

So zeigt sich, daß nicht nur der Entwicklungsstaat kränkt, sondern auch entwicklungsrelevante Institutionen in den Geberländern an einer Vielzahl von Überschneidungen, Inkonsistenzen und Ineffizienzen leiden. Kurzum: Obschon von den Geberländern effiziente Institutionen in Entwicklungsländern als gegeben vorausgesetzt oder gefordert werden, ist das eigene Haus (noch) nicht in Ordnung.

Die Diskussion über Institutionen in Geberländern mag als der wichtigste Beitrag des Ausschusses Entwicklungsländer gelten, da weder in der Institutionen- noch in der Entwicklungsliteratur dieser Bereich angesprochen wird. Die Einsicht, daß zuerst vor der eigenen Türe zu kehren wäre, kann daher nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden.

Die Untersuchung über Finanzinstitutionen des formellen und informellen Sektors ist mittlerweile fester Bestandteil der Entwicklungsliteratur. Dennoch ist der Beitrag von W. Hankel als richtungsweisend einzustufen. Auch er legitimiert seine Ausführungen mit den Defiziten der vorherrschenden Entwicklungstheorie, kritisiert verschiedene ihrer Annahmen, erreicht jedoch — im positiven Sinne — die Grenzen der Anwendbarkeit makroökonomischer Theorie durch seine, mit historischen Verweisen untermauerte These, daß im Mittelpunkt der monetären Entwicklungstheorie und -politik nicht die Kontrolle, sondern die Schaffung einer leistungsfähigen Geldwirtschaft stehen müsse. Seine Skizzierung einer alternativen Makroökonomik würde größere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen.

Nur einige Bereiche der umfangreichen Institutionendiskussion wurden in diesem Band angeschnitten. So fehlt eine tiefere Auseinandersetzung der mittlerweile fundierten Diskussion innerhalb des neoklassischen Paradigmas über mikroökonomische Institutionen traditioneller Landwirtschaften. Ebenso vermißt der Leser eine Erörterung über die mehr soziologisch ausgerichtete Diskussion über Institutionen als Systeme von Regeln. Nichtsdestotrotz muß dieser Band als wichtiger Beitrag in der Institutionenliteratur gewertet werden.

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THE POVERTY OF CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS

1. Imitating Europe

Since the Iran disproved that westernization is a one-way-street — the Iran Shock — it has been apparent that the European model of development is wanting, not only in the Third World, but in Europe too.

Up till then it had been common wisdom among developmentalists in the West, East and South, irrespective of proclivities, that following the preferred route, capitalist or communist, would lead sooner or later to a golden age of permanent prosperity. Implicitly or explicitly, all agreed with Marx: the less industrialized countries saw in the more industrialized countries their own future.

It was Harry S. Truman, no less, who set the Third World off on its breathless chase to catch up in his 1949 Four-Point address, in which he called for a bold new program to harness the benefits of American scientific and industrial progress for the advancement and growth of underdeveloped regions (cf. BALDWIN, 1966:61).

Dividing the world into so-called developed and underdeveloped regions has had incalculable consequences. It has imposed a binary order on the globe's diversity: worlds as far apart as those of the Harijans, Tuaregs and Zapotecs are horizontally lumped together and vertically decoupled from the 'advanced' world (cf. SACHS, 1989b:2). 'Underdevelopment' defines peoples not in terms of what they are and would like to be, but in terms of what they do not have and what others think they should become. Once the problem has been defined as low income, the solution can only be 'economic development'. Inevitably, the criterion for this new view of the world is suitably blunt: the measure of a country's level of civilization is its level of production (cf. SACHS, 1989a:2).

The categorical imperative of economic development became a teleological profession of faith. To speak of development meant in essence projecting the European model of society on to the entire world. Henceforth, the magic formula for 'underdeveloped peoples' was: catch up. As an oversimplification, the South wanted to become like the North, only more quickly. The task of developing whole societies was entrusted to a new class of social engineers.

2. Growth without development

In the post-colonial scramble for the Third World propagandists in East and West soon learnt to praise the comparative advantages of their respective model of society.

In fact, models of capitalistic and communist development had much in common:

- * Both models agreed on the main causes of "underdevelopment": lack of capital, lack of infrastructure and inefficient societal organization. (Poverty through lack of capital).
- * They equated development with quantitative economic growth and rapid industrialization. (Development through growth).
- * Both assumed that with time the benefits of economic growth would automatically spread to the poorer regions and population groups of the Third World. (Trickle-down effect).

All three assumptions have proved questionable if not downright wrong (cf. BRAUN, 1983:4ff.). Without resorting to "masochistic self-humiliation" (P. BERGER), one can argue that models developed in one historical context under specific sociocultural conditions cannot be exported en bloc to other societies, at least not without considerable social costs.

This view is supported by logical and empirical arguments:

- * The most spectacular failures in the economic growth stakes are precisely the poorest developing countries in the hunger belts of Africa and Asia. What is more: the least developed countries are trapped in economic decline, not economic progress.
- * The economies of the threshold countries have indeed grown at historically unprecedented rates — but so have poverty, malnutrition and unemployment. Not even notorious growth fetishists can call this 'development'
- * Not only have "northern" models of development generally failed to alleviate the most pressing problems of the Third World, worse: these models appear to engender specific social and economic ills.

"Experts gradually became aware that growth alone was not enough. Poverty flourished in the shadow of wealth, unemployment proved growth-resistant and steelworks did precious little to improve nutrition" (SACHS, 1989a:4).

