relevance of the previous changes and their continuity (except for the role given to NCCSP), and brought new elements into the matter in question. The internalisation of epistemic community criteria was enriched by the employability concept, used to classify the poor population and to include it into the different existing social policies. These processes established new meanings regarding rationality and efficiency in the field of social policies, as well as criteria to classify the poor population – and crystallise their fragmentation. It also reinforced the definitions as to the accountability of both ministries. However, domestic factors impacted on the weakest and slowed down the process of deactivation of, and migration from PJHD to PFIS or SEyC.

The most complex dimension was the multi-scalar ensemble of socio-political actors – including the IDB, the national government, technical consultants and social organisations – and their overlapping interests in the dynamic of social relations of forces. In this regard, the article provides elements to understand the paradoxical process in which the re-nationalisation of social policy management created originary conditions for the territorialisation of the MSD. Taking this into account, it is possible to identify that diverse purposes can converge in the same policy-making process, either because of their complementarity or their neutrality regarding others’ goals. This phenomenon affected the civil servants’ routines, tasks and motivations, adding more heterogeneity onto the bureaucratic ‘geologic layers’ and re-shaping the state apparatus in conflicting ways.

All the above supports the methodological decision to study the cycle of five programmes. It allowed for showing that the most relevant changes were concentrated on the first years, and they added and complemented one another despite reformulations in terms of policy feedback. In conclusion, the IDB funding cycle provided financial support for short-term social policy implementation, while it developed strategic activities related to the institutional and bureaucratic shaping in the mid and long-term. Hence, far from being specific and fragmented interventions, IDB programmes became a regulatory element for increasingly comprehensive policies. The analysis of the implementation process found a certain flexibility both in the IDB and in the national administration in order to adapt it within the domestic context – the social conflicts of which were deeply rooted after the crisis of 2001. Furthermore, even when the official discourse was hostile to ‘canned’ programmes promoted by international organisations, the CCTP was implemented following IDB criteria, but it created and developed other political devices in the field of social policies as a complement and in parallel – as autonomous state policies – to IDB programmes. From this point of view, the IDB developed its capacity of travel between scales through interventions that were flexible (but long-term), and built an unusual complementarity with those promoted by other social sectors. Consequently, even when the nation-state was wrapped, crossed and stressed by the multi-scalar configuration of the policy-making process, it kept a key role in social policy implementation by channelling the social conflict. The relevance of the institutional and bureaucratic shaping of the IDB funding cycle thus reasserts its inescapable place.

The latest findings give rise to new questions about the strategic role of national states in guaranteeing the general conditions of capitalist accumulation in the face of various historical and regional contexts, regarding the function of the multilateral development banks in the configuration of the state apparatuses. This paper invites us to include the analysis of the transformations of the institutional and bureaucratic state apparatus in critical studies on development, since this dimension contributes both to understanding the social relations of forces that are condensed in the state apparatuses and the ways in which these apparatuses intervene in the formation of the classes in conflict and in the public policies arising from that dispute.

- 1 *Conditionalities* refer to the actions that the state must fulfil for the disbursement of the agreed funds. These are set forth in the approved loan projects.
- 2 In Argentina, the riots and looting on 19th and 20th December 2001 expressed an organic convergence of different mass reactions against the consequences of neoliberalism, and marked a turning point of the 'social issue'. In this context, the President declared a state of siege, but far from controlling the situation, demonstrations grew with the slogan "Throw everyone out!" During the demonstrations, the police murdered 38 people. After that, the President resigned from office and five different presidents took office within ten days.
- 3 In Argentina, there were previous social programmes based on cash transfers, but they were considered labour programmes for the unemployed. Their conditionalities were related to labour or communitarian activities, labour training and schooling. The most relevant were *Plan Trabajar* (created in 1996) and PJHD (created in 2002), which had partial funding from the WB.
- 4 Daniel Arroyo, former Vice-Minister of the MSD. Interviewed by the author in 2013.
- 5 It does not mean that those actors abandoned their involvement in social policies, but they stayed out of the implementation of PFIS.
- 6 CICs were physical spaces built in vulnerable areas to coordinate policies of social development and primary healthcare attendance (Resolution no. 2173/2004).

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ABSTRACT Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Rolle des institutionellen und bürokratischen Staatsapparats in der Strategie der Interamerikanischen Entwicklungsbank (IDB) im 21. Jahrhundert. Die empirische Analyse konzentriert sich auf die Phase der Implementierung von fünf Programmen in Argentinien zwischen 2003 und 2010, die in einem Conditional-Cash-Transfer-Programm unter dem Titel „Plan Familias por la Inclusión Social“ resultierte. Der Artikel argumentiert, dass das Interesse der IDB an der Gestaltung des institutionellen und bürokratischen Staatsapparats nicht verschwand, diese aber ihre Interventionen in mehrfacher Hinsicht anpassen musste, um den durch soziale Kämpfe entstandenen Herausforderungen begegnen zu können. Die Bürokratie bildete auch deshalb ein strategisches Feld, weil sie in der Lage war, die Verdichtung sozialer Kräfteverhältnisse zu materialisieren und so den Rahmen der politischen Entscheidungsprozesse zu bestimmen. Sie tat dies vor dem Hintergrund der scheinbaren Neutralität und Rationalität routinemäßiger Praktiken auf stille, unpersönliche und abstrakte Weise.

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