In short: The hoped-for trickle-down effect of economic growth has proved illusory — and is recognized as such. The World Bank — a sparing critic of growth — draws the following conclusion in its most recent report: "Many developing countries have not merely failed to keep pace with the industrial countries; they have seen their incomes fall in absolute terms" (WORLD BANK, 1990:6). After four decades of energetic development efforts, more people than ever before, 1,100,000,000, now live in poverty. Where there has been some economic progress, then largely to the benefit of the already better off. And: "A clear link between aid and the reduction of poverty has been hard to find ... For many of the world's poor, the 1980's was a 'lost decade' — a disaster indeed" (WORLD BANK, 1990:7).

Economic growth in the Third World, if at all, has been "growth without development" (regardless of how development is defined).

3. Basic needs and the basics of need

The lesson of the disappointments of the first three so-called development decades is unmistakeable: the conventional concept of growth through industrialization is a no-growth industry. Development theory and programmes (though not necessarily practice) have at last discovered people's basic needs.

For analytical purposes it is useful to distinguish between material and immaterial needs. Material basic needs include food, clothing, accommodation and — though not

strictly material — work, the pre-condition for satisfying the former. Immaterial needs include human dignity, cultural identity and social participation.

The former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere has pin-pointed the relevance of genuine democracy. "The people must make the decisions about their own future through democratic procedures. Leadership cannot replace democracy; it must be part of democracy. ... There is no other way in which real development can take place. For just as real freedom for the people requires development, so real development of the people requires freedom" (NYERERE, 1973:62).

The human-needs concept is fundamentally different from the concept of conventional growth (cf. Scheme 1). It rests on two assumptions.

1. There are universal human values ascribed to by all peoples and weltanschauungen in all ages.² "The basic-needs strategy is ... not our invention. All the founders of great religions, Jesus, Mohammed and Buddha, have pointed out that the basic needs of the poor have not been satisfied. It is a very old and very humanistic idea. But people lost sight of its economic application" (STREETEN, 1987:24).
2. Economic growth is not a pre-condition for satisfying human needs but a consequence. Satisfying people's needs for food, work, social participation, etc. will create economic growth — instead of trickle-down, a trickle-up effect. In other words, the upside-down conventional growth strategy is put back on its feet.

By concentrating on elementary needs, the development debate returns to the basics of economics. This interest in fundamental, and existential, concerns is a tacit admission that theories, concepts, plans and programmes have failed, and, at bottom, their common denominator: the catch-up strategy itself. "No one can imagine an India in which the 1,000,000,000 people probably living there at the turn of the century drive around in 250,000,000 cars. That would be western European standards. At present there are 500,000 cars in India, and these are enough to make the air in large Indian cities unbearable ... Peru could attain EC per capita income levels in 359 years, Uganda already in 356 years; Pakistan, though, will take 1,356 years" (EPPLER, 1971:14).

Scheme 1

Comparison of Development Concepts

Growth and industrialization concept Basic-needs concept

UNDERDEVELOPMENT

(the condition of) material poverty

(the process of) dependence/inequality

INDICATOR

gross national product (per-capita GNP below \$500 p.a. = developing country)

absolute poverty/inequality in living conditions. political: oppression. economic: exploitation. cultural: alienation

DEVELOPMENT

growth in GNP; industrialization world market integration

satisfaction of basic needs; abolition of absolute poverty; cultural identity; social participation

In political practice this means abandoning the urban-centred industrialization strategy for the Third World. Development policy must become the political expression of the fight against poverty. The basic needs of the hundreds of millions of poor and deprived people in rural areas (the landless, hired labour, women) and slums (the unemployed, the youth, beggars) are moving — or should move — centre-stage.

Any feasible policy of immediately improving the living conditions of the poor should be three-pronged:

1. Creating conditions for viable subsistence economy in poor rural areas. Measures include expanding the amount of land under cultivation, introducing higher-yield types of indigenous cereals, instruction in and paving the way for ecological forms of land use, and promoting rural cottage and small industries. Making productive land available to the landless masses is a necessary, and possibly sufficient, condition for improving living conditions in rural areas. In other words, all experience points to the fact that rural poverty cannot be eradicated without comprehensive land reform.
2. Creating jobs and income in the megacity slums. The failure of attempts to expand employment in the formal sector (due primarily to capital-intensive methods of production and labour aristocracies) is generally accepted. The alternative is to support the informal sector, the shadow economy of the urban poor, through small credits on easy terms and on-the-job training — without smothering productive potential by 'formalizing the informal'. For, the small informal businesses use labour-intensive technology to produce for the pocket and tastes of a local market, the 'marginalized masses'.
3. Providing basic social services for the poor: health (bare-footed doctors), housing (building cooperatives) and rural education (learning for the land). Experience suggests that authoritarian regimes are less inclined to take this seriously than democratic governments.

In the words of the World Bank: "The evidence ... suggests that rapid and politically sustainable progress on poverty has been achieved by pursuing a strategy that has two equally important elements. The first element is to promote the productive use of the poor's most abundant asset — labour ... The second is to provide basic social services for the poor" (WORLD BANK, 1990:3).

The key is empowerment of the poor or — in another common phrase — establishing a 'people's economy'. Basic needs development is less concerned with things and more with people: by themselves, for themselves. In concrete terms: Grassroots initiatives and small development projects, tailored to meet the needs of the people concerned and tap the resources of collective experience and knowledge, own initiative and self-help (cf. SCHNEIDER, 1985).

"Not projects costing millions, but millions of projects" expressed this change in attitude towards development aid.

4. The poverty of development

With the new basic-needs concept development policy is said to have crossed the Rubicon. But for development theory it generates more questions than it answers.

And in development practice it generates resistance from a grand coalition of vested interests everywhere.

The concept raises serious theoretical and methodological problems.

- * The traditional one-dimensional measure of development, viz. national product, has had to be replaced by a complex system of social indicators measuring basic needs and living conditions. The attempt to construct a physical-quality-of-life index, in which average life expectancy is a weighty component, has drawn the sarcastic retort: "A longer life may not be a better one" (NOHLEN/NUSCHLER, 1982:468). The most recent UNDP efforts to create a so-called human development index give even less cause for optimism, attesting in 1988 inter alia Albania, Cambodia, Chile, China, Cuba, Sri Lanka, South Korea and Vietnam above-average 'human' development (cf. UNDP, 1990), regimes plausibly called "Dracula regimes" (Th. HANF). As yet, there is no consensus on how to measure and evaluate developmental success — perhaps, because normative, never can be.
- * Despite unanimity that certain basic needs — food, clothing and accommodation — differ by continent and culture, opinions on just what constitutes basic needs diverge widely. And the question of priority between material and immaterial needs is as controversial as ever — between Bertolt BRECHT's dictum, "first food then morals",³ and the view that development policies without political rights is prison management.
- * Notwithstanding conceptual innovations, the basic-needs approach is still "measurement without theory". Unlike dependency and modernization theories, it does not provide historical and social analysis of the causes of poverty. A more serious criticism is the approach's immanent disregard for the international dimension of poverty, "thereby ignoring a major factor for its own feasibility" (SAT-ZINGER/SCHWEFEL, 1982:328). By the same token, it does not analyse local political restrictions on fighting mass poverty, "only denouncing the consequences of this omission" (Idem).

The above indicates the political naivety of the basic-needs concept. In large part it is rhetoric without politics.

- * Development aid is also business. And the profits from small, grassroots self-help projects cannot compete with those of airports and hydroelectric dams. Hence, the industrial sector in the rich countries regards basic-needs projects with — at best — suspicion. The fight against poverty is often treated as "social mumbo jumbo" or "software" that misses the point of development aid: business and employment — in the rich countries.
- * The large organizations and institutions of the aid industry are similarly receptive to the problems of fighting mass poverty. The centralized planning bureaucracies are mesmerized by quantitative criteria of performance — production, turnover, cost-utility ratios, profitability. In practice, this means that large development projects have an immanent advantage in bureaucracies (cf. BRAUN, 1985:244). It is easier for the development apparatus to "process" one huge infrastructural or industrial project than 100 small, grassroots agricultural projects (the same phenomenon in centrally planned economies is discredited as "tonnage ideology"). This predilection for quantitative growth is just the opposite of that initially intended by the basic-needs approach.

- * Paradoxically, the propagated fight against poverty meets with solid resistance among the wealthy in the poor World. Tiermondial governments have voiced their suspicions that the basic-needs concept is a "bargain basement offer", intended to hold back technology and industry and entrench "economic and scientific" apartheid world wide. They fear a Morgenthau Plan for the Third World, turning it into one huge farm forever — and perpetuating the neo-colonial ascendancy of the industrial nations.
- * The large projects of the aid industry are objects of great desire among members of the state classes in much of the Third World (cf. ASHOFF, 1988). They afford these new rentiers lucrative opportunities for personal gain to an extent that gives reason to speak of 'dictatorships for self-enrichment'.
- * The last, and possibly most important reason to sabotage the fight against poverty is political. Successful empowerment of the poor, self-determination, self-reliance and political participation would be tantamount to a social revolution. Nothing more, but — that is the fear — nothing less. For this implies a threat to the dominance and privileges of the state oligarchies; they react, understandably, with strategies to counter insurgency.

Summary:

What was once celebrated as a new start in development politics has widely degenerated into rhetoric. An unholy alliance of vested interests blocked far-reaching social reforms. The basic-needs approach was either not taken seriously or socio-politically 'castrated', and in this way "doomed to supporting and strengthening the respective status quo in the respective developing country" (HANF, 1980:12). The poor were not reached because no one wanted to reach them.⁴ Nonetheless, the fate of many millions of poor and deprived people cannot no longer simply be removed from the international agenda. And that is something.

5. Our common future

Poverty spread instead of contracting. The foreign debt of the Third World rose almost exponentially. And towards the end of the 1980s signs of a global environmental crisis — greenhouse effect, ozone hole — could no longer be overlooked.

Conventional growth policies had simply extended the cul de sac in which man was stuck. "And once we admit this we have to bury all convictions that have intoxicated our western civilization for the past two hundred years" (PICHT, 1973:45).

- * In principle, this model sees no limits to man's economic progress. It is rooted in a Judaeo-Christian ethic that teaches man can and must subject the earth. Any threat to the natural basis of life is beyond the horizon of a materialistic ideology of growth (ecological blindness).
- * The European industrial civilization is the measure of all things. Its values, virtues and techniques are standards worldwide — for better and for worse. In consequence, non-European cultures are in some way 'inferior' or 'backward', and their

cultural identities, if not yet destroyed, must be sacrificed on the altar of progress (eurocentricity).

These two assumptions of the European model are now being radically questioned by the concept of ecodevelopment.⁵

- * The orthodox view that unlimited economic growth is some sort of eternal law has to be qualified. Infinite growth in a world of finite resources is neither possible nor desirable. But general hostility towards progress is not called for either — there is little sense in replacing the myth of unlimited growth by one of zero growth. Instead of "Rambo economics" (E.U. v. WEIZSÄCKER), what is needed is sustainable growth: "Sustainable development is development that satisfies present needs without risking that future generations will not be able to satisfy their needs (OUR COMMON FUTURE, 1987:46). This is seen as the only means of ensuring humanity's long-term survival.
- * Consequently, the concept of progress underpinning ecdevelopment takes account of each region's specific culturo-ecological conditions. Hence, any practicable model of development has to be adaptable to the culture — in the sense of the collective memory of designs of living — potential resources and ecology of each and every region.

Development in this sense means the efficient use of existing potential in order to preserve the ecological system (the exogenous limit) and satisfy people's basic needs (the endogenous limit).

According to ecdevelopmentalists, the survival of "spaceship earth" (K. BOULDING) is threatened from two sources: from overconsumption in affluent and underconsumption in poor societies, indeed, more broadly: by two parallel calamitous developments.

"All evidence points to the fact that the present rich minority of the global population take for granted a level of affluence that in terms of resource consumption and environmental damage far exceeds the ecologically possible level for the total population" (HARBORTH, 1989:83). In other words, environmental damage in affluent societies is a cost of excessive growth and unrestrained demands for ever larger quantities of goods and services. "It is thus a consequence of materialism and acquisitiveness" (SIMONIS, 1990:118).

In Third World countries, however, most environmental problems are consequences of poverty, not affluence. If the poor are denied access to means of production (land, capital, education) they often have no alternative but to exploit the natural resources (common land, forests, fisheries) to which they do have access. Under such conditions poverty is a major cause of deterioration in the physical environment. At the same time, deterioration in the environment exacerbates poverty. Poverty stimulates population growth, which further burdens the environment; this in turn deepens poverty: the vicious circle closes. It is impossible for the majority of the world's population to ever attain to the rich minority's oligarchic levels of consumption. "Our present model for prosperity succeeds at the expense of the entire world, and cannot succeed for the entire world ... there are not enough resources for that" (E.U. v. WEIZSÄCKER, 1990:5).

The worst-case eventuality will become reality if, firstly, the affluent minority's oligarchic level of consumption continues to rise, secondly, the world's population

continues to grow, and, thirdly, the poor world continues to pursue catch-up policies of development. There are plausible predictions for all three variables.⁶

What is needed is a model for development that squares the circle: solves, on the one hand, the problem of overdevelopment and, on the other hand, that of underdevelopment — without causing the spaceship earth to self-destruct. "Thus, an essential element of a strategy for sustainable development has to be the removal of absolute poverty, that is, ensuring a floor of material standards for all and, if possible, a ceiling of standards for the affluent of this world" (HARBORTH, 1989:1).

6. Sustainable development and alternative life styles

In view of the sobering results of the worldwide development business, the demand for alternative models is now fashionable in all alternative circles. But: we do not know all the right questions, let alone the answers.

The extremes are still the growth optimists (IMF, World Bank, neo-conservative governments) and pessimists (tiermondial movements, environmentalists). The South Commission lies somewhere in the middle. Accepting the "developmental imperative" of "faster and sustainable growth", it propagates qualitative growth that raises the income of the poor and protects the natural environment (cf. BOSSE-BREKENFELD, 1990:6).

Adjectives like "sustainable", "alternative", "adapted" and "equitable" reflect the new emphasis on the quality of development; the naive belief that "progress got us into this mess, progress will get us out of it" is an unrecycled pot of message.

Consensus appears to be forming on the necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, conditions any model for "sustainable" development must satisfy:

- * The objective of any alternative development approach cannot be the maximization of abstract growth and productivity indicators but the satisfaction of elementary human needs.
- * Development means first and foremost empowerment of the world's poor. Protection of human rights, democratic freedoms and political expression are *sine qua non*: not "democracy through development" but "development through democracy" (reverberations from the imploding Red Empire are felt even in the Third World).
- * Alternative development must come 'from below', draw on people's initiative and self-organization, be self-reliant and ecologically sound. Ecologically sound development conserves existing ecosystems, preferentially exploits replenishable resources and applies 'gentle' technologies.
- * For lasting success, alternative development requires the mental transition from anachronistic national policies to a "global domestic policy" (C.F. v. WEIZSÄCKER). A new world order presupposes appropriate reforms of the international economy to permanently reverse the obscene flow of resources from south to north — from poor to rich — and facilitate global disarmament to spare people the choice between guns and butter. "Such suggestions may appear utopian against the background of present political reality. But if we are to work for coexistence among all peoples in dignity, freedom and justice there is no alternative" (DEUTSCHE BISCHOFSSKONFERENZ, 1983:5).

Finally, no global model for sustainable development can be realized without alternative living patterns in the industrialized countries. "The problem children of the world are ... the affluent societies and not the poor ones" (SCHUMACHER, 1973:101).

The scientific and moral debate on an alternative life style in the developed world ("live to stay alive") is only just starting. Hence, it is not surprising that suggestions range from fasting to feasting. New ascetics call for global asceticism, rationing, planning and controls. New hedonists propagate a new model for prosperity "because it is possible to reduce consumption of energy, water and minerals by one half or two-thirds ... without reducing prosperity" (E. U. v. WEIZSÄCKER, 1989:265).

What is wanted is a global order that ensures, above all, a future without force. Nothing more, but nothing less. "The snag with the alternative life style is that there is no alternative to the alternative life style. Whereas in our society it is at least possible to live an alternative style, in an alternative society it will not be possible not to live an alternative style" (v. RECUM, 1985:53).

But how to prevent a brave new world under eco-dictatorship? Perhaps it is enough to recall a simple fact: Europe has more to offer the world than the "pre-packed solutions" (I. ILLICH) of the technical and industrial age. From Europe the cry for 'liberty', 'equality' and 'fraternity' spread round the globe. Sometimes this is forgotten.

FOOTNOTES

1This does not deny their qualitative differences, above all in the realization of fundamental human and civil rights. The author regards the question of efficiency, currently dominating the discussion on the collapse of state socialism (command economy) in the Third World, as secondary.

2Cf., for instance Friedrich ENGELS: "Just as Darwin discovered the Law of Organic Nature, so did Marx the Law of Development of Human History: the simple fact, until now hidden under ideological overgrowth, that people first have to eat, drink, have a roof over their heads and clothe themselves before they can take part in politics, science, art, religion, etc.". Idem, *Das Begräbnis von Karl Marx*, in: *Der Sozialdemokrat*, no. 13, 22 March 1883, reprinted in: Karl MARX, Friedrich ENGELS, *Ausgewählte Schriften in zwei Bänden*, Bd. II, Berlin 1970, p. 152.

3It is ironic that the scientific advisory council of the Federal German Minister of Economic Cooperation should champion this vulgar Marxist position: "In view of the above-mentioned forms of absolute poverty, there should be little dispute that food, health, education and accommodation are basic needs. Hence, they are frequently referred to ... as 'hard basic needs'. However, by including 'soft basic needs' — e.g., immaterial basic needs — the concept of basic needs is unacceptably inflated and diluted. This creates the danger that, in the final instance, anything that can be thought even remotely desirable is declared a basic need, regardless of the *hierarchy* of needs that exists in reality. In view of the deficiencies in the fields of nutrition, health, education and accommodation there is much to be said for satisfying needs in these fields *first* before tackling others that rank higher in the hierarchy of needs. These latter also contribute to *living standards*, but they are not basic needs ..." (WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT, 1982: 300; [author's italics — G.B.]).

4The — conservative — counterargument that the poor in developing countries, like those in the industrialized countries, could not be productively mobilized can be empirically disproved: "It is wrong to see the poorest 10-15 percent in developing countries as an 'underclass', accessible, if at all, only at very high unit costs. *That may apply to many of the poorest people*

in developed countries; measures to raise the 'productivity' of the poorest may be unpromising where most such people are very old and alone, or addicted to alcohol or other drugs, or severely ill or handicapped in mind or body.

This is not the case for the most ultra-poor in the developing world. They are mainly young, members of big families, and able if properly nourished to participate in school and work. The poorest 10 percent in a rich country may, in significant part, require welfare services rather than productivity enhancement. The vast majority of people in India or Kenya are a potential resource, rather than a burden" (LIPTON, 1988:7).

5The concept 'ecodevelopment' was coined in 1973 by Maurice Strong, the first executive director of the United Nations Environmental Organization (UNEP), founded in 1972. Ignacy Sachs and Bernhard Glaeser in particular gave it substance (v. Bibliography).

6In its World Development Report the World Bank predicts that in the industrialized countries gross domestic product will grow at 3 percent per annum between 1989 and 2000 (WORLD BANK, 1990:16). The World Population Report of United Nations' Population Fund concludes: "The slow-down [in family planning — G.B.] has forced the United Nations to compile new forecasts for the world's population. In 1986 it forecast a world population at the end of the century of most probably approximately 6.122 billion people. Last year the figure had to be revised upwards to 6.251 billion people, an additional 129 million people (about the population of Japan)" (UNFPA, 1990:8). As for the policy of catch-up development, one need only peruse the development plans and programmes of the most populous Third-World states, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria.

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TELL IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT

Neue Publikationen zur Rolle der Schweiz im internationalen System

Tobias Bauer, Greg J. Crough, Elias Davidsson, Frank Garbely, Peter Indermaur, Lukas Vogel (Hrsg.), *Silbersonne am Horizont. ALUSUISSE — Eine Schweizer Kolonialgeschichte* (Limmat Verlag Genossenschaft, Zürich 1989), 279 Seiten.

Renée Roux, Linda Stibler, Ginevra Signer, Barbara Weyermann, Markus Mugglin, Lukas Vogel, *Im Windschatten der Apartheid. Schweizer Firmen und schwarze Arbeiterschaft in Südafrika* (Limmat Verlag Genossenschaft, Zürich 1990), 189 Seiten.

Jean Ziegler, *Die Schweiz wäscht weißer. Die Finanzdrehseife des internationalen Verbrechens* (Piper-Verlag, München — Zürich, 4. Auflage, 1990).

700 Jahre werden (nach offizieller Zeitrechnung) im Jahr 1991 seit dem Rütli-Schwur vergangen sein, und die großen Jubiläumsfeierlichkeiten, mit denen nicht nur die amtliche Schweiz der bäuerlichen Freiheitshelden um Wilhelm Tell gedenken wird, sollten auch im Ausland zur näheren Beschäftigung mit dem oft singulären politischen System unseres Nachbarlandes Anlaß geben. Nicht nur die innere Struktur der Schweiz, auch ihre Rolle im internationalen System und insbesondere im Nord-Süd-Konflikt muß freilich in vieler Hinsicht geradezu als ein weißer Fleck auf der politischen Landkarte gelten; die Zahl der einschlägigen Publikationen ist nicht gerade groß, und schon insofern ist das kurz aufeinanderfolgende Erscheinen der nachstehend rezensierten Bücher zu begrüßen.

In „*Silbersonne am Horizont*“ zunächst machen sechs Autoren dem in Zürich ansässigen Aluminiumkonzern Alusuisse „ein nicht bestelltes Geburtstagsgeschenk“; das bei aller journalistischen Aufbereitung materialreiche und detaillierte Buch ist somit in die Reihe der seit den späten 70er Jahren immer wieder vorgelegten „alternativen Konzernmonographien“ einzuordnen.

1888 — so der am Anfang des Buches stehende firmengeschichtliche Überblick von Peter Indermaur — hatten die beiden Schweizer Maschinenfabrikanten Huber-Werdmüller (Oerlikon) und Naville (Escher, Wyss & Cie) ihre „Schweizerische Metallurgische Gesellschaft“ mit einem deutschen Firmen- und Bankenkonsortium unter der Führung Rathenaus (AEG) fusioniert; erstere verfügte über das vom Franzosen Héroult entwickelte Patent zur Schmelzflußelektrolyse, letzteres über das nötige Kleingeld. Damit war der erste europäische Aluminiumhersteller (die Umbenennung in Schweizerische Aluminium AG/Alusuisse erfolgte 1963) entstanden, dessen Produkte — etwa in Form des allbekannten „Silberpapiers“ — weltweite Verbreitung erlangten. In enger Zusammenarbeit mit der Schweizer Armee (wofür die personellen Verflechtungen des männerbündisch ausgerichteten politischen

Systems der Schweiz sorgten) und unter Ausnützung der Aluminiumkonjunktur zweier Weltkriege sollte sich die Alusuisse zu einem der sechs größten Aluminiumhersteller der Welt entwickeln (Umsatz 1969: 2,1 Mrd. Schweizer Franken; in Österreich zählt das Aluminiumwerk Lenz zum Alusuisse-Imperium), eine Marktposition, die trotz eines Konjunkturreinbruchs Ende der 70er Jahre und einer folgenden „Gesundschumpfung“ gehalten werden konnte.

Schon in den 20er Jahren hatte die Firma mit der Exploration von außereuropäischen Bauxitlagern begonnen (in Französisch-Guyana). Die Übernahme zahlreicher aluminiumverarbeitender Betriebe in West-, Süd- und Osteuropa brachte auch einzelne Beteiligungen in Übersee, so etwa in China. Die Sperre des Bauxitexports aus Frankreich durch die Volksfrontregierung gab ferner 1935 den Anstoß zur Diversifizierung der Rohstoffquellen, wodurch Indonesien und der Pazifik in den Blickwinkel der Alusuisse rückten. Schließlich öffnete die Entkolonisierung der 60er Jahre auch den bislang von Frankreich und England dominierten afrikanischen Raum für Schweizer Interessen.

Tobias Bauer und der Sydneyer Ökonom Greg J. Crough gehen in ihren Beiträgen über die „Finanzgebarung der Alusuisse“ und „Alusuisse in Australien“ einigen der Geschäftspraktiken dieses transnationalen Aluminiumkonzerns nach. Insbesondere kann — trotz aller statistischen Unschärfen — ihre Analyse der sog. Transferpreismanipulation als ein Musterbeispiel dafür gelten. „Multinationale Unternehmungen bilden eigene Weltmärkte, innerhalb derer rund um die ganze Erdkugel ein firmeninterner Handel stattfindet. Besonders intensiv ist dieser firmeneigene Handel bei 'vertikal integrierten' Unternehmen, welche die gesamte Produktionskette vom Rohstoff bis zum Endprodukt in den Händen halten. Im Fall der Alusuisse, die wie alle Alumutis ein Paradebeispiel eines vertikal integrierten Unternehmens bildet, werden zwischen deren rund hundert Konzerngesellschaften unzählige Güter hin- und hergeliefert: Bauxit, Tonerde, Rohaluminium, Aluminium-Endprodukte, Energie, Elektroden, Patente, Dienstleistungen, Know-How. Für alle diese Lieferungen sind Preise ('Transfer'- oder 'Verrechnungs'-Preise) festzulegen. Wären Verkäufer und Käufer unabhängige Unternehmen, würde sich der Lieferpreis am Weltmarktpreis orientieren. Multis hingegen stehen 'jenseits des Marktes' und können über eine abweichende Festlegung des Preises beinahe nach Belieben Gewinne zwischen Konzernunternehmungen hin- und herschieben.“ (S. 92 f)

1985 hatte die für Australien offensichtlich nachteilige Preisgestaltung des Schweizer Konzerns (die von Alusuisse an ihr Tochterwerk in Gove bezahlten Preise waren in den 70er Jahren deutlich unter den Exportpreisen anderer australischer Firmen gelegen, wodurch sich eben auch Steuereinnahmen der Regierung verringerten) zu einer amtlichen Untersuchung geführt, die drei Jahre und heftige politische Auseinandersetzungen später in einem für Canberra günstigeren Liefervertrag für Tonerde resultierte. Zumindest teilweise hatte sich die australische Regierung somit durchgesetzt und eine Konfliktstärke bewiesen, die man etwa von Sierra Leone (ebenso als Fallstudie im Buch enthalten) realistisch wohl nicht erwarten wird können. Dennoch: Der von den Entwicklungsländern Mitte der 70er Jahre im Rahmen der „Neuen internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung“ geforderte Verhaltenskodex für Multinationale Konzerne hätte wohl auch — und dies wird gerade am australischen Beispiel recht deutlich — den wohlverstandenen Interessen von Industrieländern dienlich sein können.

Dankenswerterweise wird der Band durch einen Bericht über Arbeitsbedingungen, Arbeiterbewegung und gewerkschaftliche Aktionen im Alusuisse-Werk Chappis im Wallis von Frank Garbely ergänzt, der nicht zuletzt auch auf die Umweltschädigung durch den Konzern und die Bürgerproteste dagegen (den drei Jahrzehnte andauernden „Fluorkrieg“) eingeht.

Arbeitsbedingungen und Arbeiteraktivitäten in Schweizer Multinationalen Konzernen stehen auch im Mittelpunkt von „Im Windschatten der Apartheid“, des zweiten hier zu besprechenden Buches. Nach mehreren, heute zum Teil nur mehr schwer zugänglichen Veröffentlichungen über die schweizerische „Apartheid-Connection“² wurde hier nunmehr eine weitere, einen wichtigen Bereich zusammenfassende Publikation vorgelegt; sie dürfte nicht nur für Anti-Apartheid-Aktivist:innen, sondern vor allem auch für Gewerkschafter von Interesse sein. Unterlegt mit zahlreichen Fallbeispielen aus Schweizer Konzernfilialen (z.B. Everite) zeichnet zunächst Linda Stibler ein beklemmendes Bild spezifischer Arbeitsbedingungen unter Südafrikas Apartheid-System, geht dem Einfluß von Zwangsumsiedlungen und Homelandsystem, politischer Repression und Rechtlosigkeit, von Frauendiskriminierung und rassistischem Klima im allgemeinen auf die Verwertungsbedingungen der schwarzen Arbeitskraft nach. Verständlich wird daraus die eminent politische Haltung der nicht-rassistischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung, die sich über die letzten Jahre hinweg erhebliche Freiräume erkämpfen konnte, sowie die immer wieder geäußerte Forderung nach Sanktionen, hier: nach dem geordneten Rückzug multinationaler Unternehmen aus Südafrika.

Renée Roux, Mitarbeiter am renommierten „South African Labour Bulletin“ (ihre Beiträge wurden von Lukas Vogel übersetzt, der auch im vorgenannten Buch über Alusuisse mit einem Beitrag über den Aluminiumkonzern in Südafrika vertreten ist) beschäftigt sich im Anschluß mit der Politik der Schweizer Multis im Apartheidstaat; ihrer These zufolge würden sich diese politisch konservativer verhalten, gewerkschaftsfeindlicher sein und weniger langfristig denken als etwa die Multis aus den Vereinigten Staaten. Roux erklärt dies teils aus den spezifischen Bedingungen in den unterschiedlichen Branchen, teils aber aus dem in Europa geringeren Interesse an bzw. dem schwächeren Protest gegen die Geschäftspraktiken der transnationalen Konzerne in Südafrika. Umso stärker wäre an die Gewerkschaften der Schweiz bzw. — da es sich um ein generelles, auch Österreich betreffendes Problem handeln dürfte³ — jene Gesamteuropas die Forderung zu richten, den Kampf der südafrikanischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung gerade in der gegenwärtigen Phase der Auseinandersetzung um eine „Post-Apartheid-Gesellschaft“ (womit sich Markus Mugglin in seinem Beitrag beschäftigt) in wesentlich größerem Ausmaß als bisher zu verfolgen und zu unterstützen.

Einige der Hindernisse, die sich einer solchen Forderung stellen, werden von Jean Ziegler in seinem Buch über die Rolle des Schweizer Bankenapparats und seine konkreten ökonomischen (aber auch nicht-ökonomischen) Interessen namhaft zu machen versucht. Wie schon die 1977 erschienene Anklage des Autors gegen den „sekundären Imperialismus“ der Schweiz ist auch diese Schrift eher als engagiertes Plädoyer denn als akribische wissenschaftliche Untersuchung zu lesen. „Diese Bücher wurden in der Revolte geschrieben, sie wollen aufrütteln und die faszinierende, unglaublich komplizierte und vielfältige Gesellschaft analysieren und kritisieren, in der ich lebe, deren Produkt ich bin und an die ich immer noch glaube. Wenn ich

die Kette des Todes zerlege, die Vorgänge anprangere, die über zwischengeschaltete Nummernkonten, Börsen und lokale Diktaturen viele Millionen Menschen in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika zu einem menschenunwürdigen Dasein verdammen, dann möchte ich damit auch an der Befreiung des Schweizer Volkes mitwirken.“ (S. 195)

In dieser Eigencharakteristik des Autors scheinen dem Rezensenten zugleich Wert wie Dilemma des Buches enthalten zu sein. Natürlich ist es verdienstvoll, als Parlamentarier eine weithin immer noch ahnungslose Öffentlichkeit im „eidgenössischen Emirat“ auf die Rolle der Großbanken im internationalen Drogengeschäft hinzuweisen (im Kampf gegen das isolationistische Schweizer Establishment springt Ziegler hier auf die von US- und befreundeten Regierungen vorangetriebene Anti-Drogen-Kampagne auf⁴) und die Verwahrung von Korruptions- und Fluchtgeldern blutbefleckter Dritte-Welt-Diktatoren (der Autor beschreibt im einzelnen die Fälle Marcos, Duvalier und Mobutu) im Schutz des Bankgeheimnisses anzuprangern. Spektakuläre Entwicklungen auf innenpolitischer Ebene wie der „Fall Kopp“ geben zudem modellhaften Einblick in das Netz der personellen Verflechtungen, das hinter dem wirtschaftlichen Verhalten der Institutionen zu stehen scheint. Insgesamt also vor allem ein voll zu unterschreibender moralischer Aufruf, die Infiltration einer jahrhundertealten Demokratie durch das organisierte Verbrechen (S. 18) zu stoppen, geht Ziegler auf der anderen Seite jedoch nicht erheblich über die bereits von Dritte-Welt-Gruppen und Kritischen Aktionären zusammengetragenen Fakten hinaus. Nicht selten scheint (berechtigte) Empörung die Recherche, Skandalisierung die Gewichtung der belegten oder (wohl begründet) vermuteten Tatsache zu ersetzen. Jean Ziegler hat damit sicher ein wichtiges und angesichts der weltweiten Drogenproblematik auch aktuelles Thema in die Diskussion gebracht. Von einer zusammenfassenden Analyse des staatstragenden Bankensektors in der Schweiz und seiner Rolle im internationalen System sind wir gleichwohl noch weit entfernt.

Walter Sauer

ANMERKUNGEN

1Vgl. z.B. Peter Hans-Balz, Schweiz — Dritte Welt. Bibliographische Dokumentation (Adliswil 1975); Jean Ziegler, Eine Schweiz. Über jeden Verdacht erhaben (Darmstadt — Neuwig 1977); ders., Das Schweizer Imperium (Rowohlt-Verlag, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1982); Rudolf H. Strahm, Wirtschaftsbuch Schweiz. Das moderne Grundwissen über Ökonomie und Ökologie in der Schweiz (Ex Libris-Verlag, Zürich 1987), insbesondere S. 213 ff.: Die Schweiz in der Weltwirtschaft; Bernard Michael Gilroy, Die Schweiz im Spannungsfeld der Welthandels- und Strukturanpassungsprobleme, in: JEP 4 (1988/2), S. 33 — 45; Mascha Madörin, Urs Hänsenberger, Mark Schmid, Goldgier (Bern 1989).

2Vgl. Centre Europe — Tiers Monde (Hrsg.), Suisse — Afrique du Sud, Relations Economiques et Politiques (Genève 1972); Mascha Madörin, Laurence Baysan-Fehlmann, Bankenbeziehungen Schweiz — Südafrika (Bern 1983), sowie einige Beiträge in Madörin, Hänsenberger, Schmid (Anm. 1).

3Vgl. dazu Walter Sauer, Ein Update zum Thema: Österreichische Investitionen in Südafrika, in: Informationen über Multinationale Konzerne (1/1990), S. 25 — 28 (betr. Hämmerle).

4Eine Kampagne, die allerdings in vieler Hinsicht den Kalten Krieg zu ersetzen scheint: Waltraud Queiser Morales, The war on drugs: a new US national security doctrine?, in: Third World Quarterly 11 (1989), 147 — 169.

Andre Gunder Frank

HOLIER THAN THOU IN THE GULF: A CURSE ON BOTH YOUR HOUSES

Read My Lips: Remember Tonkin Gulf and the Ten Commandments

A Kinder, Gentler Presidency?

YOU MAY WORSHIP NO OTHER GOD THAN ME. YOU SHALL NOT MISUSE MY NAME NOR USE IT TO SWEAR A FALSEHOOD — the First and Third Commandments say.

When both presidents Hussein and Bush publicly invoked ALLAH / The LORD as they went to war against each other, they carried blasphemous cynicism to new heights — and not only via the satellite TV that showed them praying and at Church. For honest believers, it is difficult to know which of them is holier than thou and who does more violence to several of the Ten Commandments of the Holy Bible and their equivalents in Verses 151 — 155 of Chapter 6 in the Holy Koran. Both presidents take God's name in vain — or rather misuse it to violate several other Commandments of the Holy Bible and the Holy Koran. Among these are you must not murder, you must not steal, you must not lie, and you must not covet thy neighbor's house and goods. Is it not especially sinful to violate the first several commandments in a deceitful attempt to cover up the violation of the last one?

Already much video tape has been aired, ink has been splattered, and now blood is being spilled to cover THE BIG LIE about this war. However, only very little attention has been devoted to a few Biblical, Koranic and homely truths in this Gulf War. Yet many previous Crusades already have invoked the Name of God in a Just Cause Holy War against the infidel to cover up their earthly economic and political motives. The 11th and 12th century Western Christian Crusades did so in their commercial enterprises against the Muslim East. President Bush's 1990s crusade against Muslim Arabs is doing so again; and so is the Holy War Jihad against the infidels led by President Hussein. Both are guilty of blasphemy of the highest order. The Spanish Conqueror of Mexico at least recognized publicly that he went there for gold, and his Christian legitimizers at least observed that "the evangelical does not enter where there is no gold." [In the meantime, Africans observed from bitter experience that "in the beginning we had the land and you had the book; now you have the land and we have the book]. Now it is time again to read the presidents' lips! Where is the promised kinder, gentler presidency?